

United States Courts  
Southern District of Texas  
FILED

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Michael H. Milby, Clerk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
HOUSTON DIVISION

In re ENRON CORPORATION SECURITIES  
LITIGATION

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§ Civil Action No. H-01-3624  
§ (Consolidated)

§ CLASS ACTION

This Document Relates To:

MARK NEWBY, et al., Individually and On  
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

ENRON CORP., et al.,

Defendants.

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THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF  
CALIFORNIA, et al., Individually and On  
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

KENNETH L. LAY, et al.,

Defendants.

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**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION  
TO MOTION TO DISMISS BY BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION**

845

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**STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS**

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**LEGISLATIVE HISTORY**

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## I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL OVERVIEW<sup>1</sup>

In the face of a 500-page complaint alleging the largest and worst securities fraud in the history of the United States<sup>2</sup> in excruciating detail, every single defendant – Enron's insiders, Enron's directors, Enron's accountants, Enron's lawyers and Enron's bankers – has moved to dismiss. Some claim it is too detailed. Some claim it is not detailed enough. Everyone denies responsibility and not one defendant has seen fit to answer. Every defendant seeks to avoid accountability by raising technical pleading arguments based on the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("95 Act") which was meant to deter the filing of *frivolous* suits – which everyone knows, except apparently the defendants, this case is not. While it does appear that the 95 Act was successful, at least in this case, in deterring plaintiffs' securities lawyers from filing cookie-cutter complaints, it does not appear to have had the same salutary impact with respect to deterring defendants from filing meritless motions to dismiss.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Because any changes to the pleading requirements were not intended to prevent aggrieved parties from obtaining redress for their valid claims "courts still apply Rule 12(b)(6) principles to motions to dismiss securities class action cases." *In re Boeing Sec. Litig.*, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1166 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (collecting cases); *see also Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.*, 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). Consequently, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to plaintiff. *Scheuer v. Rhodes*, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); *Calliott v. HFS, Inc.*, No. 3:97-CV-0924-I, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4368, at \*8 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2000); *Zuckerman v. Foxmeyer Health Corp.*, 4 F. Supp. 2d 618, 621 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (Maloney, R.) (stressing that "the complaint is to be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff"); *Young v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co.*, 2 F. Supp. 2d 914, 919 (S.D. Tex. 1998); *Lawal v. British Airways, PLC*, 812 F. Supp. 713, 716 (S.D. Tex. 1992). "A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 'is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.'" *Calliott*, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4368, at \*7. Dismissal is appropriate only if it appears that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations. *Rubinstein v. Collins*, 20 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); *Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp.*, 818 F. Supp. 971, 974 (N.D. Tex. 1993), *aff'd*, 14 F.3d 1061 (5th Cir. 1994); *Calliott*, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4368, at \*3.

<sup>2</sup> *See* Coffee, "Guarding the Gatekeepers," *New York Times*, 5/13/02 at A19, referring to Enron as a "[m]ajor debacle of historic dimensions."

<sup>3</sup> While the banks all proclaim their innocence and insist that they acted properly, without conflict or corruption, and in accordance with normal commercial lending and investment banking activities, these denials ring hollow in light of the recent revelations of corruption on Wall Street. *See* Maria Vickers & Mike France, "Wall Street: How Corrupt is it?," 5/13/02 *Business Week* attached as Ex. 1 to plaintiffs' Appendix.

If it is "irrational" to engage in acts that violate the law, then it appears Wall Street is deranged. However, if it is irrational to violate the law because of the risk of financial loss and punishment that accompanies illegal conduct then presumably no one would ever violate the law and

Bank of America Corp. ("Bank America") denigrates the detailed Consolidated Complaint ("CC")<sup>4</sup> as a "puzzle pleading" that violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. But, the CC is of the same style and format sustained by this Court in *In re Landry's Seafood Restaurants, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, No. H-99-1948 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2001) – a decision defendants basically ignore – and in many other reported and unreported decisions. The "puzzle pleading" charge has been repeatedly rejected by courts which respect good faith efforts by victims of securities fraud to provide the kind of detail and individuality required by the 95 Act – especially in complex multi-party cases. As Judge Debevoise stated in sustaining a lengthy complaint against a public company and its officers and directors:

Defendants challenge the Complaint, claiming that rather than being a "short and plain statement of the claim" in conformity with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, it is "puzzle pleading" that fails to meet the requirements of Rule 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the "Reform Act"). ***The Complaint certainly is not short, but if it is a puzzle, it is meant for a child and can be assembled readily....***

*In re Honeywell Int'l Sec. Litig.*, 182 F. Supp. 2d 414, 416 (D.N.J. 2002).<sup>5</sup> In truth, ¶¶1-74 of the CC provide a relatively succinct summary of the CC, while the balance of the CC provides the detail required by Rule 9(b) and the 95 Act, thus satisfying plaintiffs' dual pleading obligations.

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acceptance of this after the fact rationale would provide all wrong doers from embezzlers to bank robbers to price fixers and sophisticated securities violators with a built-in defense.

Plaintiffs apologize for the length and repetition involved in responding to motions to dismiss filed by each of the nine banks sued as defendants. However, since the banks insisted, as was their right, to move to dismiss separately and because they have chosen to either ignore or grossly mischaracterize the allegations against them in the 500-page Consolidated Complaint – apparently in the hope that the Court will not be able to find and focus on those allegations – plaintiffs had no choice but to respond separately as to each of the banks and set forth in detail the ***actual*** allegations made against the banks in the CC. After all, plaintiffs are entitled to have the adequacy of their CC against the banks determined based on the ***actual allegation*** of the CC, not defendants' mischaracterization of them.

<sup>4</sup> All references to "¶¶\_-\_" are to paragraphs of plaintiffs' CC filed 4/8/02.

<sup>5</sup> All emphasis is added and citations and footnotes are omitted throughout unless otherwise noted.

Bank America<sup>6</sup> portrays itself as a victim of the Enron debacle – a financial institution that was merely rendering ordinary banking services to Enron when it became engulfed in the Enron conflagration. But this is not what is pleaded in the CC and what is pleaded is what controls in the motion to dismiss context. What the CC pleads – and what now must be accepted as true – is that Bank America is liable under the 1933<sup>7</sup> and 1934<sup>8</sup> Acts because it (i) sold Enron and Enron-related securities to investors via false Registration Statements; (ii) issued false analysts' reports on Enron; (iii) employed acts and manipulative or deceptive devices; and (iv) participated in a scheme to

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<sup>6</sup> Bank America is an integrated financial services institution that, through subsidiaries and divisions (such as Bank of America Securities), provides commercial and investment banking services and advisory services, including acting as underwriter in the sale of corporate securities and providing investment analysis and opinions on public companies. ¶104.

Bank America suggests we sued the wrong party. We think not. The alleged fraudulent scheme involved **both** Bank America's investment banking **and** commercial operations, *i.e.*, it is not limited to the actions of Bank America's securities subsidiary. Thus, because the liability of Bank America flows from the activities of both its commercial and investment banking operations, naming the parent corporate entity – which, after all, is legally responsible for the operations and conduct of its subsidiaries – seems appropriate.

Not only is Bank of America's argument inappropriate at the motion to dismiss stage, but plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged Bank of America's liability for its acts as well as the acts of its subsidiaries and divisions. Resolution of the issue of whether the parent corporation is responsible for acts of its subsidiaries is "heavily fact-specific." *United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc.*, 768 F.2d 686, 694 (5th Cir. 1985); *Burnside v. Sanders Assocs., Inc.*, 507 F. Supp 165, 166 (N.D. Tex. 1980), *aff'd*, 643 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Whether a subsidiary is a separate entity is a question of fact."). *United States v. Bestfoods*, 524 U.S. 51 (1998), actually states that in certain situations, where as here, "the alleged wrong can seemingly be traced to the parent through the conduit of its own personnel and management" and "the parent is directly a participant in the wrong complained of." ... [T]he parent is directly liable for its own actions." *Id.* at 64-65.

Similarly, in *Abbell Credit Corp. v. Bank of America Corp.*, No. 01 C 2227, 2002 WL 335320 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2002), plaintiffs named both Bank of America Corporation and Banc of America Securities as defendants seeking to hold both defendants liable for failing to disclose that Bank of America Corp. provided a credit facility to the company which issued the commercial paper plaintiffs claimed they were deceived into buying by Banc of America Securities. The court dismissed claims against Bank of America Corporation noting that plaintiffs' complaint "does not allege, and plaintiffs do not argue, that corporate formalities should be disregarded in this case." *Id.* at \*4. Also, plaintiff Abbell failed to allege direct involvement of the parent corporation in the wrongdoing. Here, by contrast, plaintiffs clearly allege that Bank of America Corp. – the parent was directly involved and should be held liable.

<sup>7</sup> 15 U.S.C. §77a *et seq.*

<sup>8</sup> 15 U.S.C. §78a *et seq.*

defraud and a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit on, purchasers of Enron's securities between 10/18/98 and 11/27/01 (the "Class Period").<sup>9</sup>

**A. Year-End 97 Crisis**

The fraudulent scheme and course of business involving Enron finds its origin in mid 97 when Enron suffered huge losses on British natural gas and MTBE transactions which called into question its trading and financial risk management statistics. Analysts downgraded Enron's stock and lowered their forecasts of Enron's future earnings growth. Enron's stock lost one-third of its value and Enron's executives' performance-based bonuses were slashed. Enron was determined to halt its stock's decline and push it back to higher levels. Enron knew this could only be accomplished by reporting stronger-than-expected financial results, thus enabling it to credibly forecast stronger future earnings growth. Unfortunately, Enron's actual business operations were not capable of generating such results. ¶8.

To make matters worse, in late 12/97, Enron learned that an entity it had established with an outside investor, Joint Energy Development Incorporated ("JEDI"), and had done transactions with to generate 40% of the profits Enron reported during 97 – had to be restructured, as the outside investor was going to withdraw from JEDI. This created a crisis. Because the outside investor in JEDI had been independent of Enron, JEDI had *not* been consolidated into Enron's financial statements *i.e.*, Enron did deals with JEDI as an independent party, recognized profits and did not carry JEDI's debt on its books. Thus, unless JEDI could be quickly restructured with a new, independent investor, ***Enron would have to wipe out all of the profitable transactions it had done with JEDI in 97 – put JEDI's \$700 million debt on Enron's balance sheet – and lose the ability to generate profits from similar such deals with JEDI's successor going forward.*** ¶9.

However, Enron ***could not find a legitimate buyer for the outside investor's interest*** in JEDI. So Enron formed Chewco – which Enron and an Enron executive (Michael J. Kopper ("Kopper")) controlled, to buy the outside investor's interest in JEDI. Chewco ***did not have an***

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<sup>9</sup> Due to the arguments by Bank of America at pp. 39-41 of its Memorandum, plaintiffs are no longer pursuing §11 claims on the \$225 million 7% exchangeable notes or the \$175 million in 8.375% notes.

*outside equity investor which was an independent third party. So, Barclays Bank loaned \$240 million to Chewco, requiring a secret guarantee from Enron. Barclays also loaned the money to two straw parties to provide for their purported "equity" investment in Chewco. Because Barclays knew that the purported equity investors in Chewco were, in fact, Enron "strawmen" Barclays required Chewco to support the purported "equity loans" Barclays made to the two "strawmen" via a \$6.6 million reserve paid to Barclays! Because there was no independent outside investor in Chewco, Chewco was required to have been consolidated with Enron and **all of Enron's 97 profits from transactions with JEDI should have been eliminated!** ¶10.*

By the non-arm's-length Chewco transaction at year end 97 Enron avoided a disaster by keeping the previously recorded JEDI profits in place, inflating Enron's 97 reported profits and keeping millions of dollars of debt off its books. Chewco was now also positioned to serve as a controlled entity which Enron could use to do non-arm's-length transactions with going forward, creating at least \$350 million in phony profits for Enron and allowing Enron to conceal millions of dollars of debt. *Having now created its template to falsify Enron's results, between 98 and 01, Enron, and other of its bankers would create other secretly controlled partnerships and entities and use them to generate hundreds of millions of dollars of phony profits while concealing billions of dollars of Enron debt.* ¶11.

#### **B. The 97-00 Successes – Enron's Stock Soars**

As Enron reported *better-than-expected year-end 97 financial results*, its stock moved higher. During 98 through mid-01, Enron appeared to evolve into an enormously profitable high-growth enterprise, reaching annual revenues of \$100 billion by 00, with annual profits of \$1.2 billion, presenting a very strong balance sheet that entitled it to an investment *grade credit rating*. By 01, Enron had become the 7th largest U.S. corporation and was consistently reporting *higher-than-forecasted earnings each quarter* and forecasting *continued strong growth*. ¶12. Enron extolled the success and earning power of its Wholesale Energy trading business ("WEOS"), its Retail Energy Services business ("EES") and its Broadband Content Delivery and Access Trading, *i.e.*, intermediation, business ("EBS"). ¶2.

Throughout 98 and 99, as Enron reported record profits and a strong financial position, Enron and Enron's banks – *including Bank of America* – stated (§14(a)):


- Enron's strong results were due to the success of all of its business lines.
- Enron had a leading position in each of its businesses. Enron had an extremely strong franchise position.
- Wessex Water would be accretive to Enron's business now and a \$20 billion business in five years. Azurix Corp. was becoming a major global water company.
- International projects would drive major earnings growth for Enron. The Dabhol, India power project would contribute to earnings in 99 and beyond.
- WEOS's business remained strong.
- EES was exceeding expectations for contracts and profitability. EES was adding billions in new contracts and would be profitable by 4thQ 00.
- Enron was optimistic about its broadband business. EBS was firing on track.
- Enron's tremendous competitive advantages enabled it to achieve strong EPS growth.
- Enron was very well managed and knew how to manage and mitigate risk. Enron had effectively used off-balance sheet non-recourse financing. Enron had a strong balance sheet. Enron was a master of risk management.
- No other company offered such impressive sustainable growth.
- Enron was hitting on all eight cylinders. Enron's outlook was excellent. Enron was very optimistic.
- Enron was a global powerhouse, with EPS growth to exceed 17%. Enron would maintain strong earnings growth for years.

During 00, as Enron reported record annual profits and a very strong financial position, Enron and its banks – *including Bank America* – stated (§14(b)):

- Enron's strong financial results were due to strong results in all operations.
- Enron had very strong momentum. Its trends were sustainable and would accelerate.
- Enron's business was booming. All its operations were gaining momentum.
- Investors were about to see breakout performance of EES and rapid growth and development of EBS.
- EES's new contracts and profitability were accelerating. EES had the potential to double Enron's size in a few years.
- EBS broadband trading was accelerating. The market was larger than expected, and would reach \$100 billion in a few years with 3%-4% margins.

- Enron/Blockbuster video-on-demand ("VOD") deal a "killer app." Unparalleled quality of service. Contract worth over \$1 billion. VOD to rollout nationally in 01. All components in place. VOD had solid technology and platform.
- Enron's WEOS merchant investments were protected through hedging.
- Enron had monumental earnings potential over the next five years. Enron was well managed and a pioneer in global energy. Enron was never in better shape. Enron was very optimistic about the continued strong outlook for the Company.
- Growth and strong earnings were why investors should buy Enron stock.

As a result of Enron's strong earnings, the positive statements about its business and the forecasts of continuing strong earnings growth, Enron's stock was a very strong performer and its debt securities also traded at high prices. ¶15. Enron's apparent success and forecasts of strong profit growth gave Enron and its bankers ready access to the capital markets by which they raised billions of dollars by selling newly issued Enron securities to public investors, using the proceeds to repay Enron's bank debt. ¶16. Enron's stock soared to its all-time high of \$90-3/4 in 8/00 and then continued to trade at or near these levels for months, as shown below (¶15):



However, the apparent success of Enron was an illusion – a false picture created by contrivances and deceptive acts – a fraudulent scheme and course of business by defendants that operated as a fraud and deceit on the purchasers of Enron's publicly traded securities. The fraudulent scheme was accomplished by, *inter alia*, Enron and several banks, including Bank America, which

pocketed millions of dollars a year from Enron – which by 97-98 had become the *golden goose of Wall Street*. ¶17.

Inside Enron there was a fixation on Enron's stock and doing whatever was required to generate the financial results necessary to push the stock ever higher. Throughout Enron's corporate headquarters in Houston were TV monitors that displayed the price of Enron stock. Inside Enron there was a saying that managers were to be "*ABCing*," meaning to "*always be closing*" deals to generate revenues and profits, even if the economics of the deal were suspect – a practice facilitated by a compensation system inside Enron for corporate managers and executives that directly rewarded them financially for *closing* transactions and placing a high (*i.e.*, inflated) value on them, regardless of the true economic substance of the deal, so long as the deal generated an apparent profit when "marked to market." ¶50.

Inside Enron, the pressures applied to corporate managers by the top executives to do anything necessary to enable Enron to make its numbers was widespread, as was the knowledge that Enron's revenues and earnings were being falsified. Former insiders have been quoted as saying "*[y]ou don't object to anything*" and "*[t]he whole culture at the vice-president level and above just became a yes-man culture.*"

But that culture had a negative side beyond the inbred arrogance. *Greed was evident, even in the early days. "More than anywhere else, they talked about how much money we would make," says someone who worked for Skilling. Compensation plans often seemed oriented toward enriching executives rather than generating profits for shareholders. For instance, in Enron's energy services division, which managed the energy needs of large companies like Eli Lilly, executives were compensated based on a market valuation formula that relied on internal estimates. As a result, says one former executive, there was pressure to, in effect, inflate the value of the contracts – even though it had no impact on the actual cash that was generated.*

*Fortune*, 12/24/01 (¶51).

*"If your boss was [fudging], and you have never worked anywhere else, you just assume that everybody fudges earnings," says one young Enron control person. "Once you get there and you realized how it was, do you stand up and lose your job? It was scary. It was easy to get into 'Well, everybody else is doing it, so maybe it isn't so bad.'"*

\* \* \*

*The flaw only grew more pronounced as Enron struggled to meet the wildly optimistic expectations for growth it had set for itself. "You've got someone at the*

*top saying the stock price is the most important thing, which is driven by earnings," says one insider. "Whoever could provide earnings quickly would be promoted."*

*The employee adds that anyone who questioned suspect deals quickly learned to accept assurances of outside lawyers and accountants. She says there was little scrutiny of whether the earnings were real or how they were booked. The more people pushed the envelope with aggressive accounting, she says, the harder they would have to push the next year. "It's like being a heroin junkie," she said. "How do you go cold turkey?"*

*Business Week, 2/25/02 (¶51). In fact, in mid-8/01, an Enron executive wrote Lay, telling him Enron was "nothing but an elaborate accounting hoax," and, in referring to the SPE transactions, which Enron's banks – including Bank America – had funded, that nothing "will protect Enron if these transactions are ever disclosed in the bright light of day" – warning "[W]e're such a crooked company." ¶51.*

By 97-98, Enron was a hall of mirrors inside a house of cards – reporting hundreds of millions of dollars of phony profits, while concealing billions of dollars of debt – inflating its shareholder equity by billions of dollars. Enron had turned into the largest Ponzi scheme in history – constantly raising fresh money by selling its securities or those of related entities, while appearing to achieve successful growth and profits. But, because Enron's reported profits were being generated by phony, non-arm's-length transactions and improper accounting tricks – including the abuse of "mark-to-market" accounting<sup>10</sup> to accelerate the recognition of hundreds of millions of dollars of

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<sup>10</sup> Enron engaged in several accounting tricks and manipulations to falsify its financial results during the Class Period. Chief among these was the abuse of "**mark-to-market accounting**" whereby Enron would compute the purported profit it would ultimately obtain on a multi-year contract, discount that to present value and recognize the entire "mark-to-market" profit in the current period. Enron misused and abused mark-to-market accounting **throughout its entire business to grossly inflate its reported revenues and profits**. In Enron's WEOS business this was done by assigning unrealistic values to wholesale energy transactions which inflated current period income. In Enron's EES business where Enron had no long-term track record to justify the use of mark-to-market accounting, Enron nevertheless consistently utilized mark-to-market accounting to record huge current period profits on long-term, highly speculative retail energy risk-management contracts which, in fact, Enron had no basis to project a profit on and in fact knew would likely result in losses. Finally, in Enron's EBS business – also a new business where Enron had absolutely no track record which would justify the use of mark-to-market accounting – Enron utilized mark-to-market accounting to generate hundreds of millions of dollars of phony current period profits in several transactions. Also, when reviewing those computations on a quarterly basis as it was required to do, Enron consistently **increased** the estimated value of the transaction even though subsequent data revealed **a reduction of the estimated value of the transaction, a practice known within Enron as "moving the curve."** ¶36.

profits to *current periods* from transactions in which Enron was only entitled to receive *cash over many future years* – Enron was cash starved. Yet to continue to report *growing* profits, Enron was forced to not only continue to engage in such transactions and accounting abuses, *but to accelerate the number and size of such transactions it engaged in*. This created a vicious cycle further exacerbating Enron's need to obtain cash from these transactions. To make matters worse, Enron had capitalized certain controlled entities it was doing phony deals with (*which Bank America or its top executives were helping to fund, via the LJM2 partnerships*), with shares of Enron stock and *had agreed to issue millions and millions of additional shares of its stock to these entities if Enron's stock price fell below certain "trigger prices" i.e., \$83, \$81, \$79, \$68, \$60, \$57, \$52, \$48, \$34 and \$19 per share and to become liable for the debt of those entities if Enron lost its investment grade credit rating*. Because of the "triggers" and the way Enron capitalized these entities, it was absolutely vital to participants, including Enron and Bank America or its top executives and the others in the fraudulent scheme and course of business that Enron's stock continue to trade at high levels and that Enron maintain its "investment grade" credit rating, otherwise the scheme would unravel. ¶¶18, 20.<sup>11</sup>

*Enron became completely dependent on maintaining its investment grade credit rating and a high stock price so that Enron could continue to have access to the capital markets to borrow billions in commercial paper and to enable it to periodically raise hundreds of millions of dollars of new longer term capital it needed to repay its commercial paper debt and the short-term loans*

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<sup>11</sup> Enron's investment grade credit rating was indispensable. As Enron's CFO stated in a 10/01 conference call, "*We understand that our credit rating is critical to both the capital markets as well as our counterparties.*" Earlier, Fastow stated to *CFO Magazine*, "*My credit rating is strategically critical.*" This investment grade credit rating gave Enron access to the commercial paper market – a market reserved for America's largest and most creditworthy corporations – so that it could borrow billions of dollars to maintain its liquidity and finance its capital-intensive business. Enron's access to the commercial paper market also meant that Enron's \$3 billion commercial paper back-up credit line, arranged by the lead banks (JP Morgan and CitiGroup) with Bank America as a participating bank *would likely not be drawn down upon*, thus limiting those banks' financial exposure to Enron. It also meant that Enron and its banks could easily sell debt securities to investors to raise long-term capital, using the proceeds to reduce short-term commercial paper and other bank debt. Enron's investment grade credit rating was critical to the scheme, as only Enron's insiders and its banks knew, because under the terms of the partnership/SPE deals, *if Enron's debt was downgraded to below investment grade, the debt of those entities would become recourse to Enron, which could cause the house of cards to topple.* ¶19.

*it was receiving from its banks – including Bank America – to sustain its business operations and so the stock issuance "triggers" would not be hit which would force Enron into a death spiral.* ¶20.

### **C. The Partnerships and SPEs**

To falsify Enron's reported financial results, Enron and its banks – including Bank America – engaged in a series of purported "partnership" and "related party" transactions with the entities known as SPEs. A public company that conducts business with an SPE may treat that SPE as if it were an independent entity *only if it does not control the SPE*. *And*, at a bare minimum, two other conditions must be met: (i) an owner independent party must make an equity investment of *at least 3% of the SPE's assets, which must remain at risk throughout the transaction*; and (ii) *the independent party must exercise control of the SPE*. ¶21.

In 99, Enron created, and then entered into numerous non-arm's-length transactions with, two *LJM partnerships (LJM and LJM2) which Enron secretly controlled*. *Enron then engaged in numerous non-arm's-length transactions – which were, in fact, manipulative or deceptive contrivances – with the LJM partnerships and associated SPEs, which inflated Enron's reported profits by more than a billion dollars – at the same time enriching Enron's CFO (Fastow) and Enron's banks or bankers who had been secretly allowed to invest in the LJM2 partnership as a reward for their participation in the scheme – by hundreds of millions of dollars. The reason for establishing these partnerships was that they would permit Enron to accomplish transactions it could not otherwise accomplish with an independent entity, by providing Enron with a buyer of assets that Enron wanted to sell.* ¶¶23, 29, 646-647.

One of the primary vehicles used to falsify Enron's financial results during 99-01 was LJM2, which Enron used to create numerous SPEs (including the infamous "Raptors") which then engaged in non-arm's-length fraudulent transactions to artificially inflate Enron's profits while concealing billions of dollars in its debt on terms so unfair to Enron that the deals would provide huge returns to the LJM2 investors. Because the LJM2 partnership was going to be so lucrative to investors in that entity *and provide exceptional returns to them as the Enron Ponzi scheme continued*, Enron decided that it would *allow certain favored banks or officers of the banks to secretly get in on*

**LJM2.** The LJM2 offering memorandum by which Enron (and Merrill Lynch which was to raise the LJM equity money) brought investors into the partnership – *which was not a public document* – contained an invitation to benefit from the self-dealing transactions that LJM2 would engage in. It stressed the "*unusually attractive investment opportunity*" resulting from LJM2's connection to Enron. It emphasized Fastow's position as Enron's CFO, and that LJM2's day-to-day activities would be managed by Fastow, and other Enron insiders.<sup>12</sup> It explained that "*[t]he Partnership expects that Enron will be the Partnership's primary source of investment opportunities*" and that it "*expects to benefit from having the opportunity to invest some \$150 million in Enron-generated investment opportunities that would not be available otherwise to outside investors.*" It specifically noted that Fastow's "*access to Enron's information pertaining to potential investments will contribute to superior returns.*" *In addition, investors were told that investors in a similar Fastow controlled partnership (JEDI) that had done deals with Enron like the ones LJM2 would do had tripled their investment in just two years and that overall returns of 2,500% to LJM2 investors were actually anticipated.* ¶25.

Enron and Bank America knew that because LJM2 was going to engage in transactions *with Enron where Enron insiders would be on both sides of the transactions, the LJM2 partnership would be extremely lucrative – a deal that was virtually guaranteed to provide huge returns to LJM2's investors as the Enron Ponzi scheme went forward.* ¶24. In short, the non-public offering memorandum was an invitation to join in the benefits of non-arm's-length self-dealing transactions with Enron – to loot Enron and join in the fruits of that looting.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> In fact, Fastow's dual role by which he could self-deal on behalf of the LJM2 partnership with Enron's assets was so important *that investors in LJM2 were assured that they did not have to make any additional capital contributions if Fastow's dual role ended.* ¶24.

<sup>13</sup> While Enron's publicly filed reports disclosed the existence of the LJM partnerships, these disclosures did not reveal the essence of the transactions completely or clearly, and failed to convey the substance of what was going on between Enron and the partnerships. The disclosures also did not fully disclose the nature or extent of Fastow's financial interest in the LJM partnerships. This was the result of an effort to avoid disclosing Fastow's financial interest and to downplay the significance of the related-party transactions and to disguise their substance and import. The disclosures also represented that the related-party transactions were reasonable compared to transactions with third parties when, in fact, they were not. ¶67.

*Enron's bankers and the top executives of those banks – including Bank America – were permitted to invest in LJM2, as a reward to them for their ongoing participation in the scheme – a sure thing for them.*<sup>14</sup> ¶25. *Bank America or its executives became the largest single investor in LJM2 – \$45 million – and were the largest single beneficiary of the bogus LJM2 deals with Enron, which looted Enron for the benefit of its Enron's insiders and its banks like Bank America. Thus, these favored investors in LJM2 like Bank America or its executives actually witnessed a series of extraordinary pay outs from the Raptor SPEs which LJM2 controlled over the next two years – securing hundreds of millions of dollars in distributions from the Raptors to LJM2 and then to themselves – cash generated by the illicit and improper transactions Enron was engaging in – i.e., the manipulative or deceptive contrivances – with the Raptors to falsify Enron's financial results.* ¶31.

From 6/99 through 6/01, Enron entered into numerous non-arm's-length transactions with the LJM partnerships. Enron sold assets to LJM that it wanted to get off its books on terms that no independent third party would ever have agreed to. *The transactions between the LJM partnerships and Enron or its affiliates occurred close to the end of financial reporting periods to artificially boost reported results to meet forecasts Enron and other participants in the scheme had been making.* For instance, near the end of the 3rd and 4thQ 99, Enron sold interests in seven assets to LJM1 and LJM2. The transactions permitted Enron to conceal its true debt levels by removing the assets from Enron's *balance sheet and, at the same time, record large gains. However, (i) as it had agreed in advance it would do, Enron bought back five of the seven assets after the close of the financial reporting period; (ii) the LJM partnerships made large profits on every transaction, even when the asset they had purchased actually declined in market value; and (iii) those transactions generated "earnings" for Enron of \$229 million in the second half of 99 out of total earnings for that period of \$549 million. In three of these transactions where Enron ultimately bought back LJM's interest, Enron had agreed in advance to protect the LJM partnerships against any loss. Thus, the LJM partnerships functioned only as vehicles to accommodate defendants in the*

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<sup>14</sup> Bank America says this allegation is wrong – but they do not contest it. Disbelief of the allegation is not permitted at this stage and we do have an adequate factual basis for the allegation.

*falsification and artificial inflation of Enron's reported financial results, while enriching the LJM investors— who were benefitting from the looting of Enron. ¶32. And the banks and bankers who were partners in LJM2, like Bank America, were not only knowing participants in the Enron scheme to defraud, they were economic beneficiaries of it – and of the looting of Enron.<sup>15</sup> Had the Enron Ponzi scheme continued to operate for the full life of the LJM2 partnership, Enron's banks - including Bank America - would have achieved the stupendous returns they were promised – measured in thousands of percent.<sup>16</sup> As it was, they made many, many millions. ¶31.*

One "hedging" transaction with LJM in 6/99 involved Rhythms NetConnections ("Rhythms") stock owned by Enron, *to "hedge" Enron's huge gains in Rhythms stock and enable Enron to create a huge profit. Enron transferred its own stock to the SPE in exchange for a note. But if the SPE were required to pay Enron on the "hedge," the Enron stock would be the source of payment. Other "hedging" transactions occurred in 00 and 01 and involved SPEs known as the "Raptor" vehicles. These were also structures, funded principally with Enron's own stock, that*

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<sup>15</sup> The returns to the LJM2 investors were huge – up to 2,500% on one deal and 51% overall *in the first year* of the partnership. *Skilling has recently told investigators such gargantuan returns were possible only because LJM2, with Fastow at the wheel, was defrauding Enron in the billions of dollars of deals it was doing with Enron so Enron could create false profits and hide billions of dollars in debt. N.Y. Times, "Enron Ex-Chief Said to Voice Suspicion of Fraud," 4/24/02.*

<sup>16</sup> After LJM2 was formed and Bank America and/or its top executives had secretly been permitted to invest in LJM2 to the tune of some \$45 million, Bank America continued to issue very positive analyst reports on Enron. Each of these reports contained "boilerplate" disclosures like:

We may from time to time have long or short positions in any buy and sell securities referred to herein. The firm may from time to time perform investment banking or other services for, or solicit investment banking or other business from, any company mentioned in this report.

*These boilerplate disclosures did not change after Bank America and/or its top executives became huge investors in LJM2, which funded repeated illicit transactions with Enron, to boost Enron's reported profits and/or hide billions of dollars of debt – providing lush returns to Bank America or its executives from the looting of Enron. The failure to disclose the LJM2 investments of Bank America and LJM2's transactions with Enron for the benefit of Bank America or its top executives or its other transactions with Enron to boost its profits or enable it to hide debt and made Bank America's "boilerplate" disclosure false and misleading and *concealed from the market the very significant and serious conflict of interests between Enron and Bank America which they knew would have cast serious doubts on the objectivity and honesty of those banks' analyst reports and disclosed that the banks or their executives had compromising ties to and serious conflicts of interest regarding Enron.* ¶29. Copies of relevant pages of a pre- and post-6/00 Bank America analyst report are attached as Ex. 4 to plaintiffs' Appendix.*

*were intended to "hedge" against declines in the value of certain of Enron's merchant investments. These transactions were not economic hedges. They actually were contrivances devised to deceive and circumvent accounting rules. The economic reality was that Enron never escaped the risk of loss, because it had provided the bulk of the capital with which the SPEs would pay Enron.* Enron and Enron's banks used these contrivances and manipulative or deceptive devices to inflate Enron's reported financial results. In 99, Enron recognized income of over \$100 million from the Rhythms' "hedging" transaction. *In the last two quarters of 00, Enron recognized pre-tax earnings of \$530 million on several transactions with the Raptor entities* out of reported pre-tax earnings of \$650 million. *These "earnings" from the Raptors' deceptive contrivances accounted for more than 80% of the total!* ¶33.

Hedging Enron's investments with the value of Enron's stock created an enormous and unusual motive for the participants in the scheme to keep Enron stock trading at inflated levels. This was because if the value of Enron stock fell, the SPEs would be unable to meet their obligations and the "hedges" would fail. This happened in late 00 and early 01. In 12/00, Enron's gain (and the Raptors' corresponding net loss) on these transactions was over \$500 million. Enron could recognize these gains – offsetting corresponding losses on the investments in its merchant portfolio – *only if the Raptors had the capacity to make good on their debt to Enron.* If they did not, Enron would be required to record a "credit reserve," a loss that would defeat the very purpose of the Raptors, which was to shield Enron from reflecting the decline in value of its merchant investments. ¶34.

As year-end 00 approached, two of Enron's LJM2-financed Raptor SPEs were in danger of coming unwound as they lacked sufficient credit capacity to support their obligations. If something were not done to prevent the unwinding of these SPEs, Enron would have to take a multi-million dollar charge against earnings which would expose the prior falsification of Enron's financial results and result in Enron's stock plunging, more and more of the stock issuance "triggers" in the LJM2 SPEs would be hit, and a vicious fatal down-cycle would kick in. Therefore, Enron restructured and capitalized the LJM2-financed Raptor SPEs at year-end 00 by transferring to them rights *to receive even more shares* of Enron stock, creating ever-increasing pressure on Enron and the other

participants in the scheme to support Enron's stock price. This artifice enabled Enron to avoid recording a huge credit reserve for the year ending 12/31/00. ¶35.

**D. Enron Energy Services ("EES")**

Enron and its banks (including Bank America) were telling investors that an area of tremendous growth for Enron was its retail energy services business – EES – whereby Enron purportedly undertook to manage the energy needs of corporate consumers for multi-year periods in return for fees to be paid over a number of years. Enron and its banks presented this business as achieving tremendous success by constantly signing new multi-million or even billion dollar contracts which allowed EES to exceed internal forecasts, and that this division had turned profitable in the 4thQ 99 and was achieving substantial gains in its profitability thereafter. ¶37.

The falsification of Enron's financial results was not limited to non-arm's-length fraudulent partnership and SPE transactions. However, EES was also actually losing hundreds of millions of dollars. This was because in order to induce large enterprises to sign long-term energy management contracts and "jumpstart" this business so it could appear to obtain huge contract volumes, Enron was entering into EES management contracts which it knew would likely result in huge losses. However, by the abuse of mark-to-market accounting, Enron grossly overvalued the ultimate value of these contracts and created greatly inflated current period profits from transactions which generated little, if any, current period cash, and which would likely actually result in long-term cash out plans and losses. As a letter written in 8/01 to Enron's Board by an EES manager stated just after Skilling "resigned"(¶38):

One can only surmise that the removal of Jeff Skilling was an action taken by the board to correct the wrongdoings of the various management teams at Enron .... (i.e., *EES's management's ... hiding losses/SEC violations*).

\* \* \*

... [I]t became obvious that EES had been doing deals for 2 years and was losing money on almost all the deals they had booked.

\* \* \*

... [I]t will add up to over \$500MM that EES is losing and trying to hide in Wholesale. Rumor on the 7th floor is that it is closer to \$1 Billion.... [T]hey decided ... to hide the \$500MM in losses that EES was experiencing.... *EES has knowingly*

*misrepresented EES['s] earnings. This is common knowledge among all the EES employees, and is actually joked about. But it should be taken seriously.*

**E. Enron Broadband ("EBS")**

Another purported growth area of Enron's business was its broadband services business – EBS – which consisted of constructing an 18,000-mile fiber optic network which Enron was supposedly building out and engaging in trading access to Enron's and others' fiber optic cable capability, *i.e.*, "Broadband Intermediation." Enron and its banks presented *both parts* of Enron's broadband business as poised to achieve and later as actually achieving huge success, reporting that its fiber optic network was being or had been successfully constructed, was state of the art and provided unparalleled quality of service, and that its broadband trading business was succeeding and achieving much higher trading volume and revenues than expected – *i.e.*, "*exponential growth.*" ¶39.

A prime example of the purported success of Enron's broadband content business was its video on demand ("VOD") joint venture with Blockbuster Entertainment, announced in 7/00. Enron presented this 20-year agreement as having a *billion dollar value*, that it was a *first-of-its-kind product* whereby consumers would obtain VOD content from Blockbuster in their home as if they were watching the movie on their own VCR (start, stop, rewind) and that this incredible advance in technology was made possible due to the *high quality of Enron's fiber optic network*. Abusing mark-to-market accounting and using an LJM2 SPE, Enron improperly recognized an astonishing bogus \$110+ million profit on this deal in the 4thQ 99 and 1stQ 00, even though the project was failing in its test markets because Enron did not have the technology to deliver the product as represented – and which could never have gone forward because Blockbuster did not have the legal right to deliver movies in digital format, the only format which could be utilized for VOD. ¶40.<sup>17</sup>


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<sup>17</sup> Just eight months after announcing this contract with great fanfare and just weeks after representing that testing of the system in four cities had *succeeded* and that the service was being launched nationwide, Enron was forced to abandon the venture. But Enron did not reverse the huge profits it had secretly recorded on this transaction, for to do so would have not only exposed its ongoing abuse and misuse of mark-to-market accounting, but also would have crushed Enron's stock at a time when Enron and the other participants in the scheme were desperately attempting to halt Enron's then falling stock price so that it would not fall below certain trigger prices. ¶41.

## **F. New Power**

Another example of how Enron and its banks falsified Enron's reported results is the New Power IPO in 10/00, by which Enron improperly created a \$370 million profit in the 4thQ 00. Because Enron controlled New Power and owned millions of shares of New Power stock, if Enron could take New Power public and create a trading market in its stock, it could recognize a profit on the gain in value on its shares by "hedging" that gain via yet another non-arm's-length transaction via LJM2. In the 4thQ 00, Enron desperately needed to create profits to perpetuate the Ponzi scheme. Enron did the New Power IPO – 27.6 million shares at \$21 per share in 10/00. Then, in a deal secretly structured with LJM2 before the IPO, Enron created a phony profit using an LJM2 SPE called Hawaii 125-0. CIBC (and several other of Enron's banks, including Bank America) made a "loan" of \$125 million to Hawaii 125-0, but received a secret guarantee against loss. Enron transferred millions of New Power warrants to Hawaii 125-0 and thus created a huge \$370 million "profit" on the purported gain on the New Power warrants. Hawaii 125-0 simultaneously supposedly "hedged" the warrants with another entity created and controlled by Enron called "Porcupine." To supposedly capitalize Porcupine, LJM2 put \$30 million into Porcupine to facilitate the so-called hedge of the New Power warrants, but, one week later, Porcupine paid the \$30 million back to LJM2 plus a \$9.5 million profit – leaving Porcupine with no assets. New Power stock immediately fell sharply, as the chart below shows:

**New Power Holdings, Inc.**



This collapse converted Enron's huge gain on its New Power equity holdings into a huge loss early in 01 – a loss of about \$250 million – which was concealed. ¶42.

**G. Enron's Access to the Capital Markets**

Enron required constant access to huge amounts of capital. For Enron to continue to appear to succeed it had to keep its investment grade credit rating and keep its stock price high. Enron's investment grade credit rating and high stock price could *only* be maintained by (i) limiting the amount of debt shown on Enron's balance sheet; (ii) reporting strong current period earnings; *and* (iii) forecasting strong future revenue and earnings growth. Yet Enron was able to achieve these ends only by pursuing an increasing number of phony transactions, many of which were accomplished by increasing the number and size of transaction entities which were supposedly independent of Enron but which, in fact, Enron controlled through a series of secret understandings and illicit financing arrangements, including LJM2 partnership. As a result of reporting strong earnings, the apparent success of its business and its future earnings growth forecasts, Enron had unlimited access to the capital markets, borrowing billions of dollars in the commercial paper

markets and by selling billions of dollars of Enron securities to the public. Enron and its bankers – including Bank America – raised at least \$10 billion in new debt and equity capital from public investors through numerous offerings of Enron securities or securities of related entities, thus raising the capital necessary to allow Enron to repay or pay down its short-term debt and continue to operate. The Enron offerings involving Bank America are shown below (¶48):

| <b>ENRON SECURITIES UNDERWRITINGS</b>   |   |  |
|---|---|--|
| <b>Banks Named As Defendants</b>  | <b>Date of Offering</b>                     | <b>Security Sold</b>   |
| <i>Bank America</i>   | 11/97                                       | \$250,000,000<br>6.625% Notes due 11/15/2005   |
| CS First Boston<br>Lehman Brothers<br>Merrill Lynch<br>CIBC<br>JP Morgan<br><i>Bank America</i> | 5/98  | 35 million shares of common stock at \$25 per share raising \$800 million for Enron            |
| Lehman Brothers<br><i>Bank America</i><br>CIBC  | 05/19/99                                    | \$500,000,000<br>7.375% Notes due 5/15/2019  |
| <i>Bank America</i><br>CitiGroup  | 08/10/99                                    | \$222,500,000<br>7% Exchangeable Notes due 7/31/2002   |
| <i>Bank America</i><br>Lehman Brothers  | 05/00                                       | \$500,000,000<br>Notes due 5/23/2005 and 6/15/2003   |
| Deutsche Bank<br>JP Morgan<br><i>Bank America</i><br>Barclays<br>CitiGroup                      | 02/01 (private placement)<br>7/01 (resales) | \$1,907,698,000<br>Zero Coupon Convertible Senior Notes due 2021, original issue date 2/7/2001 |

Some of the offerings of securities of Enron's associated entities involving Bank America are shown below (¶49):

| <b>ENRON-RELATED SECURITIES UNDERWRITINGS</b>                                |                         |   |
|--|-------------------------|---|
| <b>Banks Named As Defendants</b>   | <b>Date of Offering</b> | <b>Security Sold</b>  |
| Merrill Lynch<br>CS First Boston<br>Deutsche Bank<br><b>Bank America</b>     | 6/99                    | 38.5 million shares Azurix stock at \$19 per share raising \$370 million for Enron        |
| <b>Bank America</b>  | 7/99                    | 27 million shares of Enron Oil & Gas at \$22.25 per share, raising \$607 million          |
| CS First Boston<br>Deutsche Bank<br><b>Bank America</b><br>CIBC<br>JP Morgan | 7/01                    | \$1 billion 6.31% and 6.19% Marlin Water Trust II and Marlin Water Capital Corp. II Notes |

#### **H. Late 00/Early 01 Prop-Up**

In late 00/early 01, Enron's financial results began to come under scrutiny from a few accounting sleuths and short-sellers, who began to question the quality of Enron's reported financial results. While Enron, its top insiders and its bankers – including Bank America – assured investors of the correctness of Enron's accounting and the high quality of Enron's reported earnings, the success and strength of its business and its solid prospects for continued strong profit growth, in part because of this increasing controversy, Enron's stock began to decline. As this price decline accelerated, it put pressure on Enron's top executives to do something – anything – to halt the decline in the price of the stock as they knew that if that price decline continued and the stock fell to lower levels, more and more of the Enron stock "triggers" contained in agreements for deals with LJM2 would be triggered, *which would require Enron to issue over 100 million shares of its common stock to those partnerships, causing a huge reduction in Enron's shareholders' equity.* ¶52.

*In late 3/01, inside Enron it appeared that Enron would be required to take a pre-tax charge against earnings of more than \$500 million to reflect a shortfall in credit capacity of the LJM2-financed Raptor SPEs, which would have been catastrophic and exposed the scheme. Rather than take that loss and face these consequences, Enron "restructured" the LJM2-financed Raptor vehicles by transferring more than \$800 million of contracts to receive Enron's stock to them just before quarter-end, which permitted the participants in the scheme to conceal substantial losses*

*in Enron's merchant investments, keep billions of dollars of debt off Enron's balance sheet and allowed the Enron Ponzi scheme to continue* – while the LJM2 investors, like Bank America, pocketed the proceeds of the looting of Enron. ¶53.

During early 01, Enron continued to report record results and it and its banks – *including Bank America* – continued to make very positive statements (¶54):

- Enron's strong results reflected breakout performance in all business units. Enron was a strong unified business.
- WEOS had strong growth and a tremendous market franchise with significant sustainable competitive advantages.
- EBS intermediation was great. Broadband glut and lowered prices *would help Enron*.
- VOD was successfully tested and launched. Proven technology created enormous opportunities.
- All of Enron's businesses were generating high levels of earnings. Fundamentals were improving. Enron was very optimistic. Enron was confident growth was sustainable for years to come.

#### **I. The Impending Collapse**

By the Summer of 01, Enron realized that it would not be able to continue to sustain the illusion of strong profitable growth and that it would have to take large write-offs in the second half of 01 that, in turn, could result in a downgrade of Enron's critical investment-grade credit rating – an event that they knew would mean that debt on the books of the SPEs Enron did business with (and partnerships controlled by them), which debt Enron had assured investors was "*non-recourse*" to Enron would, in fact, become Enron's obligation. ¶55.

On 8/14/01, Enron announced that Skilling – who had become Enron's CEO just months earlier – was resigning, for "*personal reasons*." While this resignation fanned the controversy over the true nature of Enron's finances and the condition of Enron's business, Enron and its banks – **including Bank America** – lied to investors, telling them that Skilling's resignation was only for personal reasons and did not raise "*any accounting or business issues of any kind*" and that Enron's financial condition "*had never been stronger*" and its "*future had never been brighter*." They said there was "*nothing to disclose*," Enron's "*numbers look good*," there were "*no problems*" or

"*accounting issues.*" According to them, the Enron "*machine was in top shape and continues to roll on – Enron's the best of the best.*" ¶57.

**J. The End**

By 8/01, inside Enron management employees were complaining to Enron's Board that the fraud at Enron was so widespread it was out of control. In 8/01, two employees complained to the Board (¶59):

A. One employee wrote:

Skilling's abrupt departure will raise suspicions of accounting improprieties and valuation issues. Enron has been very aggressive in its accounting – most notably the Raptor transactions and the Condor vehicle. We do have valuation issues with our international assets and possibly some of our EES MTM positions.

\* \* \*

We have recognized over \$550 million of fair value gains on stock via our swaps with Raptor, much of that stock has declined significantly – Avici by 98%, from \$178 mm to \$5 mm. The New Power Co. by 70%, from \$20/share to \$6/share. The value in the swaps won't be there for Raptor, so once again Enron will issue stock to offset these losses. Raptor is an LJM entity. It sure looks to the layman on the street that we are hiding losses in a related company and will compensate that company with Enron stock in the future.

*I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in a wave of accounting scandals.... [T]he business world will consider the past successes as nothing but an elaborate accounting hoax....*

*[W]e booked the Condor and Raptor deals in 1999 and 2000, we enjoyed a wonderfully high stock price, many executives sold stock, we then try and reverse or fix the deals in 2001 and it's a bit like robbing the bank in one year and trying to pay it back 2 years later. Nice try, but investors were hurt, they bought at \$70 and \$80/share looking for \$120/share and now they're at \$38 or worse. We are under too much scrutiny and there are probably one or two disgruntled "redeployed" employees who know enough about the "funny" accounting to get us in trouble.*

\* \* \*

I realize that we have had a lot of smart people looking at this .... *None of that will protect Enron if these transactions are ever disclosed in the bright light of day....*

\* \* \*

I firmly believe that the probability of discovery significantly increased with Skilling's shocking departure. Too many people are looking for a smoking gun.

\* \* \*

3. *There is a veil of secrecy around LJM and Raptor. Employees question our accounting propriety consistently and constantly....*

- a. Jeff McMahon was highly vexed over the inherent conflicts of LJM. ***He complained mightily to Jeff Skilling ....*** 3 days later, Skilling offered him the CEO spot at Enron Industrial Markets ....
  - b. ***Cliff Baxter complained mightily to Skilling and all who would listen about the inappropriateness of our transactions with LJM.***
  - c. I have heard one manager level employee ... say "***I know it would be devastating to all of us, but I wish we would get caught. We're such a crooked company.***"... ***Many similar comments are made when you ask about these deals....***
- B. A second employee wrote:

One can only surmise that the removal of Jeff Skilling was an action taken by the board to correct the wrong doings of the various management teams at Enron. However ... I'm sure the board has only scratched the surface of the impending problems that plague Enron at the moment. (*i.e.*, EES's ... hiding losses/SEC violations ... lack of product, etc.).

\* \* \*

[I]t became obvious that EES had been doing deals for 2 years and was losing money on almost all the deals they had booked. (JC Penney being a \$60MM loss alone, then Safeway, Albertson's, GAP, etc.). Some customers threatened to sue if EES didn't close the deal with a loss (Simon Properties – \$8MM loss day one).... Overnight the product offerings evaporated.... Starwood is also mad since EES has not invested the \$45MM in equipment under the agreement.... Now you will loose [sic] at least \$45MM on the deal.... You should also check on the Safeway contract, Albertson's, IBM and the California contracts that are being negotiated.... It will add up to over \$500MM that EES is losing and trying to hide in Wholesale. Rumor on the 7th floor is that it is closer to \$1 Billion....

This is when they decided to merge the EES risk group with Wholesale to hide the \$500MM in losses that EES was experiencing. But somehow EES, to everyone's amazement, reported earnings for the 2nd quarter. According to FAS 131 – Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) #131, "Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and related information," EES has knowingly misrepresented EES' earnings. This is common knowledge among all the EES employees, and is actually joked about....

There are numerous operational problems with all the accounts.

\* \* \*

... Some would say the house of cards are falling....

You are potentially facing Shareholder lawsuits, Employee lawsuits ... Heat from the Analysts and newspapers. The market has lost all confidence, and its obvious why.

You, the board have a big task at hand. You have to decide the moral, or ethical things to do, to right the wrongs of your various management teams.

\* \* \*

... But all of the problems I have mentioned, they are very much common knowledge to hundreds of EES employees, past and present.

***On 10/16/01, Enron shocked the markets with revelations of \$1.0 billion in charges and a reduction of shareholders' equity by \$1.2 billion.*** Within days, *The Wall Street Journal* began an exposé of the LJM Partnerships, the SEC announced an investigation of Enron, and Fastow "resigned." In 11/01 Enron was ***forced to admit that Chewco had never satisfied the SPE accounting rules and – because JEDI's non-consolidation depended on Chewco's status – neither did JEDI, and Enron consolidated Chewco and JEDI retroactive to 97. This retroactive consolidation resulted in a massive reduction in Enron's reported net income and massive increase in its reported debt.*** Enron then revealed that it was restating its 97, 98, 99 and 00 financial results to eliminate \$600 million in previously reported profits and approximately \$1.2 billion in shareholders' equity as detailed below (¶61):

| <u>ENRON ACCOUNTING RESTATEMENTS</u>                      |               |               |               |                 |
|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|
|   | <u>1997</u>   | <u>1998</u>   | <u>1999</u>   | <u>2000</u>     |
| <b>Recurring Net Income</b><br>Amount of<br>Overstatement | \$ 96,000,000 | \$113,000,000 | \$250,000,000 | \$ 132,000,000  |
| <b>Debt</b><br>Amount of<br>Understatement                | \$711,000,000 | \$561,000,000 | \$685,000,000 | \$ 628,000,000  |
| <b>Shareholders' Equity</b><br>Amount of<br>Overstatement | \$313,000,000 | \$448,000,000 | \$833,000,000 | \$1,208,000,000 |

These partnerships – Chewco, LJM and LJM2 – ***were used by Enron and its banks to enter into transactions that Enron could not, or would not, do with unrelated commercial entities.*** The significant transactions were designed ***to create phony profits or to improperly offset losses.*** These transactions allowed Enron to conceal from the market ***very large losses resulting from Enron's merchant investments by creating an appearance that those investments were hedged – that is, that a third party was obligated to pay Enron the amount of those losses, when in fact that third party was simply an entity in which only Enron had a substantial economic stake. The Raptors***

*transactions with LJM2 alone resulted in Enron reporting earnings from the 3rdQ 00 through the 3rdQ 01 that were almost \$1 billion higher than should have been reported!*<sup>18</sup> ¶62.

By 11/28/01, Enron's publicly traded debt was downgraded to "junk" status. On 12/2/01, Enron filed for bankruptcy – *the largest bankruptcy in history*. Enron's publicly traded securities have suffered massive price declines, inflicting billions of dollars of damages on purchasers of those securities. ¶66.

As *Newsweek* has written (¶69):

In the late 1990s, by my count, Enron lost about \$2 billion on telecom capacity, \$2 billion in water investments, \$2 billion in a Brazilian utility and \$1 billion on a controversial electricity plant in India. Enron's debt was soaring. If these harsh truths became obvious to outsiders, Enron's stock price would get clobbered – and a rising stock price was the company's be-all and end-all. Worse, what few people knew was that Enron had engaged in billions of dollars of off-balance-sheet deals that would come back to haunt the company if its stock price fell.

*Newsweek*, 1/21/02.

*The key to the Enron mess is that the company was allowed to give misleading financial information to the world for years.* Those fictional figures, showing nicely rising profits, enable Enron to become the nation's seventh largest company, with \$100 billion of annual revenues. Once accurate numbers started coming out in October, thanks to pressure from stockholders, lenders and the previously quiescent SEC, Enron was bankrupt in six weeks. The bottom line: we have to change the rules to make companies deathly afraid of producing dishonest numbers, and we have to make accountants mortally afraid of certifying them. Anything else is window dressing.

*Newsweek*, 1/28/02. The rise and demise of Enron is graphically presented below:

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
<sup>18</sup> As huge as the 11/01 restatements of Enron's 97-00 financial statements were, they just scratched the surface of the true extent of the prior falsification of Enron's financial statements, failing to eliminate additional hundreds of millions of dollars of phony profits. ¶63.

# Enron Timeline

## 7/1/98 - 3/7/02

**Total Shares Sold By Defendants: 20,788,957 shares**  
**Defendants' Insider Trading Proceeds: \$1,190,479,472**

**Enron Stock Issuance Price Trigger**



## II. SUMMARY OF BANK AMERICA'S INVOLVEMENT AND LIABILITY

Bank America had an extensive relationship with Enron. It provided *both* commercial banking and investment banking services to Enron, helped fund Enron's key secretly controlled partnership (LJM2) and its illicit transactions with its SPEs, which enabled Enron to falsify its financial statements and misrepresent its financial condition – creating bogus profits, while hiding debt. Bank America or its top executives were permitted to personally invest at least \$45 million in Enron's lucrative LJM2 partnership as a reward to them for orchestrating Bank America's participation in the fraud. Bank America also sold some \$6 billion in Enron or Enron-related securities while making \$5 billion in loans or lending commitments to Enron. All the while, Bank America's *securities analysts were issuing 15 extremely positive – but false and misleading – reports on Enron, extolling Enron's business success, the strength of its financial condition and its prospects for strong earnings and revenue growth.* ¶782.

Bank America acted as an underwriter in selling \$500 million of Enron 7.375% notes – pursuant to a false 5/99, 8/99 and 5/00 Registration Statement. ¶¶612-641. This exposes Bank America to §11 liability under the 1933 Act – *non-fraud liability* – under which it is *prima facie* liable and can avoid liability only by bearing *its burden of proof* that it had, "after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe ... that the statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading," *i.e.*, the underwriter's so-called "due diligence" defense.

In addition to the false statements in the 7.375% note Registration Statement, Bank America also made false and misleading statements in a 2/99 Registration Statement used by Bank America to sell 27.6 million shares of Enron stock and in 15 analysts' reports on Enron, which helped to artificially inflate the trading prices of Enron's securities. ¶¶612-641. Such false statements are expressly made illegal by the text of Rule 10b-5, issued pursuant to §10(b) of the 1934 Act, which prohibits "*any untrue statement of a material fact*" by "*any person*" in connection with securities transactions.

Bank America's false statements in the Registration Statements and analysts' reports were also part of a wider pattern of misconduct by Bank America in which Bank America employed acts,

manipulative or deceptive devices and contrivances to deceive and participated in a fraudulent scheme and course of business – providing millions to fund Enron's secretly controlled partnerships and illicit transactions with associated SPEs to falsify Enron's reported financial condition and profits, disguising and thus concealing billions of dollars of Enron debt, all of which operated to artificially inflate the prices of Enron's publicly traded securities. This conduct is also expressly prohibited by the language of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5.<sup>19</sup> Bank America's sale of Enron and Enron-related securities, its loans to Enron and its analysts' reports on Enron are shown on the following graphic chart:

---

<sup>19</sup> False statements in a Registration Statement can create liability under both 1933 Act §11 and 1934 §10(b) and Rule 10b-5. *Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston*, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). The remedies provided investors under the 1933 and 1934 Acts are cumulative. *Id.*

# Enron Timeline -- Barclays Underwritings/Loans/Analyst Reports

**Total Shares Sold By Defendants: 20,788,957 shares**  
**Defendants' Insider Trading Proceeds: \$1,180,479,472**

7/31/98 - 3/7/02


Bank America Analysts  
 Enron Stock Issuance

## Summary of Barclays Bank Involvement

- Funded Chewco with \$240 million in 12/97, enabling JEDI interest to be bought out - requiring secret Enron guarantee and multimillion dollar deposit - preserving millions in phony 97 profits and hiding hundreds of millions of debt
- 98 loans \$500 million to Chewco/JEDI to finance further phony transactions to boost profits
- 98-01 Chewco/JEDI deals creating hundreds of millions of dollars of phony profits and hide billions in debt
- \$1.9 billion sale of 0% convertible notes in 2/01
- \$4 billion in loans and commitments to Enron

Hundreds of millions of dollars of phony profits created and billions of dollars of debt concealed via Chewco/JEDI deals financed by Barclays, supported by secret no-loss guarantees by Enron

Dollars Per Share



Class Period 10/19/98 - 11/27/01

According to the Supreme Court, §10(b)'s prohibition of "any *manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance*" necessarily encompasses any "*scheme to defraud*." In *Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder*, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Court referred to the *dictionary definitions* of §10(b)'s words, to find that a "device" is "[t]hat which is devised, or formed by design; a contrivance; an invention; project; *scheme; often, a scheme to deceive*; a stratagem; an artifice." *Id.* at 199 n.20 (quoting *Webster's International Dictionary* (2d ed. 1934)). The Court found that a "contrivance" means "*a scheme, plan, or artifice*." *Id.* (quoting *Webster's International Dictionary*); see also *Aaron v. SEC*, 446 U.S. 680, 696 n.13 (1980). Thus scheme liability *is authorized by the text of §10(b)*. Rule 10b-5 was adopted by the SEC to implement §10(b). In addition to prohibiting false statements, Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any person "*directly or indirectly*" to employ "*any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud*" or to "*engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates ... as a fraud or deceit upon any person*." 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5. See also *U.S. Quest, Ltd. v. Kimmons*, 228 F.3d 399, 407 (5th Cir. 2000).

In *Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States*, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), the Court observed that "the second subparagraph of [Rule 10b-5] specifies the making of an untrue statement of a material fact and the omission to state a material fact," *id.* at 152-53, but held that "[t]he first and third subparagraphs *are not so restricted*." *Id.* at 153. It held that the defendants violated Rule 10b-5 when they participated in "*a 'course of business' or a 'device, scheme or artifice' that operated as a fraud*" – *even though these defendants had never themselves said anything that was false or misleading*. *Id.*; *Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.*, 404 U.S. 6, 11 n.7 (1971) ("[We do not] think it sound to dismiss a complaint merely because the *alleged scheme does not involve the type of fraud that is 'usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities.'* We believe that §10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed involve a garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique form of deception. Novel or atypical methods should not provide immunity from the securities laws.") (quoting *A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow*, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967)). As stated by the Second Circuit: "*Not every violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities law can be, or should be, forced into a category headed 'misrepresentations' or 'nondisclosures.'*"

*Competitive Assocs., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath*, 516 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir. 1975). "Fraudulent devices, practices, schemes, artifices and courses of business are also interdicted by the securities laws." *Id.*

Thus, the Fifth Circuit sitting *en banc* held that a defendant who did not himself make the statements in a misleading Offering Circular could be held primarily liable ***as a participant in a larger scheme to defraud of which that Offering Circular was only a part: "Rather than containing the entire fraud, the Offering Circular was assertedly only one step in the course of an elaborate scheme."*** *Shores v. Sklar*, 647 F.2d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 1981). See *Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp.*, 817 F.2d 356, 363 (5th Cir. 1987) (Complaint alleging manipulations of reported financial results by two public companies properly alleged a scheme to defraud or course of business operating as a fraud as the effect was to defraud certain purchasers of Docutel securities in violation of 10b-5(1) and (3)).

The fraudulent scheme and course of business involving Enron ***was worldwide in scope, years in duration and unprecedented in scale.*** Wrongdoing of this scope and on this scale could not have been accomplished solely by the efforts of Enron's executives, no matter how dishonest or determined they may have been. Wrongdoing of this scope and on this scale required the skills and active participation of lawyers, bankers and accountants. It could not have happened otherwise.

The notion that *Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A.*, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), issued a broad edict that lawyers, banks and accountants are immune from liability for their participation in complex securities frauds is nonsense. *Central Bank* expressly recognized: "The absence of §10(b) aiding and abetting liability ***does not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from liability under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a lawyer ... or bank who employs a manipulative device<sup>20</sup> or makes a material misstatement (or omission)***

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<sup>20</sup> As pointed out earlier, the Court has previously held that §10(b)'s language "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" includes a "scheme to deceive" or "scheme, plan or artifice." *Ernst & Ernst*, 425 U.S. at 199 n.20.

*on which a purchaser ... relies<sup>21</sup> may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5.... In any complex securities fraud, moreover, there are likely to be multiple violators."* 511 U.S. at 191. A scheme to defraud often will involve a variety of actors, and investors are entitled to allege "**that a group of defendants acted together to violate the securities laws, as long as each defendant committed a manipulative or deceptive act in furtherance of the scheme.**" *Cooper v. Pickett*, 137 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1998); accord *SEC v. First Jersey Sec.*, 101 F.3d 1450, 1471 (2d Cir. 1996).

*Central Bank* denied recovery to victims of an alleged securities fraud who pleaded **only one theory of recovery** against a bank defendant – "secondary" liability they dubbed "aiding and abetting." 511 U.S. at 191. However, neither the words aiding and abetting nor any other language encompassing aiding and abetting appear in §10(b) or Rule 10b-5. The Court said "**[T]he text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid and abet a §10(b) violation [and] that conclusion resolves the case.**" *Id.* at 177. The *Central Bank* plaintiffs did not, as the plaintiffs here do, plead or pursue recovery under the theory that the bank defendants – including Bank America (i) made false and misleading statements in Registration Statements where the bank acted as underwriter in selling securities or other documents the bank issued to the public, e.g., analysts' reports **or** (ii) employed acts, manipulative or deceptive devices and contrivances **or** (iii) engaged in a fraudulent scheme or course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit on purchasers of the securities in issue. In the words of the Court, the plaintiffs "**concede that Central Bank did not commit a manipulative or deceptive act within the meaning of §10(b).**" *Id.* at 191. Plaintiffs here make no such concession. Thus, because the *Central Bank* plaintiffs made fatal concessions and pursued a theory of recovery which found **no support in the text of either the statute or the rule, they lost.**

*Central Bank* cannot mean that a defendant cannot be liable under §10(b) unless the defendants it says made misleading statements because the Court later rejected that argument in *United States v. O'Hagan*, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). The Eighth Circuit had held that, under *Central*

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<sup>21</sup> Because this action's 1934 Act claims are "fraud-on-the-market" claims, reliance is established, *i.e.*, presumed, based on the materiality of false representations to the market, subject to defendants' right to rebut that presumption. *Basic Inc. v. Levinson*, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988); *Summit Props. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.*, 214 F.3d 556, 561 (5th Cir. 2000), *cert. denied*, 531 U.S. 1132 (2001); *Fine v. Am. Solar King Corp.*, 919 F.2d 290, 298 (5th Cir. 1990).

Bank, "§10(b) covers *only deceptive statements or omissions on which purchasers and sellers ... rely.*" *Id.* at 664. The Court reversed, holding that §10(b) does not require a defendant to speak. *Id.* Because §10(b) prohibits "*any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance*" in contravention of SEC rules and this reaches "any deceptive device," whether or not the defendant spoke. *Id.* at 653. *Bankers Life*, 404 U.S. 6, is consistent with *O'Hagan*. In *Superintendent of Ins.*, a *unanimous* Court upheld a §10b/Rule 10b-5 complaint involving a "*fraudulent scheme*" involving the sale of securities where *no* false statement was alleged because:

*There certainly was an "act" or "practice" within the meaning of Rule 10b-5 which operated as "a fraud or deceit" on Manhattan, the seller of the Government bonds.*

*Id.* at 9.

This court has repeatedly stated:

*A defendant need not have made a false or misleading statement to be liable.*

*Landry's*, slip op. at 9 n.12; *In re Waste Mgmt, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, No. H-99-2183, slip op. at 75 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2001);<sup>22</sup> *In re Sec. Litig. BMC Software, Inc.*, 183 F. Supp. 2d 860, 869 (S.D. Tex. 2001). *So while making false statements is not indispensable to §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability, here Bank America allegedly made numerous false and misleading statements in Registration Statements and analysts' reports.* Thus even if the "bright line" liability test for §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability Bank American claims exists did exist, Bank America would be liable under that test here.

That this reading of §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 is clearly correct is shown by a new *unanimous* Supreme Court decision – *SEC v. Zandford*, \_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_, No. 01-147, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4023 (June 3, 2002). In *Zandford*, the Court repeatedly cited with approval its seminal "*fraudulent scheme*" case *Superintendent of Ins.*, and reversed dismissal of a §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 complaint making the following key points:

- "*The scope of Rule 10b-5 is coextensive with the coverage of §10(b) ....*" *Id.* at \*7 n.1.

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<sup>22</sup> Due to the length of these opinions, and the fact the Court has access to them, they have not been attached to this brief.

- "[N]either the SEC nor this Court has ever held that there must be a misrepresentation about the value of a particular security" to violate §10(b). *Id.* at \*13.<sup>23</sup>
- Allegations that defendant "engaged in a fraudulent scheme" or "course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit" stated a §10(b) claim. *Id.* at \*13, \*14-17.

*Central Bank* clearly – **but merely** – stands for the proposition that no aiding and abetting liability exists under the 1934 Act because neither §10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 contain language encompassing "aiding and abetting." The decision in *Central Bank* is actually **quite narrow**. By contrast, the language of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is **very broad** and the purposes of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are remedial, intended to provide access to federal court to persons victimized in fraudulent securities transactions:

[T]he 1934 Act and its companion legislative enactments [including the 1933 Act] embrace a "fundamental purpose ... to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of *caveat emptor* and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry." ... Congress intended securities legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes."

*Affiliated Ute Citizens*, 406 U.S. at 151. As noted by the Fifth Circuit:

[T]he Court has concluded that the Exchange Act and the Securities Act should be **construed broadly to effectuate the statutory policy affording extensive protection to the investing public**. See *Tcherepnin*, 389 U.S. at 336, 88 S. Ct. at 553. See also S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong. 1st Sess. 1 (1933) (**indicating legislative intent of the Securities Act to protect the public from the sale of fraudulent and speculative schemes**).

*Meason v. Bank of Miami*, 652 F.2d 542, 549 (5th Cir. 1981). "**The federal securities statutes are remedial legislation and must be construed broadly, not technically and restrictively.**" *Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank*, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980).

Here, Bank America did it all. Bank America made false statements in Registration Statements where Bank America sold Enron and Enron-related securities **and** in Bank America's analysts' reports on Enron. And Bank America employed specified acts, manipulative or deceptive devices and contrivances to help falsify Enron's finances and which were essential to the ongoing fraudulent scheme and course of business. In short, in order to pocket billions of dollars of fees,

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<sup>23</sup> To the extent *Ziamba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc.*, 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001), seems to require a statement be made about a company which is "publicly attributable to the defendant at the time the plaintiff's investment decision was made," it is inconsistent with *Zandford*.

commissions, interest and other charges – profits from its investment in the fraudulent scheme and course of business – Bank America facilitated, furthered and participated in the fraud. All of these activities directly contravened prohibitions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Bank America was not an unwitting victim of the fraud involving Enron – *it was an active perpetrator of and participant in that fraud. Thus, Bank America's alleged liability is "primary" and not "secondary."*

Not only does the CC assert viable legal theories of recovery against Bank America under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, it also pleads *in detail* why the statements made by Bank America were false when made and why Bank America *knew or recklessly disregarded that those statements were false* thus satisfying the two-pronged pleading standard, *i.e.*, "falsity" and "scienter" of the 95 Act as applicable to the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. §78u-4.

The Registration Statements Bank America used to sell 27.6 million shares of Enron stock in 2/99, \$500 million of 7.375% Enron notes in 5/99, \$222 million 7% Enron exchangeable notes in 8/99 and \$500 million in 7.875% and 8.375% Enron notes in 5/00, contained Enron's false annual and interim financial results and false statements concerning the structures of and Enron's relationship to SPEs and related parties, Enron's financial risk management statistics, as well as the condition of Enron's business operations and the value of its assets. *See infra* at 91-92. The 15 Bank America analysts' reports on Enron issued between 9/99-10/01 also contained false statements about Enron's financial results and financial condition and the success of Enron's EES and EBS businesses. *See infra* at 75-90. Thus, the allegedly false statements made by Bank America are *quoted, specified by date, and the reasons the statements were false when made are pleaded*, satisfying the PSLRA's "falsity" pleading requirement.

Bank America's scienter, *i.e.*, its "required state of mind" is also well pleaded.<sup>24</sup> The CC explains how due to the close involvement of Bank America top executives and commercial and investment bankers with Enron, in lending, deal-making and other activities, Bank America knew of the falsity of the statements it was making in Registration Statements and analysts' reports concerning Enron. *See infra* at §VII. The CC also details specific fraudulent Enron transactions

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<sup>24</sup> Scienter is only required for the 1934 Act claims. Bank America's 1933 Act liability requires no showing of fraud, intent or knowledge. 15 U.S.C. §77k; *Landry's*, slip op. at 11 n.13, 65.

Bank America participated in which were intentionally deceptive acts or manipulative contrivances to deceive – falsifying Enron's publicly reported financial results and financial condition and making Enron's business appear to be successful when it was not. These include Bank America's participation in the LJM2 partnership, where during 00-01, Bank America or its executives provided \$45 million to help fund LJM2 so it could participate in the looting of Enron via billions of dollars worth of non-arm's-length fraudulent transactions with Enron which also artificially boosted its profits during 99-01, while hiding billions of dollars of debt that should have been reported on Enron's balance sheet. *See id.*

In addition to Bank America's knowledge of the fraud and intentional involvement in many of Enron's deceptive and fraudulent transactions, the CC details Bank America's motive and opportunity<sup>25</sup> to engage and participate in the fraudulent scheme and course of business. Bank America was reaping huge amounts of money from the scheme. Also, Bank America or *top Bank America officials had been rewarded by being allowed to get in on LJM2 and thus reaping huge returns<sup>26</sup> as secret investors in the LJM2 partnership, unusually profitable returns generated by that entity's illicit deals with Enron SPEs – transactions Bank America knew would collapse if Enron's stock fell through the equity issuance trigger prices embedded in those LJM2/SPE deals.* Bank America had *powerful incentives for Bank America to take steps to not only keep Enron solvent, but to maintain its coveted investment grade credit rating* which provided Enron access to the commercial paper market. Bank America had made and was making hundreds of millions of dollars from the fraudulent scheme involving Enron and Enron's fraudulent course of business and stood to continue to make hundreds of millions more *if it could be sustained – and to lose a bundle*

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<sup>25</sup> By selling Enron and Enron-related securities via SEC filed Registration Statements and issuing analysts' reports on Enron and helping structure and finance Enron's illicit partnerships and their related SPE transactions, Bank America had plenty of opportunity to mislead investors and advance the fraud as well.

<sup>26</sup> The returns to the LJM2 investors were huge – up to 2,500% on one deal and 51% overall *in the first year* of the partnership. *Skilling has recently told investigators such gargantuan returns were possible only because LJM2, with Fastow at the wheel, was defrauding Enron in the billions of dollars of deals it was doing with Enron so Enron could create false profits and hide billions of dollars in debt.* *N.Y. Times*, "Enron Ex-Chief Said to Voice Suspicion of Fraud," 4/24/02.

*if the scheme was discovered, unraveled or came to an end.* Bank America had plenty of motive to defraud Enron's investors.

Thus, as to Bank America, the CC pleads 1933 Act §11 non-fraud liability and 1934 Act **"primary liability" based on legal theories** of recovery rooted in the express language of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and pleads the facts in **sufficient detail** to satisfy the "falsity" and "scienter" prongs of the PSLRA's pleading standard applicable to the 1934 Act.

And, in fact, many courts have upheld complaints against banks in §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 cases where, as here, false statements, manipulative or deceptive devices, contrivances and acts, and participation in a scheme to defraud have been alleged with sufficient particularity. *Cooper*, 137 F.3d at 628 (Scheme liability survived *Central Bank*. Allegations that the investment bank defendants had issued analysts' reports knowing them to be false due to their **"access to inside information"** stated a valid §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim); *In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig.*, 174 F. Supp. 2d 144, 150-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (Complaint alleging investment bank made disguised loan to Livent enabling Livent to falsify financial condition, while selling securities to public states valid §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claims); *Murphy v. Hollywood Entm't Corp.*, No. 95-1926-MA, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22207 (D. Or. May 9, 1996) and *Flecker v. Hollywood Entm't Corp.*, No. 95-1926-MA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5329, at \*25 (D. Or. Feb. 12 1997) (Refused to dismiss complaint or grant summary judgment to banks, stating that their **"roles as analysts, investment bankers and business advisors with extensive contacts with [issuer] defendants, superior access to nonpublic information and participation in both drafting and decision-making is sufficient to establish triable primary liability claims under 10(b)."**); *In re Cascade Int'l Sec. Litig.*, 840 F. Supp. 1558, 1568 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (Allegations that a securities broker issued false reports on company which made exaggerated predictions while ignoring "red flags" adequately pleaded recklessness); *McNamara v. Bre-X-Minerals Ltd.*, No. 5:97-CV-159, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4571, at \*166 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2001) (Denied motion to dismiss by J.P. Morgan based on allegations it participated in a scheme to violate §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 by helping to structure fraudulent business transactions, acting as Bre-X's financial advisor, and issuing false analysts' reports, while ignoring "red flags"). See also *SEC v. U.S. Envtl., Inc.*, 155 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1998) (while there is no aiding and

abetting, where complaint properly alleged defendant to be primary violator because he "**participated in the fraudulent scheme,**" noting "**lawyers, accountants, and banks who engage in fraudulent or deceptive** practices at their client's direction [are] a primary violator"); *Scholnick v. Continental Bank*, 752 F. Supp. 1317, 1323 & n.9 (E.D. Mich. 1990) ("bank ... may still be held liable under Rule 10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c) as a participant in the allegedly fraudulent scheme" and "allegations that Continental was directly involved in perpetrating a fraudulent scheme distinguish" case from situation where bank was only engaging in a "routine commercial financing transaction"). The CC in this action pleads more wrongful conduct by Bank America vis-à-vis the fraudulent scheme involving Enron and with more specificity than was pleaded in any of the above cases where complaints naming banks as defendants in §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 actions were upheld.

Of course, as with most fraudulent schemes, the scheme to falsify Enron's finances and inflate the prices of its securities – and sustain its fraudulent course of business – ultimately collapsed from the accumulated weight of years of deceit and deception. But the fact that the scheme ultimately collapsed in late 01 is of little legal moment. It had succeeded for years, enriching the perpetrators to the tune of billions of dollars. Securities violators frequently find themselves involved in complicated schemes by which financial reports are manipulated, securities prices are inflated, new securities are sold to the public and yet, despite all their efforts to perpetuate the wrongdoing, the scheme ultimately collapses and their participation is disclosed. But participants in fraudulent schemes – especially Ponzi securities schemes like Enron – expect them to succeed and take action to help them **continue to succeed, as they gain more profits from the scheme as long as it continues**. Thus, it is not irrational, as Bank America contends, for it to have engaged in a scheme where it was making huge profits. The fact that such complex schemes may ultimately fail – and the perpetrators may **then** suffer some loss – in no way shields them from liability for the damage inflicted on the victims of their unlawful conduct while the scheme was succeeding. In the end it is the public investors in a situation like Enron – the people and pension funds who invested **billions of dollars to purchase newly-issued Enron securities to purchase the publicly traded securities of Enron at inflated prices that are left holding the bag. They are the ones who are truly damaged**. And the federal securities laws are supposed to protect them.

The important remedial purposes of investor suits under the anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act were *ratified by Congress when it enacted the 95 Act*:

The overriding purpose of our Nation's securities laws is to protect investors and to maintain confidence in the securities markets, so that our national savings, capital formation and investment may grow for the benefit of all Americans.

... Private securities litigation is an indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely upon government action. Such private lawsuits promote public and global confidence in our capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing and to guarantee that *corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others properly perform their jobs....*

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), *reprinted in* 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 730. Certainly the 95 Act's pleading requirements must be applied and interpreted with these important principles in mind.

It is an unfortunate reality that the worst securities frauds create the most difficult situations for the victims.<sup>27</sup> The issuer (here Enron) goes bankrupt – and is *shielded from liability*. Whatever directors' and officers' liability insurance policies exist (here some \$350 million) *are impaired* – as the carriers can claim that they were defrauded into issuing the policies by the issuer's false financial statements. Here, the situation is further exacerbated by the fact that Andersen, which played a significant role in the fraud, is financially impecunious and able to pay only a fraction of the damages suffered by the victims.

If Enron investors are to achieve any significant recovery here, in what is acknowledged to be the largest and worst financial fraud in U.S. history, it will only be because our nation's securities laws permit these victims to hold accountable *securities professionals like banks and lawyers, who are supposed to safeguard the public in securities transactions, for their misconduct in employing acts and contrivances to deceive and participating in a scheme to defraud and a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit on those purchasers of Enron's securities*. As one man's deep pocket is another's legitimate defendant. If our Nation's securities laws do not provide an opportunity for the thousands of investors in Enron – what appeared to be a hugely successful public company earning a billion dollars of profit a year – to pursue Enron's bankers and lawyers who

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<sup>27</sup> For instance, *Equity Funding, U.S. Financial, Lincoln Savings, Washington Public Power Supply Systems* and *Global Crossing*.

allegedly engaged and participated in the fraudulent scheme and course of business that will make a mockery of the investor protection purposes of our securities laws. To put it bluntly, if the PSLRA's enhanced pleading standard combined with the Court's decision in *Central Bank* operate to shield the banks named as defendants here from even having to answer the complaint and defend the allegations on the merits, then Congress will have to act by ameliorating that harsh pleading standard and restoring aiding and abetting liability.

### III. DETAILED FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING BANK AMERICA

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint in response to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), before any evidence has been submitted, the district court's task is limited. *Scheuer v. Rhodes*, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support its claims. *Id.* The district court should consider all allegations in favor of the plaintiff and accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint. *Lawal v. British Airways, PLC*, 812 F. Supp. 713, 716 (S.D. Tex. 1992). Dismissal is not appropriate "unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [his] claim which would entitle him to relief." *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

*Landry's*, slip op. at 4 n.8. The Fifth Circuit recently stated, "we will accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs." *Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc.*, 267 F.3d 400, 406 (5th Cir. 2001). This Court must consider the allegations in their entirety. As Judge Buchmeyer stated in *STI Classic Fund v. Bollinger Indus., Inc.*, No. 3-96-CV-823-R, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21553, at \*5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 1996), it is improper to isolate "the circumstances alleged in plaintiffs' amended complaint rather than to consider them in their totality."

Bank America seems to argue that the three-year statute of repose for 34 Act claims bars plaintiffs from pursuing damages against them for any time period prior to 4/8/99 *and* any consideration of its alleged misconduct prior to 4/8/99 for pleading or other purposes. We agree as to the former point, but not as to the latter. In other words, while the three-year statute of repose bars damage recovery from Bank America on behalf of purchasers who purchased before 4/8/99, it does not affect plaintiff's ability to plead conduct or present evidence of its misconduct prior to that date. *United States v. Ashdown*, 509 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1975), affirmed defendants' mail fraud convictions, holding there was no merit in the argument that it was error to admit evidence of acts committed

beyond the statute of limitations period where the evidence helped to establish the scheme – "the statute of limitations is a defense to prosecution, not a rule of evidence. Therefore, once prosecution is timely instituted, the statute of limitations has no bearing on the admissibility of evidence." *Id.* at 798.<sup>28</sup> Instead, the court found that the evidence defendants questioned "**helps establish the scheme and the guilty intent.**" *Id.*; accord *United States v. Blosser*, 440 F.2d 697, 699 (10th Cir. 1971) (Evidence of mail fraud occurring before the statute of limitations "**bore on the existence of the scheme to defraud, the falsity of representations made, and intent.**").<sup>29</sup>

A similar result has been obtained in Title VII cases. *Fitzgerald v. Henderson*, 251 F.3d 345 (2d Cir. 2001), *petition for cert. filed*, (Aug. 29, 2001), held that evidence of defendant's sexual advances and the fact that the plaintiff rebuffed those advances at an earlier time were relevant to show defendant's motivation for the harassment that occurred during the time plaintiff's claim was ripe. "**A statute of limitations does not operate to bar the introduction of evidence that predates**

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<sup>28</sup> There is no dispute that as to Bank America, claims were timely filed for the three-year period, beginning 4/8/99.

<sup>29</sup> An early case upholding this principle is *Little v. United States*, 73 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1934). There, the court held that "if the mails were used in execution of a fraudulent scheme, it is no defense that the scheme was formed and partially carried out back of the statute of limitations. Proof running back of the statute is admissible provided it is connected up with the scheme existing when the letters were mailed." *Id.* at 867; accord *United States v. Marconi*, 899 F. Supp. 458, 463 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (Defendant misunderstood the nature of the statute of limitations as "acts of fraud prior to that date are still evidence of his continuing fraudulent scheme to defraud." Trier of fact can consider defendant's pre-statute of limitations action to determine whether defendant had the requisite intent to defraud.); *United States v. Whitt*, 718 F.2d 1494, 1501 (10th Cir. 1983) (Certain testimony regarding events that were not within the statute of limitations was used "to establish a scheme or plan rather than as direct evidence."); *United States v. Haskins*, 737 F.2d 844, 848 (10th Cir. 1984) (Affirmed mail fraud and extortion convictions noting that arguments relating to evidence of transactions not charged in the indictment but used to help support scheme allegations could be properly admitted. "The fact that a number of the overt acts performed in furtherance of the conspiracy were committed beyond the statute of limitations does not preclude the admission in evidence of such acts to show the nature of the scheme and [the commissioner's] intent where the later use of the mails occurred."). Although these cases relate to evidentiary issues, the same reasoning should apply in this case at the motion to dismiss stage. If evidence can be admissible at trial regarding defendants' earlier acts in furtherance of their scheme then so too should allegations regarding actions taken beyond the statute of limitations be considered at the pleading stage.

*the commencement of the limitations period but that is relevant to events during the period."* *Id.* at 365.<sup>30</sup>

Bank America provided **both** commercial banking and investment banking services to Enron, helped fund Enron's secretly controlled LJM2 partnership and its illicit transactions with its SPEs to enable Enron to falsify its financial statements and misrepresent its financial condition. At the same time, Bank America's *securities analysts were issuing extremely positive – but false and misleading – reports on Enron, extolling Enron's business success, the strength of its financial condition and its prospects for strong earnings and revenue growth.*<sup>31</sup> Bank America or top

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<sup>30</sup> In *Black Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n v. City of Akron*, 824 F.2d 475 (6th Cir. 1987), the Sixth Circuit found the lower court erred when it granted a motion by the City seeking to limit evidence presented in the case to events that occurred within the one year statute of limitations period. *Id.* at 479. "It is clear that the district court erred in using the statute of limitations to bar the admission of evidence. The function of the statute of limitations is to bar stale claims." *Id.* at 482-83. "The statute of limitations is a defense ..., not a rule of evidence. Therefore, ... [it] has no bearing on the admissibility of evidence." *Id.* at 483. The Sixth Circuit found that plaintiffs were correct in offering evidence of events extending beyond the statute of limitations **as admissible to show motive, intent or continuing scheme.** *Id.* (citing *United States v. Garvin*, 565 F.2d 519, 523 (8th Cir. 1977)).

<sup>31</sup> As the CC explains, the banks named as defendants all evolved into their present form after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 99. That law prohibited banks from acting in dual capacities and was enacted to remedy some of the abuses that occurred in the 20s when banks sold securities of, and made loans to, their corporate customers. With the repeal of Glass-Steagall, the banks sued here, including Bank America, quickly morphed back into financial services institutions offering commercial **and** investment banking services to corporate customers. The abuses of the 20s quickly returned as well. ¶¶643-644. According to *Business Week* (¶643):

After the stock market crashed in 1929, Congress hauled in Wall Street bosses to explain how bankers helped companies inflate earnings for a decade through complex structures. Congress scrutinized bank practices for years, then passed the Glass-Steagall Act, splitting commercial banks from brokerages. That checked the Street's temptation to monkey with clients' finances while flogging their stock.

Now Congress needs answers from Wall Street's chiefs again. Congress repealed Glass-Steagall in 1999, under pressure from bankers **who swore they would manage such conflicts of interests. They would erect so-called Chinese Walls that forbade sharing information between those selling a company's stock and those arranging its financing.**

**But the Chinese walls are porous. Bankers ignore them when it's convenient: They take analysts on road shows of investment-banking clients – their way of making it clear they don't want downgrades of those companies.** The walls also provide cover for bankers, who let analysts push a client's stock even when they know the company is in trouble. That's why analysts recommended Enron to the end, though the bankers behind its complex financing knew it was on the skids.

executives of Bank America were permitted to invest at least \$45 million in Enron's lucrative LJM2 partnership – *becoming the single largest equity investor in that primary vehicle to falsify Enron's financial statements – and thus the largest single beneficiary of the looting of Enron that took place via LJM2's reported non-arm's-length fraudulent deals with Enron. The opportunity to invest in this partnership was a reward for Bank America's participation in this fraud.* ¶¶31, 649,785.

Bank America participated in the fraudulent scheme and course of business in several ways. It participated in commercial loans and lending commitments of some \$5 billion to Enron. Bank America also helped raise over \$6 billion from the investing public for Enron via the sale of Enron and Enron-related securities, sales often accomplished *via four false Registration Statements.* ¶774.

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*Business Week, 3/25/02.*

According to the *Miami Herald* on 3/19/02 (¶644):

***Banks Tangled in Fall of Enron***

\* \* \*

They are the titans of Wall Street, possessing pedigrees that date to the founding of America and wealth greater than many nations.

\* \* \*

Empowered by the massive deregulation of financial services they zealously sought, New York's investment banks created their masterpiece in Enron, providing every conceivable product and service.

***They lent it money, often without collateral. They sold its securities to an unsuspecting public. They wrote rosy, inaccurate analyst reports.***

***They were pivotal players in the mysterious offshore partnerships that ultimately brought Enron down.***

Wearing so many hats was unthinkable a generation ago, when laws kept the banking, brokerage and insurance industries separate. Deregulation changed all that, particularly in 1999 when the Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act was repealed....

\* \* \*

Enron was such a lucrative customer that virtually every Wall Street firm had a relationship with it.

Bank America acted as an underwriter of billions of dollars of Enron securities, including (¶776):

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>SECURITY</u>  |
|-------------|--|
| 11/97       | \$250 million 6.675% Enron notes   |
| 5/98        | 35 million shares Enron common stock at \$25 per share, raising \$875 million      |
| 2/99        | 27.6 million shares Enron common stock at \$31.34 per share, raising \$870 million |
| 5/99        | \$500 million 7.375% Enron notes   |
| 8/99        | \$222 million 7% Enron exchangeable notes  |
| 5/00        | \$500 million 7.875% and 8.375% Enron notes due 2003/2005                          |
| 2/01        | \$1.9 billion zero coupon convertible notes (acted as reseller) <sup>32</sup>      |

Bank America was also a major lender to Enron.<sup>33</sup> For instance:

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<sup>32</sup> In addition, Bank America acted as underwriter of billions of dollars of other Enron-related securities. For instance:

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>SECURITY</u>   |
|-------------|---|
| 12/98       | \$175 million 6% Enron Oil & Gas notes  |
| 7/99        | 27 million common shares Enron Oil & Gas at \$20.25 per share, raising \$540 million          |
| 7/01        | \$1 billion 6.31% and 6.19% senior notes in Marlin Water Trust-II and Marlin Water Capital-II |

Bank America also acted as a lead underwriter in the Azurix IPO on 6/99, selling 38.5 million shares at \$19, generating \$370 million in fresh capital for Enron, which sold at least 19.5 million shares of Azurix stock in that IPO. ¶49.

<sup>33</sup> In analyzing potential commercial borrowers, Bank America was required to perform extensive credit analysis of the borrower and obtain detailed financial information from it. Included in this credit analysis is a detailed review of the borrower's actual and contingent liabilities, its liquidity position, any equity issuance obligations it may have which could adversely affect its shareholders' equity, any debt on which the borrower may be potentially liable, even if not on the borrower's books directly, the quality of the borrower's profits on earnings and the borrower's actual **liquidity**, including sources of funding to support repayment of any loans. In addition, when Bank America made large loans to or committed itself to credit facilities for a corporation, it was required to closely monitor the company by frequently reviewing its financial condition and ongoing operations for any material changes and insist that top financial officers of the borrower keep it informed of the current status of the borrower's business and financial condition. As a result, Bank America obtained extremely detailed information concerning the actual financial condition of Enron and was aware that the actual condition of Enron's business, its finances and its financial condition

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>TRANSACTION</u>  |
|-------------|---|
| 9/98        | \$1 billion Enron credit facility to back up Enron commercial paper |
| 7/01        | \$582 million project credit facility                               |
| 8/01        | \$3 billion Enron credit facility to back up Enron commercial paper |
| 6/02        | \$457 million loan to finance Dabhol power plant                    |

¶779. Bank America's commercial paper back-up credit facilities for Enron were *extremely significant*. They enabled Enron to stay liquid by helping Enron maintain its access to the commercial paper market where it could borrow billions to finance day-to-day operations, while Bank America pocketed huge commitment fees on the back-up credit line. ¶¶773-786.

Bank America was willing to participate in the fraudulent scheme and course of business because its participation created enormous profits for Bank America *as long as the Enron scheme continued in operation* – something that Bank America was in a unique position to cause. Bank America knew that so long as Enron maintained its investment-grade credit rating and continued to report strong current period financial results and credibly forecast strong ongoing revenue and profit growth, *Enron's access to the capital markets would continue to enable Enron to raise hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars of fresh capital from public investors which would be used to repay or reduce Enron's commercial paper debt and the loans from Bank America to Enron so that the scheme could continue.* ¶780.

The proceeds of Enron's securities offerings during the Class Period underwritten by Bank America or other investment banks were utilized to repay Enron's existing commercial paper and bank indebtedness, including indebtedness to Bank America. Thus, throughout the Class Period, Bank America was pocketing millions of dollars a year in interest payments, syndication fees and investment banking fees by participating in the Enron scheme to defraud and stood to *continue* to collect these huge amounts on an annual basis going forward so long as it helped perpetuate the Enron Ponzi scheme, *while Bank America or its executives pocketed huge returns on their secret investment in LJM2* – returns created by the very manipulative or deceptive acts and contrived

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was far worse than was being publicly disclosed by Enron, or as described or disclosed in each of Bank America's analyst reports on Enron. ¶650.

transactions between Enron and LJM2 entities which Bank America was financing – and which were hiding billions of Enron's debt and artificially inflating its profits by hundreds of millions of dollars. ¶785.

In addition, Bank America also engaged and participated in the scheme to defraud by **making false statements to the market regarding Enron**. First of all, the Registration Statements for Enron's 2/99 27.6 million share common stock sale, Enron's 5/99 \$222 million 7% Enron exchangeable note sale, Enron's 8/99 \$500 million 7.375% note sale and Enron's 5/00 \$500 million 7.875% and 8.375% note sale, where Bank America was one of the lead underwriters contained false and misleading statements – **which are statements made by Bank America as an underwriter** – including false interim and annual financial statements, and false statements concerning the structures of and Enron's relationship to SPEs and related parties, Enron's financial risk management statistics, as well as the condition of Enron's business operations and the value of its assets. *See infra* at 91-92. In addition, Bank America **issued** 15 analysts' reports on Enron which contained false and misleading statements concerning Enron's business, finances and financial condition and prospects, including those dated 9/30/99, 10/12/99, 10/15/99, 12/16/99, 1/12/00, 1/18/00, 1/20/00, 4/17/00, 7/24/00, 8/17/00, 9/19/00, 10/17/00, 8/14/01, 8/28/01 and 10/16/01. ¶¶173, 182, 185, 193, 195, 200, 203, 233, 252, 255, 258, 265, 346, 357, 371. ¶782. *See infra* at 75-90.

***These were all statements by Bank America*** to the securities markets which helped artificially inflate the trading prices of Enron's publicly traded securities. ***Keeping Enron's stock price inflated was also important to Bank America as it knew that if the stock price fell below various "trigger" prices in the LJM2/SPE deals, Enron would be required to issue millions of additional Enron shares, which would reduce Enron's shareholders' equity by hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars, endanger its investment-grade credit rating, likely cut off its access to the capital markets, and thus endanger the ongoing scheme from which Bank America and its top officials were profiting.*** ¶782.

In addition to making false statements, Bank America also engaged and participated in and furthered the fraudulent scheme by participating in contrivances and devices to deceive – illicit transactions with Enron which it knew would falsify Enron's financial condition. ¶783.

One of the primary vehicles utilized to falsify Enron's financial condition and results during the Class Period was the LJM2 partnership, which was secretly controlled by Enron and was used to create numerous SPEs (including the infamous Raptors) with which Enron engaged in contrived transactions to artificially inflate Enron's profits while concealing billions of dollars in debt.

Bank America knew, because LJM2 was going to be principally utilized to engage in transactions with Enron where Enron insiders (Fastow, Kopper and Glisan) would be on both sides of the transactions, that the LJM2 partnership would be extremely lucrative – virtually guaranteed to provide huge returns to LJM2's investors. *As a reward for its participation in the fraudulent scheme, Bank America or its executives were permitted to secretly invest \$45 million in LJM2 through the Papyrus Funding Trust.*<sup>34</sup> *This was the largest single equity investment in LJM2 – and therefore generated the largest profit return of LJM2's non-arm's-length/fraudulent transactions with Enron.*<sup>35</sup> *The LJM2 partnership, using the money Bank America or its executives secretly provided, was able to create several SPEs – including the Raptors – with which Enron engaged in manipulative or deceptive contrivances and transactions to inflate its reported profits, while improperly moving billions in debt off Enron's balance sheet and into the SPEs during* 00. ¶785. According to *The New York Times*:

***Enron Ex-Chief Said to Voice Suspicion of Fraud***

Jeffrey K. Skilling, the former chief executive of Enron, has told investigators *that the top flight financial returns that investors made from a partnership that did business with the company could have been achieved only if the corporation was defrauded, according to documents and people involved in the case....* He indicated to the S.E.C. and to investigators for a special committee of the Enron board that such returns – which were as high as 2,500 percent in one transaction – ***could not have been achieved through arm's-length transactions***, according to these people and investigative notes.

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<sup>34</sup> Bank America says we do not have a basis for this allegation. They are wrong – we do. If this allegation is false **and** was made without an adequate basis, Rule 11 sanctions at the end of the case is the appropriate remedy. Disbelief of the allegation is not permitted at this stage.

<sup>35</sup> The returns to the LJM2 investors were huge – up to 2,500% on one deal and 51% overall ***in the first year*** of the partnership. ***Skilling has recently told investigators such gargantuan returns were possible only because LJM2, with Fastow at the wheel, was defrauding Enron in the billions of dollars of deals it was doing with Enron so Enron could create false profits and hide billions of dollars in debt.*** *N.Y. Times*, "Enron Ex-Chief Said to Voice Suspicion of Fraud," 4/24/02.

When shown records that laid out the details of the financial returns during his testimony several months ago before the S.E.C., Mr. Skilling was said to have grown agitated as he described his opinion of the information.... Mr. Skilling made his statements to investigators after reviewing LJM2 records during his testimony to the S.E.C., according to documents and people involved in the case.... In the LJM2 presentation, investors were told that the partnership had generated rates of return on its investments in the Raptor ranging from just more than 150 percent to 2,500 percent.

*New York Times*, "Enron Ex-Chief Said to Voice Suspicions of Fraud," 4/24/02.

During 00-01, favored investors in LJM2, like Bank America or the top executives at Bank America, ***actually witnessed and benefitted from*** a series of extraordinary payouts from the Raptor SPEs which LJM2 controlled over the next two years – securing hundreds of millions of dollars in distributions from the Raptors to LJM2 and ***then to themselves*** – cash generated by the illicit and contrived transactions Enron was engaging in with the Raptors to falsify its financial results. Thus, the banks and bankers like Bank America, who were partners in LJM2 ***were not only knowing participants in the Enron scheme to defraud, they were direct economic beneficiaries of it – and of the looting of Enron.***<sup>36</sup> ¶785.

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<sup>36</sup> All of the Bank America research reports issued by Bank America during 00-01 were false for an additional reason. After LJM2 was formed and Bank America and/or its top executives had secretly been permitted to invest in LJM2 on or about 6/00 – ultimately to the tune of some \$45 million – Bank America continued to issue very positive analyst reports on Enron. Each of these reports contained "boilerplate" disclosures like:

We may from time to time have long or short positions in any buy and sell securities referred to herein. The firm may from time to time perform investment banking or other services for, or solicit investment banking or other business from, any company mentioned in this report.

***These boilerplate disclosures were the same as they were before 12/99 – i.e., they did not change after Bank America and/or its executives became the largest investors in LJM2*** which funded numerous non-arm's-length fraudulent deals with Enron to create phony profits and hide debt – providing lush returns to Bank America or its executives from the looting of Enron. The failure to disclose the LJM2 investments of Bank America and/or its executives – and LJM2's involvement with Enron – made its "boilerplate" disclosure false and misleading and concealed from the market the very significant and serious conflict of interests which Enron and Bank America knew would have cast serious doubts on the objectivity and honesty of Bank America's analyst reports on Enron and disclosed that Bank America or its executives had compromising ties to and serious conflicts of interest regarding Enron.

**IV. BANK AMERICA IS LIABLE UNDER 1933 ACT TO PURCHASERS OF ENRON'S 7.375% NOTES, 7% EXCHANGE NOTES AND 7.875%/8.375% NOTES FOR SELLING THOSE SECURITIES PURSUANT TO FALSE AND MISLEADING REGISTRATION STATEMENTS**

Wall Street underwriters play an extremely important role in protecting investors in public companies and ensuring that public companies and those associated with public companies comply with their obligations of full, fair and complete disclosure when selling securities to the public.

By associating himself with a proposed offering, an underwriter impliedly represents that he has made such an investigation in accordance with professional standards. Investors properly rely on this *added protection which has a direct bearing on their appraisal of the reliability of the representations in the prospectus*. The underwriter who does not make a reasonable investigation is derelict in his responsibilities to deal fairly with the investing public.

*In re Richmond Corp.*, 41 S.E.C. 398, 406 (1963). In *Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.*, 480 F.2d 341, 370 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit stated:

Self-regulation is the mainspring of the federal securities laws. *No greater reliance in our self-regulatory system is placed on any single participant in the issuance of securities than upon the underwriter*. He is most heavily relied upon to verify published materials because of his expertise in appraising the securities issue and the issuer, and because of his incentive to do so. He is familiar with the process of investigating the business condition of a company and possesses extensive resources for doing so. Since he often has a financial stake in the issue, he has a special motive thoroughly to investigate the issuer's strengths and weaknesses. *Prospective investors look to the underwriter – a fact well known to all concerned and especially to the underwriter – to pass on the soundness of the security and the correctness of the registration statement and prospectus*.

In *Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp.*, 283 F. Supp. 643, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court emphasized the importance of independent verification by underwriters:

The purpose of Section 11 is to protect investors. To that end the underwriters are made responsible for the truth of the prospectus. If they may escape that responsibility by taking at face value representations made to them by the company's management, then the inclusion of underwriters among those liable under Section 11 affords the investors no additional protection. To effectuate the statute's purpose, the phrase "reasonable investigation" must be construed to require more effort on the part of the underwriters than the mere accurate reporting in the prospectus of "data presented" to them by the company. It should make no difference that this data is elicited by questions addressed to the company officers by the underwriters, or that the underwriters at the time believe that the company's officers are truthful and reliable. *In order to make the underwriters' participation in this enterprise of any value to the investors, the underwriters must make some reasonable attempt to verify the data submitted to them. They may not rely solely on the company's officers or on the company's counsel. A prudent man in the management of his own property would not rely on them*.

Finally, in *Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.*, 332 F. Supp. 544, 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), the court stated that underwriters

are expected to exercise ***a high degree of care in investigation and independent verification of the company's representations.*** Tacit reliance on management assertions is unacceptable; the underwriters must play devil's advocate.

The banks named as defendants in this action grossly violated these duties in their dealings with Enron. This court has noted §11 is a non-fraud remedy:

A plaintiff is not required to demonstrate scienter under §11, and a defendant will be liable for innocent or negligent material misrepresentations. *Id.* Nevertheless, where §11 and §12(a)(2) claims sound in fraud, the plaintiff is required to plead the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud with particularity under Rule 9(b). *Melder v. Morris*, 27 F.3d 1097, 1100 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994); *In re Stac Electronics Sec. Litig.*, 89 F.3d 1399, 1405 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1996), *cert. denied sub nom. Anderson v. Clow*, 520 U.S. 1103 (1997). The Fifth Circuit recently issued an opinion that limits the holding of *Melder* and makes clear that where a complaint does not allege that the defendants are liable for fraudulent or intentional conduct, especially where it disavows and disclaims any allegations of fraud in its strict liability 1993 Securities Act claims, its claims do not "sound in fraud" and they cannot be dismissed for failure to satisfy Rule 9(b). *Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky's Inc.*, \_\_\_ F.3d \_\_\_, No. 99-50958, 2001 WL 21259, \*2-3 (5th Cir. Jan. 9, 2001).

*Landry's*, slip op. at 11 n.13.<sup>37</sup>

Bank America acted as underwriter for the sale of Enron securities via the Registration Statements, as specified below as to which §11 claims are asserted.<sup>38</sup>

| <u>Securities</u>                         | <u>Date of Offering/<br/>Registration Statement</u> |
|---|---|
| \$500 million 7.375%<br>Notes due 5/15/09 | 5/19/99   |

With respect to the 7.375% note offering in 5/99, Bank America's only argument that a 11 claim does not exist is that plaintiffs claims sound in fraud and are thus barred by the fraud pleading standard. This is clearly wrong under *Schlotzskys* and *Landry's*.

The Registration Statement for the 5/99 sale of the 7.375% notes contained false statements or material omissions as set forth below. This Registration Statement was false and misleading due

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<sup>37</sup> The CC contains this disclaimer. See ¶1005.

<sup>38</sup> Plaintiffs concede there is no §11 claim for the 7% Exchangeable Notes and 8.375% notes for the reasons argued by Bank America.

to the incorporation Enron's 97 and 98 10-Ks and its 98 10Qs that contained Enron's *admittedly false financial statements for 97 and 98, which understated Enron's debt by billions of dollars and overstated its earnings by hundreds of millions of dollars*, as detailed in ¶¶418-611 of this CC. While the Registration Statement included audited annual financial statements, significantly, they also incorporated or included all documents filed pursuant to §13(a) of the 1934 Act prior to the respective offerings, *including Enron's 98 10-Qs which contained Enron's admittedly unaudited financial false and misleading unaudited quarter financial results for 98*. ¶¶612-613.<sup>39</sup> Of course, since the interim financial statements were unaudited they were not expertised and all signers of those Registration Statements and the underwriter banks are responsible for the accuracy of those interim unaudited financial statements.

The restatement of previously issued financial statements is an admission that they were materially false when issued and Enron has restated *all* the financial statements in the Registration Statement for the 7.375% notes in huge amounts. Thus, under 1933 Act §11, Bank America, as an underwriter in this offering is *prima facie* liable to the purchasers of these securities subject to the defendant proving that in the exercise of due care or diligence, they did not know and could not have known of the falsity of the Registration Statements forecasting these false financial results. Given the duration of falsity (over two years) and the size of the falsity (literally billions of dollars), Bank America, which foisted these worthless securities on the public, faces quite a burden in this regard.

This exposes Bank America to §11 liability under the 1933 Act – *non-fraud liability* – under which it is *prima facie* liable and can avoid liability only by bearing *its burden of proof* that it had, after reasonable investigation, "reasonable ground to believe and did believe ... that the statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated thereon or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading," *i.e.*, the underwriter's so-called "due diligence" defense. §77k(a)(5), (b)(3).

In *Landry's*, this court upheld a §11 claim against the defendant investment banks, stating:

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<sup>39</sup> While Bank of America may be able at trial to establish a defense to liability for these expertised, *i.e.*, certified financial statements, in light of the CCs allegations that it knew those annual certified financial statements were false they may not do so now at the 12b-6 stage. *Murphy*, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22207, at \*23.

The Court also finds that Plaintiffs have also adequately pled their claims against the Landry Defendants under §11 of the Securities Act. They have identified specific purportedly untrue statements in Landry's Prospectus and alleged that Defendants, who were directors of the issuer and some of whom signed the document, negligently breached their duty to make a reasonable investigation or possess reasonable grounds for believing that the representations were true and not materially misleading. The complaint expressly disavows reliance on or incorporation of the allegations elsewhere in the complaint alleging fraud, thus falling within the holding of *Melder*, 27 F.3d at 1100 n.6. *Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky's Inc.*, \_\_\_ F.3d \_\_\_, No. 99-50958, 2001 WL 21259, \*2-3 (5th Cir. Jan. 9, 2001).

\* \* \*

As for the Underwriter Defendants' motion to dismiss, Section 11 imposes essentially absolute liability for false statements or omissions in a prospectus. No scienter need be alleged. Nor do the requirements of Rule 9(b) need to be met. *Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky's Inc.*, \_\_\_ F.3d \_\_\_, No. 99-50958, 2001 WL 21259, \*2-3 (5th Cir. Jan. 9, 2001). Plaintiffs have met their pleading burden.

*Landry's*, slip op. at 64-65. The same is true here as to Bank America.

So regardless of any enhanced pleading standard imposed by the 95 Act on plaintiff's §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 fraud claims or the reach of §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability, Bank America is in this case as a defendant under the 1933 §11 claims.

**V. BANK AMERICA CAN BE LIABLE UNDER 1934 ACT §10(b) AND RULE 10b-5 (i) FOR MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS, OR (ii) FOR PARTICIPATING IN A FRAUDULENT SCHEME OR COURSE OF BUSINESS THAT OPERATED AS A FRAUD OR DECEIT ON PURCHASERS OF ENRON'S SECURITIES, OR (iii) FOR EMPLOYING ACTS OR MANIPULATIVE DEVICES TO DECEIVE**

Plaintiffs here have also pleaded and are pursuing theories of recovery against Bank America that are well-grounded in the express language of the 1934 Act. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act states:

Manipulative and deceptive devices

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ....

\* \* \*

(b) [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... **any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance** in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.<sup>40</sup>

15 U.S.C. §78j(b).

Rule 10b-5 promulgated by the SEC flows directly from the language of §10(b) itself and provides:

240.10b-5 Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,

- (a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
- (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
- (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,

in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5.

Not only does Rule 10b-5 forbid the making of "any untrue statement of a material fact," it also provides for scheme liability. Scheme liability is authorized by the text of §10(b). According to the Supreme Court, §10(b)'s prohibition of "**any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance**" necessarily encompasses any "**scheme to defraud.**" In *Ernst & Ernst*, the Court referred to the dictionary definitions of §10(b)'s words, to find that a "device" is "[t]hat which is devised, or formed by design; a contrivance; an invention; project; **scheme; often, a scheme to deceive**; a stratagem; an artifice." 425 U.S. at 199 n.20 (quoting *Webster's International Dictionary* (2d ed. 1934)). The Court found that a "contrivance" means "**a scheme, plan, or artifice.**" *Id.* (quoting *Webster's International Dictionary*); see also *Aaron*, 446 U.S. at 696 n.13. Clearly, "scheme" is encompassed in the broad language of §10(b).

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<sup>40</sup> Note that §10(b) itself does not expressly prohibit untrue statements of material facts or material omissions. This prohibition, like the prohibition against fraudulent schemes and fraudulent courses of business, are expressed in Rule 10-5.

Thus Rule 10b-5 – adopted by the SEC to implement §10(b) – makes it unlawful for any person "*directly or indirectly*" to employ "*any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,*" "*to make any untrue statement[s],*" or to "*engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates ... as a fraud or deceit upon any person.*" 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5. See also *U.S. Quest*, 228 F.3d at 407.

Prior to the Supreme Court's endorsement of the presumption of reliance based on the fraud-on-the-market theory for both misrepresentations and omissions in *Basic*, 485 U.S. 224, the Fifth Circuit had held that the theory applied *only* to omission cases and not misrepresentation cases. Thus, in some instances, securities plaintiffs sought recovery under subsection (1) and (3) of Rule 10b-5 alleging *fraudulent scheme and course of business liability*. The Fifth Circuit expressly recognized the validity of these theories of recovery.

For instance, in *Finkel*, 817 F.2d 356, plaintiffs sued under §10(b) and Rule 10b-5, claiming that the stock of Docutel was inflated due to false financial reports. According to plaintiff, Olivetti (which owned 46% of Docutel and controlled it) forced Docutel to buy Olivetti's excess inventories at inflated prices so Olivetti could hide losses it was suffering. Docutel concealed this financial manipulation for some time but, when its auditors discovered the financial manipulation and forced a large inventory writedown, huge losses were disclosed and Docutel stock fell. The district court dismissed the complaint against Olivetti and Docutel because plaintiff failed to allege reliance on any of the false statements in Docutel's SEC filings that were alleged in the Complaint.

But the fact that the complaint lists a number of documents filed with the SEC does not limit plaintiff's claim to subsection (2) only. For, as in *Shores*, plaintiff's lack of reliance on these documents does not resolve the claims made under 10b-5(1) and (3). ***We find that plaintiff's complaint properly alleges a scheme to defraud or course of business operating as a fraud for purposes of the first and third subsections; plaintiff's complaint, taken as a whole, alleges that Olivetti forced Docutel to take its worthless inventories, that this scheme or course of business was not disclosed, and that the effect was to defraud certain purchasers of Docutel.***

\* \* \*

The most significant event which allegedly led to the loss by plaintiff is the claim that Olivetti forced Docutel to take worthless inventories without disclosing that fact in the marketplace; ***if proved, that conduct could equate with a scheme to defraud or course of business operating as a fraud in violation of 10b-5(1) and (3).*** Thus, we conclude that the district court erred in its dismissal of the complaint as to plaintiff's claims under 10b-5(1) and (3).

*Id.* at 363-64; accord *Heller v. Am. Indus. Props. Reit*, No. SA-97-CA-1315-EP, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23286, at \*14 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 1998) ("The first and third subsections, on the other hand, **create a duty not to engage in a fraudulent scheme or course of conduct ....**").

Thus, the Fifth Circuit sitting *en banc* held that a defendant who did not himself make the statements in a misleading Offering Circular could be held primarily liable **as a participant in a larger scheme to defraud of which that Offering Circular was only a part: "Rather than containing the entire fraud, the Offering Circular was assertedly only one step in the course of an elaborate scheme."** *Shores*, 647 F.2d at 468.

The fraudulent scheme and course of business involving Enron **was worldwide in scope, years in duration and unprecedented in scale** and required the skills and active participation of lawyers, bankers and accountants to help design, implement, conceal and falsely account for the deceptive acts and devices, manipulative or deceptive contrivances and artifices they and Enron were using to falsify Enron's reported profits and financial condition and to continue its fraudulent course of business.

The notion that *Central Bank*, 511 U.S. 164, issued a broad edict that lawyers, bankers and accountants are immune from liability for their participation in complex securities frauds is nonsense. *Central Bank* expressly recognized: "The absence of §10(b) aiding and abetting liability **does not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from liability under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a lawyer ... or bank who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser ... relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5.... In any complex securities fraud, moreover, there are likely to be multiple violators.**" *Id.* at 191. A scheme to defraud often will involve a variety of actors, and investors are entitled to allege "**that a group of defendants acted together to violate the securities laws, as long as each defendant committed a manipulative or deceptive act in furtherance of the scheme.**" *Cooper*, 137 F.3d at 624; accord *First Jersey*, 101 F.3d at 1471; *In re Health Mgmt. Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 970 F. Supp. 192, 209 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); *Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares*, 884 F. Supp. 1398, 1401 (N.D. Cal. 1995); *In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig.*, 864 F. Supp. 960, 969-70 (C.D. Cal. 1994).

In *Central Bank*, 511 U.S. 164, a public building authority issued bonds to finance public improvements. Central Bank served as indenture trustee. The bonds were secured by liens covering property. The bond covenants required that the liened land be worth at least 160% of the principal amount of the bonds. Central Bank got a letter expressing fear that property values were declining and that perhaps the 160% value test was no longer met. The bank did nothing. Soon afterwards, the public building authority defaulted on the bonds. The bonds were not publicly traded. Central Bank, which had no commercial lending relationship with the municipal entity involved and was not an investment bank, issued no analysts' reports about the issuer of the municipal bonds and thus made no statement and took no affirmative act that could have affected the trading price of the municipal bonds in issue. Clearly, this is a significantly different fact pattern from the Enron situation.

The *Central Bank* majority noted that their reasoning was "confirmed" by the fact that if they accepted the plaintiffs' aiding and abetting argument it would impose §10(b) liability when "at least one element critical for recovery" was absent, *i.e.*, reliance. *Id.* at 180 (citing *Basic*, 485 U.S. at 243 (the Supreme Court's "**fraud-on-the-market**" decision) for the proposition that a plaintiff must show reliance to recover under 10b-5). "Were we to allow the aiding and abetting action proposed in this case, the defendant could be liable without any showing that the plaintiff relied upon the aider and abettor's statements **or actions**." *Id.* The Court found that allowing plaintiffs to "circumvent the reliance requirement would disregard the careful limits on 10b-5 recovery mandated by our earlier cases." *Id.* However, in this case, the alleged scheme and fraudulent course of business **inflated** the prices of Enron's **publicly traded** securities. ¶¶74, 418-424, 773-786. Thus, the reliance element is not "**absent**" and the Supreme Court's prior decision in *Basic* is not circumvented – it is satisfied.

*Central Bank* thus denied recovery to victims of an alleged securities fraud who pleaded only one theory of recovery against the defendant bank – secondary liability dubbed "aiding and abetting." 511 U.S. at 191. However, the words aiding and abetting do not appear in §10(b) or Rule 10b-5. The Court said "[T]he text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid and abet a §10(b) violation ... that conclusion resolves the case." *Id.* at 177. The *Central Bank* plaintiffs did not, as the plaintiffs do here, plead or pursue recovery under the theory that the bank defendant made false

and misleading statements in Registration Statements or other documents issued to the public, *e.g.*, analysts' reports *or* employed acts and manipulative or deceptive devices or engaged in a fraudulent scheme or course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit on purchasers of the securities in issue. In the words of the Court, the plaintiffs "concede that Central Bank did not commit a manipulative or deceptive *act* within the meaning of §10(b)." *Id.* at 191. Thus, because the *Central Bank* plaintiffs pursued a theory of recovery which found *no support in the text of either the statute or the rule, they lost.*

*Central Bank* cannot mean that a defendant cannot be liable under §10(b) unless it made misleading statements because the Court rejected that argument in *O'Hagan*, 521 U.S. 642. The Eighth Circuit had held that, under *Central Bank*, "§10(b) covers only deceptive statements or omissions on which purchasers and sellers, and perhaps other market participants, rely." *Id.* at 664. The Court reversed, holding that §10(b) does not require a defendant to speak. *Id.* Because §10(b) prohibits "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in contravention of SEC rules, this reaches "any deceptive device," whether or not the defendant spoke. *Id.* at 653. *Superintendent of Ins.*, 404 U.S. 6, is consistent with *O'Hagan*. In *Superintendent of Ins.*, a *unanimous* Court upheld a §10b/Rule10b-5 complaint involving a "fraudulent scheme" involving the sale of securities where *no* false statement was alleged because:

***There certainly was an "act" or "practice" within the meaning of Rule 10b-5 which operated as "a fraud or deceit" on Manhattan, the seller of the Government bonds.***

*Id.* at 9.

This Court has stated, citing *O'Hagan*, that:

***A defendant need not have made a false or misleading statement to be liable.***

*Landry's*, slip op. at 9 n.12; *Waste Mgmt.*, slip op. at 75; *BMC Software*, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 869. Here, however, we again stress Bank America made false statements in Registration Statements and analysts' reports.

That this reading of §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 is clearly correct is shown by a new *unanimous* Supreme Court decision – *Zandford*, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4023. In *Zandford*, the Court repeatedly

cited with approval its seminal "*fraudulent scheme*" case *Superintendent of Ins.*, and reversed dismissal of a §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 complaint making the following key points:

- "*The scope of Rule 10b-5 is coextensive with the coverage of §10(b) ....*" *Id.* at \*7 n.1.
- "*[N]either the SEC nor this Court has ever held that there must be a misrepresentation about the value of a particular security" to violate §10(b).* *Id.* at \*13.<sup>41</sup>
- Allegations that defendant "*engaged in a fraudulent scheme*" or "*course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit*" stated a §10(b) claim. *Id.* at \*13, \*14-\*17.

*Central Bank* clearly – *but merely* – stands for the proposition that no aiding and abetting liability exists under the 1934 Act because neither §10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 contain "aiding and abetting" language. The decision in *Central Bank* is *quite narrow*. By contrast, the language of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is *very broad*. Also the purposes of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are remedial, intended to provide access to federal court to persons victimized in securities transactions:

[T]he 1934 Act and its companion legislative enactments [including the 1933 Act] embrace a "fundamental purpose ... to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of *caveat emptor* and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry." ... Congress intended securities legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes."

*Affiliated Ute Citizens*, 406 U.S. at 151. As noted by the Fifth Circuit:

[T]he Court has concluded that the Exchange Act and the Securities Act should be construed broadly to effectuate the statutory policy affording extensive protection to the investing public. *See Tcherepnin*, 389 U.S. at 336, 88 S. Ct. at 553. *See also* S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong. 1st Sess. 1 (1933) (indicating legislative intent of the Securities Act to protect the public from the sale of fraudulent *and speculative schemes*).

*Meason*, 652 F.2d at 549. "The federal securities statutes are remedial legislation and must be construed broadly, not technically and restrictively." *Paul F. Newton & Co.*, 630 F.2d at 1118.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> To the extent *Ziamba*, 256 F.3d at 1205, seems to require a statement be made about a company which is "publicly attributable to the defendant at the time the plaintiff's investment decision was made," it is inconsistent with *Zandford*.

<sup>42</sup> The broad purposes of §10(b)'s prohibition of securities fraud and the Supreme Court's longstanding recognition of such broad purposes also support conspiracy and scheme liability. *See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green*, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) ("No doubt Congress meant to prohibit the full range of ingenious devices that might be used to manipulate securities prices."); *Affiliated Ute Citizens*, 406 U.S. at 152-53 (Proscriptions of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 "are broad and, by repeated use of the word 'any,' are obviously meant to be inclusive. The Court has said that the 1934 Act and

Bank America's claim that *Central Bank* eliminated scheme liability is flawed. Notwithstanding *Central Bank*, liability based on participation in a scheme in violation of and schemed to defraud a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit on securities purchasers on subsections (a) or (c) of Rule 10b-5 continue to be viable theories of liability. Fraudulent scheme or course of business liability is viable because:

- It is encompassed by the *express language* of the statute, which prohibits the "direct or indirect" "use or employment" of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance";
- It is encompassed by the *express language* of Rule 10b-5;
- It comports with the *broad antifraud purposes* of the statute;
- It has *long been upheld* by the courts; and
- It imposes liability based on a *primary* violation of the 1933 Act committed directly by the defendant that goes beyond merely assisting another in committing a violation.

***In Central Bank, the plaintiffs did not allege primary liability against the bank, did not allege a scheme to defraud, did not allege a fraudulent practice or course of business and did not invoke subsections (a) or (c) of Rule 10b-5.***<sup>43</sup> The plaintiffs alleged only that the bank was "*secondarily* liable under § 10(b) for its conduct in *aiding and abetting the fraud.*" *Central Bank*, 511 U.S. at 168. The Court, therefore, did not address other liability theories. Yet defendants offer up numerous rationales as to why *Central Bank* eliminated Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) liability. They are:

1. ***The "Textualist" Rationale.*** The court took a strict textualist approach in concluding that there is no private aiding and abetting liability under §10(b). Just as the statute does not

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its companion legislative enactments embrace a 'fundamental purpose ... to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of *caveat emptor* and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.'" (footnote omitted) (quoting *SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.*, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)); *Capital Gains Research*, 375 U.S. at 186 (§10(b) should be construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes"); *Superintendent of Ins.*, 404 U.S. at 11 n.7 ("[We do not] think it sound to dismiss a complaint merely because the alleged scheme does not involve the type of fraud that is "usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities." We believe that §10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit *all* fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed involve a garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique form of deception. Novel or atypical methods should not provide immunity from the securities laws.") (emphasis in original) (quoting *A. T. Brod & Co.*, 375 F.2d at 397).

<sup>43</sup> The *Central Bank* decision did not distinguish among the different subsections of Rule 10b-5.

explicitly mention "aiding and abetting," it also does not mention "scheme," "act," "practice," or "course of business."

2        ***The "Manipulation and Misrepresentation Is It" Rationale.*** The court stated that "the statute prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act," *Central Bank*, 511 U.S. at 177, which must be interpreted to mean that liability can only be premised upon conduct falling within subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5.

3.        ***The "No More Secondary Liability" Rationale.*** The court's opinion holds that only primary violators may be held liable. Because scheme liability is a secondary liability theory similar to aiding and abetting, it is precluded.

None of these rationales for precluding fraudulent scheme and/or course of business liability is supportable because scheme and course of business liability is a ***textually-based, primary liability theory*** and there is no hard and fast rule that a defendant must make a false statement to face §10(b) liability – while in this case Bank America did, in fact, allegedly make several false and misleading statements.

None of the rationales as to how Central Bank eliminated Rule 10b-5(a) or (c) liability holds water.

- ***The Flaws of the "Textualist" Rationale***

A major flaw of the textualist rationale is that scheme liability is **firmly based** on the language of both the statute and the rule. The statute itself contains only the general "***manipulative or deceptive device[s] or contrivance[s]***" language, leaving it to the SEC to more specifically proscribe fraudulent conduct. The SEC's rule-making authority would be superfluous if the rules it adopted had to use precisely the same words as in the statute. To be sure, "the private plaintiff may not bring a 10b-5 suit against a defendant for acts not prohibited by the text of § 10(b)," *Central Bank*. 511 U.S. at 173, and "the 1934 Act cannot be read more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit," *id.* at 174 (quoting *Chiarella v. United States*, 445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980)). But it is patently reasonable for the SEC to have determined that the "employment" of

a "scheme to defraud" and the "engagement" in a fraudulent "act, practice, or course of business" constitute the "use or employ[ment]" of a "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance."<sup>44</sup>

In *Ernst & Ernst*, the Court implicitly found that a "scheme to defraud" falls within the meaning of the "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" language of §10(b). 425 U.S. at 199 n.20. The Court relied in part on the 1934 dictionary definitions of "device" and "contrivance." *See id.*; *see also Aaron*, 446 U.S. at 696 n.13 (relying on same definitions to find scienter requirement under §17(a)(1) of 1933 Act). Both of those definitions included a "scheme." *See Ernst & Ernst*, 425 U.S. at 199 n.20.<sup>45</sup>

The Court itself showed that *Central Bank* should not be interpreted as ushering in a new era of strict textualist construction of the federal securities laws. In upholding the misappropriation theory of insider trading in *O'Hagan*, 521 U.S. 642, the Court upheld a non-textual form of securities fraud and, in doing so, again exposed the long familiar broad expressions of the remedial purposes of the statute.<sup>46</sup>

- ***The Flaws of the "Manipulation and Misrepresentation Is It" Rationale***

The Court in *Central Bank* said that §10(b) "prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or omission) *or the commission of a manipulative act.*" 511 U.S. at 177. It also

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<sup>44</sup> No subsection of Rule 10b-5 has ever been successfully challenged in any court as being outside the scope of §10(b) in the 60-year existence of the Rule.

<sup>45</sup> The statutory prohibition against "directly or indirectly" violating §10(b) must cover a scheme to commit manipulative or deceptive acts. It is unlikely that Congress would have prohibited the direct commitment of a fraudulent act and yet approved the commission of the same fraudulent act through joint activity – *i.e.*, a scheme. The "directly or indirectly" language in §10(b) was not enough for the Supreme Court to save aiding and abetting liability in *Central Bank*. But that was because aiding and abetting liability covered a broader range of conduct than the direct commission of a manipulative or deceptive act. Scheme conduct, however, involves joint action to commit a manipulative or deceptive act that should itself be considered, directly or indirectly, a manipulative or deceptive act by each of the schemers.

<sup>46</sup> The Court also noted that the misappropriation theory is designed to protect the integrity of the securities markets against abuses and that the 1934 Act was enacted in part to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets and thereby promote investor confidence. *O'Hagan*, 521 U.S. at 652, 657-59. For example, the Court stated that "the theory is also well-tuned to an animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence." *Id.* at 658. The Court detailed how investors would be hesitant to invest in an unfair market. *See id.*

indicated §10(b) liability existed where there was reliance on a defendant's "statements or actions." *Id.* at 180; *see also id.* at 191 ("Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5, assuming *all* of the requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met.") (emphasis in original).

There is absolutely nothing in the language of the statute, the legislative history, or the rule that warrants restricting liability solely to misrepresentations or omissions or certain technical forms of manipulation. The express language of §10(b) clearly allows for liability by a person who does not actually make a statement or omit to say something he is under a duty to disclose. The statutory language "directly or indirectly, ... [t]o employ" in §10(b) is much broader than simply "directly to make." Similarly, the statutory language "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" is much broader than simply "a misrepresentation or omission." Therefore, if the starting point in interpreting a statute is the language itself, *see Central Bank*, 511 U.S. at 173, there is no reason why liability under §10(b) must be limited to directly making misstatements or omissions or manipulating securities prices through certain specific technical or mechanical means.<sup>47</sup>

In addition, the SEC, in adopting subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5, implicitly recognized this. ***Unless this Court would strike down a rule that has been upheld for 60 years, the language "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" and "engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit" in subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5 is much broader than simply "make a misrepresentation or omission."***<sup>48</sup>

If the court in *Central Bank* meant to strike down subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5, the court certainly would have explicitly said so. To the contrary, the court and circuit courts of appeals have long recognized that the scope of liability under subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5 is broader than that under subsection (b) and that those who engage in a fraudulent scheme may be liable in the

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<sup>47</sup> As the Supreme Court has stated, "[n]o doubt Congress meant to prohibit the full range of ingenious devices that might be used to manipulate securities prices." *Santa Fe*, 430 U.S. at 477.

<sup>48</sup> Even from a common sense standpoint, schemes, acts, practices, and courses of conduct can readily be manipulative or deceptive, irrespective of any statements or omissions.

absence of misrepresentations or omissions. *See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens*, 406 U.S. at 152-53 (subsections (a) and (c) are broader than subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5); *First Jersey*, 101 F.3d at 1471-72; *SEC v. Seaboard Corp.*, 677 F.2d 1301, 1312 (9th Cir. 1982); *Shores*, 647 F.2d at 468 (en banc); *Competitive Assocs.*, 516 F.2d at 814-15 ("Not every violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities law can be, or should be, forced into a category headed 'misrepresentations' or 'nondisclosures'. **Fraudulent devices, practices, schemes, artifices and courses of business are also interdicted by the securities laws.**"); *Blackie v. Barrack*, 524 F.2d 891, 903 n.19 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Rule 10b-5 liability is not restricted solely to isolated misrepresentations or omissions; **it may also be predicated on a 'practice, or course of business which operates ... as a fraud ...'**"); *Richardson v. MacArthur*, 451 F.2d 35, 40 (10th Cir. 1971) ("Rule 10b-5 is a remedial measure of far greater breadth than merely prohibiting misrepresentations and nondisclosures concerning stock prices. No attempt is made in 10b-5 to specify what forms of deception are prohibited; rather, **all fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase and sale of securities are prohibited.**") (emphasis added and in original).

- ***The Flaws of the "No More Secondary Liability" Rationale***

The principal flaws of this rationale are that *Central Bank* did not strike down every form of "secondary" liability and that, in any event, violations through fraudulent schemes, acts, practices, or courses of business constitute primary violations of § 10(b). In *Central Bank*, the Court did not make fine distinctions between conduct that constitutes a "primary" as opposed to that which constitutes a "secondary" violation of the statute. Nor did it hold that only "primary" violations are cognizable. It held that aiding and abetting could not constitute a violation because, as interpreted by the courts, aiders and abettors did not commit violations **but only assisted them**, and the statute holds liable only those who commit violations.

Fraudulent acts, practices and scheme liability and course of business are **primary** liability theories in the sense that the defendant is directly liable for committing a violation of the statute. ***The fraudulent scheme, act, practice, or course of business is a direct violation of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5.*** With respect to fraudulent acts, practices and a participation in the scheme to defraud or fraudulent course of business is itself the manipulative or deceptive act, even without the making of

misrepresentations or omission. There is nothing derivative, vicarious, or secondary about it. ***And Bank America here allegedly made false and misleading statements as well.***

All three subsections of Rule 10b-5 proscribe conduct for which a defendant may be ***primarily*** liable. Therefore, liability for a scheme to defraud or fraudulent act, practice, or course of business does not run afoul of *Central Bank's* elimination of aiding and abetting liability. Cases both before and after *Central Bank* have recognized that scheme liability is a form of primary liability. *Hill v. Hanover Energy, Inc.*, No. 91-1964 (JHG), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18566 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 1991), is an example of such a pre-*Central Bank* case. In *Hill*, the defendant argued that the §10(b) claim should be dismissed for failure of the plaintiffs to allege any misrepresentations or omissions of material facts. *Id.* at \*10-\*11. The court rejected that argument, specifically finding that *Santa Fe* does not restrict §10(b) liability to misrepresentations or omissions. *See id.* at \*11-\*12. Rather, the court found that the alleged conduct of the defendant Hanover Energy, which included fraudulently inducing the plaintiff to give up his rights to acquire certain stock and to post a letter of credit, could fairly be viewed as manipulative or deceptive within the meaning of §10(b) and an unlawful scheme to defraud within the meaning of subsection (a) or (c) of Rule 10b-5. *See id.*<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> District court decisions after *Central Bank* have continued to recognize scheme liability as a form of primary liability. For example, in *BMC Software*, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 885-86, this court seemed to recognize scheme liability, although it found that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the pleading requirements. In *BMC Software*, when discussing the pleading requirements in securities fraud cases and what must be pled to support scheme allegations this Court stated:

As its first ground for dismissal, Defendants emphasize that the amended complaint fails to allege with any particularity that nine of the eleven individual Defendants made any representations or participated in any way in the alleged scheme to defraud.... ***Plaintiffs must allege what actions each Defendant took in furtherance of the alleged scheme and specifically pled what he learned, when he learned. it and how Plaintiffs know what he learned.***

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***"Primary liability may be imposed not only on persons who made fraudulent misrepresentations but also on those who had knowledge of the fraud and assisted in its perpetration."***

*Id.* at 885-86, 904-05.

District court decisions prior to *Central Bank* recognized scheme liability. In *ZZZZ Best*, the

A scheme is "[a] plan or program of something to be done."<sup>50</sup> A "scheme to defraud" encompasses any "plan designed or concocted for perpetrating a fraud." *Ballentine's Law Dictionary* ("scheme to defraud") 1142 (3d ed. 1969). It has long included any scheme to defraud investors by causing securities to trade at fraudulently inflated prices.<sup>51</sup> When §10(b) was enacted such conduct already was an unlawful "scheme to defraud" under the mail fraud statute, and today it is called a

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district court directly addressed Ernst & Young's liability under subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5, explicitly recognizing that liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is not restricted to material misstatements and omissions. 864 F. Supp. at 971-72 ("It appears that the scope of deceptive devices or schemes prohibited by subsections (a) and (c) [of Rule 10b-5] is quite extensive."). The plaintiffs alleged that Ernst & Young, hired to review the company's financial statements, was primarily liable because it participated in the creation of publicly released statements, issued a review report, and failed to disclose additional material facts related to the review report. Ernst & Young moved for dismissal on the grounds that it was really being charged with aiding and abetting liability precluded by *Central Bank*. The court denied the motion, concluding that the facts taken as a whole as to Ernst & Young's participation and knowledge could render it liable under a scheme to defraud. *Id.* at 969-72.

In *Adam*, the plaintiffs alleged that Deloitte & Touche was primarily liable under §10(b) for misrepresentations and "participation in a scheme to defraud" through its involvement with the issuer's press releases and financial statements. 884 F. Supp. at 1401. The plaintiffs also alleged that Deloitte knew of the inadequate controls and deviated from conducting its audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. *Id.* at 1399. The court denied the accounting firm's motion to dismiss because it found that its participation in the preparation of the issuer's statements was part of a scheme to defraud, making the firm primarily liable under Rule 10b-5. *Id.* at 1399-1401. In so holding, the court recognized that Rule 10b-5(b) "essentially outlaws the making of a material misrepresentation or omission," but that subsections (a) and (c) of the Rule "also" outlaw fraudulent schemes and courses of conduct. *Id.* at 1400.

In *In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Bus. Sec. Litig.*, 676 F. Supp. 458, 467-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), Morgan Stanley's liability did not depend on whether it "certified or made other public representations about a corporation's allegedly misleading statements"; rather, its "alleged role in knowingly or recklessly preparing the projections could constitute the employment of a 'device, scheme, or artifice to defraud' in violation of 10b-5(1) or an 'act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person' in violation of 10b-5(3)."

<sup>50</sup> *Aaron*, 446 U.S. at 696 n.13 ("Webster's International Dictionary (2d ed. 1934) defines ... 'scheme' as '[a] plan or program of something to be done; an enterprise; a project; as, a business *scheme* [or a] crafty, unethical project ....") (emphasis in original). To "scheme" is "[t]o form plans or designs; to devise intrigue." *Webster's International Dictionary* 2234 (2d ed. 1934). *The Oxford English Dictionary* 616 (2d ed. 1989) defines "scheme": "A plan, design; a programme of action .... Hence, [a] plan of action devised in order to attain some end; a purpose together with a system of measures contrived for its accomplishment; a project, enterprise." *Black's Law Dictionary* 1344 (6th ed. 1990) defines "scheme": "A design or plan formed to accomplish some purpose; a system."

<sup>51</sup> In *Harris v. United States*, 48 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1931), for example, "[t]he fraudulent scheme charged ... was one for the sale of [a mining company's] corporate stock ... by the manipulation of the price of the stock on the [stock exchanges] and the circulation of false reports concerning the mine through the mails." *Id.* at 774. "In fact, the whole scheme centered around the establishment of an alleged stock exchange value which is in fact wholly fictitious." *Id.* at 775.

"fraud-on-the-market" that is actionable under §10(b). *See Basic*, 485 U.S. at 241-47; *Lipton v. Documation, Inc.*, 734 F.2d 740, 744-47 (11th Cir. 1984). Every person who intentionally engages in a "scheme" to defraud is thus a **primary violator** of Rule 10b-5 and §10(b).

In *Affiliated Ute Citizens*, the Court observed that "the second subparagraph of the rule specifies the making of an untrue statement of a material fact and the omission to state a material fact," 406 U.S. at 152-53, but held that "[t]he first and third subparagraphs are not so restricted." *Id.* at 153. It held that the defendants violated Rule 10b-5 when they participated in "**a 'course of business' or a 'device, scheme, or artifice' that operated as a fraud**" – **even though these defendants had never themselves said anything that was false or misleading.** *Id.* "**Not every violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities law can be, or should be, forced into a category headed 'misrepresentations' or 'nondisclosures.'**" *Competitive Assocs.*, 516 F.2d at 814. "Fraudulent devices, practices, schemes, artifices and courses of business are also interdicted by the securities laws." *Id.*

Subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5 thus are aimed at "broader schemes of securities fraud" than are necessarily embodied in a single misleading statement or document, and the "'classic' fraud on the market case [which] **arises out of transactions on an open and developed market**" **easily fits within the expansive language of Rule 10b-5(1) and (3).** *Lipton*, 734 F.2d at 744, 745-47. Thus, the Fifth Circuit sitting *en banc* held that a defendant who did not himself make the statements in a misleading Offering Circular could be held primarily liable **as a participant in a larger scheme to defraud of which that Offering Circular was only a part: "Rather than containing the entire fraud, the Offering Circular was assertedly only one step in the course of an elaborate scheme."** *Shores*, 647 F.2d at 468.

In *Cooper*, 137 F.3d 616, plaintiffs sued Merisel, its officers and directors, its accountants, Deloitte and Touche **and Lehman Brothers and Robinson-Humphrey, investment banks which served as underwriters of Merisel's public offerings and issued analysts' reports on Merisel.** The complaint alleged that "[D]efendants falsely presented the Company's current and future business prospects and prolonged the illusion of revenue and earnings growth by making it appear that the Company's revenue and earnings growth was strong and would continue." *Id.* at 620.

Defendants argued that "plaintiffs cannot allege a 'scheme' to defraud, because *those are conspiracy allegations foreclosed by Central Bank.*" *Id.* at 624. However, the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that the complaint "alleges a 'scheme' in which Merisel and the other defendants directly participated, tracking the language of *Rule 10b-5(a), which makes it unlawful for any person 'to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.'*" *Id.* Moreover, "Central Bank does not preclude liability based on allegations that a group of defendants acted together to violate the securities laws, as long as each defendant *committed a manipulative or deceptive act in furtherance of the scheme.*" *Id.* Furthermore,

"[t]he absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from liability under the securities Acts. *Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) ... may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5....* In any complex securities fraud, moreover, there are likely to be multiple violators....

*Id.* at 624-25.

In *First Jersey*, 101 F.3d 1450, a top First Jersey corporate official who had not made any false statement claimed he should not be held liable under §10(b) of the 1934 Act for an extensive violation of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by First Jersey. The Second Circuit stated:

Brennan contends that even if First Jersey committed fraud, he should not have been held personally liable for any violation ... as a primary violator of the securities law....

#### 1. Primary Liability

"Any person or entity ... who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under [federal securities law], assuming all of the requirements for primary liability ... are met." *Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank*, 511 U.S. 164, 191, 128 L. Ed. 2d 119, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994) (emphasis omitted). *Primary liability may be imposed "not only on persons who made fraudulent misrepresentations but also on those who had knowledge of the fraud and assisted in its perpetration."* *Azzielli v. Cohen Law Offices*, 21 F. 3d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1994).

*The evidence presented at trial sufficed to establish that Brennan had knowledge of First Jersey's frauds and participated in the fraudulent scheme.*

\* \* \*

In light of the evidence presented at trial with regard to Brennan's hands-on involvement in the pertinent decisions, we conclude that the trial court did not err in

finding that Brennan ***knowingly participated in First Jersey's illegal activity and that he should be held primarily liable for its violations of the securities laws.***

*Id.* at 1471-72.

And, in fact, many Courts have upheld complaints against banks in §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 cases where, as here, false statements, manipulative or deceptive devices, contrivances and acts, and participation in a scheme to defraud have been alleged with sufficient particularity.

In *Cooper*, 137 F.3d at 628, the court held scheme liability had survived *Central Bank* and specifically noted that allegations that the investment banks named as defendants there had knowingly issued false analysts' reports and had "***access to inside information***" set them apart from other analysts who had issued favorable reports on the issuer during the Class Period and stated a valid §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim.

Lehman Brothers also made specific forecasts.... Although the complaint quotes other analysts who made similar positive statements about [the company's] current status and future prospects, this does not mean that the Lehman Brothers and Robinson-Humphrey analysts' statements are somehow automatically reasonable. All the analysts wrote optimistic reports based in part on information from [the company]; ***only Robinson-Humphrey and Lehman Brothers are alleged to have known better through their access to inside information.***

Even the analysts' optimistic statements can be actionable if not genuinely and reasonably believed, or if the speaker is aware of undisclosed facts that tend seriously to undermine the statement's accuracy.... The complaint alleges that the analysts were aware of undisclosed facts that showed there was no reasonable basis for their forecasts, which they did not genuinely believe.

*Id.* at 629. These false analysts' reports were misleading and deceptive acts and part of the fraudulent scheme. When the banks in *Cooper* claimed the so-called "Chinese Wall" shielded them from liability, the Ninth Circuit rejected this assertion:

[Defendant investment banks] Robinson-Humphrey and Lehman Brothers assert that they followed SEC rules which prevent the sharing of inside information within their companies. 15 U.S.C. §78o(f) requires registered brokers or dealers to create and enforce "written policies and procedures reasonably designed ... to prevent the misuse ... of material, nonpublic information by such broker or dealer or any person associated with such broker or dealer," and authorizes the SEC to create rules for such policies. ***If Robinson-Humphrey and Lehman Brothers have established such policies and followed them in this case, they may raise that as a defense. The existence of such policies does not, however, preclude plaintiffs from asserting in their complaint that inside information was misused.***

*Id.* at 628-29. The court said that the Chinese Wall might later be used as a defense, but, the court said, such an assertion (a factual issue) was ***not*** a defense at the motion to dismiss stage.

In *Murphy v. Hollywood Entm't Corp.*, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22207, and *Flecker v. Hollywood Entm't Corp.*, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5329, the court refused to dismiss a complaint against investment bankers and then later refused to grant summary judgment to those banks, stating that their "**roles as analysts, investment bankers and business advisors with extensive contacts with [issuer] defendants, superior access to non-public information and participation in both drafting and decision-making is sufficient to establish a triable primary liability claim under §10(b).**" *Id.* at \*25. In initially denying the bank's motion to dismiss, the court recognized that "**any person or entity who directly participates in an alleged violation of §10(b), even if that person falls within the category of professionals usually deemed 'collateral' participants, may still be liable as a 'primary violator' under § 10(b).**" *Id.* at \*20-\*21. The court concluded:

As for the Underwriters' role in the alleged fraud, plaintiffs do not allege the existence of any contemporaneous "smoking gun" type of documents which would demonstrate that the Underwriter defendants knew they were selling a landfill when they sold Hollywood securities. However, plaintiffs do allege that the underwriter defendants had a "**close association" with Hollywood which gave them "constant access" to the individual Hollywood defendants and all relevant, non-public information about the company. Plaintiffs further allege that the underwriter defendants were "direct participants" in the alleged wrongdoing by their role in coordinating the offering, drafting disputed offering documents and conducting a due diligence investigation. This is sufficient to bring the complaint within the scope of allegations similar to those sustained by the Ninth Circuit in Software Toolworks....** Plaintiffs' claims are not limited to accounting fraud and thus, the underwriters' claimed reliance upon certified accounting statements does not bar the maintenance of plaintiffs' claims under 10(b). **Further, whether the underwriters' reliance upon expertised portions of the financial statements was reasonable as a matter of law is an issue best addressed on summary judgment....**

*Murphy*, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22207, at \*21-\*23.

In later denying summary judgment, the *Flecker* court noted that the defendants' motive included a "**desire to keep the stock price above \$ 25.50 to avoid having to redeem**" certain shares previously issued in a corporate transaction and that the investment banks "**stood to accrue significant fees.**" *Flecker*, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5329, at \*14. The court stated that "primary liability extends to all who make assertions 'in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing public'" (*id.* at \*23) and then denied summary judgment because:

[T]he underwriters ... had long standing close connections to Hollywood such that they either knew or should have known that historical revenues were misstated due to changes in the same store sales base, and that revenue projections were ill-founded given the company's earnings track record as influenced by accounting changes

which had the effect of adding revenue to Hollywood's balance sheets and prior earnings per share dividends.

\* \* \*

Based on the foregoing, I find that defendants' roles as analysts, investment bankers and business advisors with extensive contacts with Hollywood defendants, superior access to non-public information and participation in both drafting and decision-making is sufficient to establish a triable primary liability claim under § 10(b).

*Id.* at \*20, \*25.

*Livent*, 174 F. Supp. 2d 144, shows that a valid §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim has been alleged here. In *Livent*, purchasers of Livent securities sued Livent's investment bank (CIBC) for violations of 1933 Act §11 and 1934 Act §10(b)/Rule 10b-5. The court held plaintiffs' §11 claims sufficient under a Rule 8 non-fraud pleading standard. The court also sustained the adequacy of the §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claims – finding the bank's participation in "Livent's fraudulent scheme" was adequately pleaded. The key allegation against CIBC was that CIBC allegedly made a \$4.6 million payment to Livent in return for theatrical royalties, which in reality was a secret "bridge" loan, as CIBC had a side agreement from Livent to repurchase the \$4.6 advance in six months for \$4.6 million, plus interest – the "CIBC Wood Gundy Agreement." This was a fraudulent contrivance because Livent recorded income on the transaction, but did not record the loan. The district court held scienter adequately alleged, stating:

It does not require an unreasonable inferential leap to conclude, as the Noteholders suggest, that in entering into the bridge loan transaction and secret side agreements with Livent, CIBC, as Livent's investment bankers since 1993, had acquired substantial knowledge of Livent's real financial condition and was aware of Livent's reasons to account for the \$ 4.6 million "non-refundable fee" as a revenue-generating investment rather than a repayable loan....

Significantly, according to the complaint, the proceeds from the alleged fraudulent arrangement were reported by Livent as current revenue in its accounts and public registration statements in order [to] [sic] create a false financial basis to reinforce and ensure the success of Livent securities issues intended in part to repay Livent's substantial debt to CIBC.

From these allegations, *it is fair to infer that in entering into the CIBC Wood Gundy Agreement, CIBC was aware not only that Livent contemplated marketing securities on the basis of public representations of its financial condition that Livent knew to be false, but that CIBC itself subsequently undertook to solicit and sell the very securities whose value incorporated and was affected by the falsehood CIBC itself had conceived with Livent. In this manner, CIBC's*

*participation in Livent's fraudulent scheme went beyond a passive capacity as Livent's investment banker and financial adviser.*

\* \* \*

*The Noteholders have pled facts suggesting that CIBC became part and parcel of Livent's misleading statements by entering into a loan transaction whose true character and financial implications it agreed not to disclose. This financial interest and complicity not only assisted Livent in concealing critical information, it also committed CIBC to similarly withhold the truth from investors with whom it dealt in Livent securities, a commitment that effectively conflicted with any applicable duty CIBC had to disclose material facts in connection with subsequent public sales of such securities affected by the transaction.*

*Rather than generally reflecting the profit motive of any securities dealer, the concrete benefit derived by CIBC from Livent's fraud alleged here was uniquely personal to CIBC in several ways. Only CIBC, as Livent's investment bankers since 1993, is alleged to have had a longstanding, intimate relationship with Livent executives that offered it uncommon opportunity to know of, and play an active role in Livent's, financial affairs. And only CIBC is accused, in furtherance of its own motives, of assisting Livent in structuring and keeping secret the misrepresented CIBC Wood Gundy Agreement. Later, in publicly marketing Livent securities whose value partly depended on the true nature of that agreement, CIBC stood to realize gains particular to it. Beyond the standard fees and commissions associated with any investment bank's sales of securities, CIBC had a higher stake in Livent's public financings. It uniquely benefitted from the application of the proceeds of the Notes sales to Livent's considerable debt to CIBC.*

*Id.* at 151-54.

Similarly, in *Cascade*, 840 F. Supp. 1558, the court found that allegations that a securities broker ignored red flags presented a sufficient showing of recklessness to constitute scienter. According to the complaint, the broker, Raymond James, continued to recommend Cascade's stock, ignoring red flags that had been raised, while its

"reports and statements with respect to [the company], while purporting to be disinterested and objective professional investment analyses, based on in-depth current research, were in reality substantially false and misleading sales brochures which made exaggerated predictions based on unverified and unsupported information for which Raymond James knew, or should have known, it had no reasonable basis."

*Id.* at 1578. Based on the broker's alleged disregard of red flags, the court held the complaint sufficiently pleaded scienter. "These allegations, if true, may evince severe recklessness or proof of knowing misconduct." *Id.*

Finally, in *Bre-X-Minerals*, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4571, the court denied the motion to dismiss by J.P. Morgan based on allegations it participated in a scheme to violate §10(b) and Rule

10b-5 in connection with the securities fraud involving Bre-X. In *Bre-X Minerals*, plaintiffs alleged involvement of J.P. Morgan in assisting Bre-X in structuring fraudulent business transactions, acting as Bre-X's financial advisor, and issuing false analysts' reports – ignoring "red flags" that Bre-X's claimed assets were falsified. Thus, J.P. Morgan's motion to dismiss was denied.<sup>52</sup>

The CC in this action pleads more wrongful conduct by Bank America vis-à-vis the fraudulent scheme involving Enron and with more specificity than was pleaded in any of the above cases where complaints naming banks as defendants in §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 actions were upheld.

Defendants cannot escape liability by claiming that the illicit SPEs and contrived transactions detailed in the CC do not meet the technical definition of a "manipulative device." It is of no moment that certain cases, purportedly building on *Santa Fe*, 430 U.S. 462, appear to have expressly read into §10(b)'s manipulation language a limited and restrictive congressional intent to simply prohibit such "practices in the marketplace which have the effect of either creating the false impression that certain market activity is occurring when in fact such activity is unrelated to actual supply and demand or tampering with the price itself." *Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co.*, 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1360 (N.D. Tex. 1979); *see also Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc.*, 568 F. Supp. 197 (D. Del. 1983), *aff'd*, 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1984); *In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Sec. Litig.*, 484 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Tex. 1979). **First**, whether or not the SPEs and transactions are technically "market manipulation" devices is academic even under these very cases. The SPE transactions have been pleaded as both contrivances and deceptive devices – and each was clearly deceptive for they falsified Enron financial condition – thereby allowing for Rule 10b-5 scheme liability to attach. *See, e.g., Hundahl*, 465 F. Supp. at 1360 ("Few efforts to play with the price of

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<sup>52</sup> *See also U.S. Env'tl.*, 155 F.3d at 112 (while there is no aiding and abetting, where complaint properly alleged defendant to be primary violator because he "**participated in the fraudulent scheme**," noting "**lawyers, accountants, and banks who engage in fraudulent or deceptive practices at their client's direction [are] a primary violator**"); *Scholnick*, 752 F. Supp. at 1323 & n.9 ("bank ... may still be held liable under Rule 10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c) as a participant in the allegedly fraudulent scheme" and "allegations that Continental was directly involved in perpetrating a fraudulent scheme distinguish" case from situation where bank was only engaging in a "routine commercial financing transaction").

a traded stock can be successful without running afoul of section 10(b)'s other weapon deception." ).<sup>53</sup> **Second**, *Santa Fe* is not so restrictive as defendants and certain courts would make it seem. Indeed, the Court clearly expressed its approval of reading the manipulation language of §10(b) broadly by stating: "No doubt Congress meant to prohibit **the full range of ingenious devices** that might be used to manipulate securities prices." *Santa Fe*, 430 U.S. at 477.<sup>54</sup> **Third**, *Santa Fe*, *Hundahl*, *Schreiber* and *Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro* are all clearly off-point because each case really involved what was merely a state law breach of fiduciary duty cause of action, stemming from a corporate merger or acquisition, dressed up in ill-fitting federal securities law garb.<sup>55</sup> This case is not a mere mismanagement or breach of fiduciary duty case. Without question, it is properly before the court as a federal securities action alleging fraud and deception. No one could plausibly suggest otherwise.

In finding the complaint in *Landry's* did not adequately plead a §10(b) claim against the defendant investment banks there, this court stated:

Plaintiffs have generally alleged without any particularity that the Underwriters also conducted a comprehensive due diligence investigation into Landry's operations and future prospects in connection with the secondary offering, for which they helped prepare the Registration Statement and Prospectus. They purportedly had access to confidential corporate information and communicated frequently with Fertitta and West about the business, but Plaintiffs fail to provide any details or identify specifically **what kind of information, when it was conveyed, by whom and to whom**. Plaintiffs have failed to identify any specific information communicated by

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<sup>53</sup> Liability under §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may be imposed for actions either manipulative or deceptive. *See, e.g., Cooper*, 137 F.3d at 624 (Each defendant is a primary actor liable under §10(b) "as long as each defendant committed a **manipulative** or **deceptive** act in furtherance of the **scheme**.").

<sup>54</sup> *See also* 430 U.S. at 475-76 ("Those cases forcefully reflect the principle that '[§]10(b) must be read flexibly, **not technically and restrictively**' and that the statute provides a cause of action for any plaintiff who 'suffer[s] an injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale [or purchase] of securities....'").

<sup>55</sup> *See, e.g. Santa Fe*, 430 U.S. at 480 ("There may well be a need for uniform federal fiduciary standards to govern mergers such as that challenged in this complaint. But those standards should not be supplied by judicial extension of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5...."); *Schreiber*, 568 F. Supp. at 205 ("This case is the perfect example of a plaintiff, who may have nonfrivolous claims based on state law for breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, breach of fiduciary duties and perhaps even conspiracy, attempting to characterize those state law claims as violations of the federal securities laws."); *Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro*, 484 F. Supp. at 259 (plaintiffs bringing additional claims for "breach of fiduciary duty" stemming from merger activities); *Hundahl*, 465 F. Supp. at 1362 ("[F]ederalism supports this court's definition of manipulation. The court in *Santa Fe* stated its reluctance to imply a federal cause of action for a claim 'traditionally relegated to state law....' "[T]he 39 acts of which plaintiffs complain ... are classic breaches of fiduciary duty.")

document or conversations to the Underwriter Defendants or uncovered by them in their due diligence investigation. Instead they have made general statements that might give rise to speculation, but not particularized facts giving rise to a strong inference that the Underwriters acted with severe recklessness or knowingly to support allegations of fraud under the Exchange Act.

*Landry's*, slip op. at 66. Obviously, the allegations against Bank America in this case are much more detailed than those found wanting in *Landry's*. The specifics regarding Bank America's (or its executives') secret funding of LJM2 – *as LJM2's largest investor* – to enable LJM2 to engage in numerous non-arm's-length fraudulent deals with Enron which artificially boosted Enron's reported earnings by hundreds of millions of dollars, while hiding billions of dollars of its debt, while Bank America or its top executives enjoyed the lush returns of those deals *i.e.*, the looting of Enron, *plus* the extensive investment banking and *commercial* lending relationship between Bank America and Enron (10 securities offerings raising \$6+ billion and several loans/loan commitments totaling \$5+ billion) distinguish the pleading here from that found wanting under §10b/Rule 10b-5 in *Landry's*. Bank America actually took affirmative steps to further the fraudulent scheme while enjoying the direct economic benefits of the scheme. Nothing approaching this was alleged in *Landry's*.

#### **VI. BANK AMERICA MADE FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS IN A REGISTRATION STATEMENTS AND ANALYSTS REPORTS**

Bank America makes two arguments with respect to whether its analyst reports are actionable under Section 10(b) for being misleading; neither is convincing. *First*, Bank America asserts that plaintiffs "fail to satisfy the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) and the Reform Act." Mot. at 19. This is not the case, as demonstrated herein, and which is evident from a close reading of the CC. *Second*, Bank America argues that its analyst statements are not actionable because "a securities analyst is not liable to the entire marketplace for allegedly misleading analyst reports issued to its clients." Mot. at 34. Bank America, however, misrepresents reality. Bank America is well aware that its analyst reports are disseminated to a broad spectrum of institutional investors via services that those institutional investors subscribe to. These institutional investors set the market price for securities, such as Enron's securities, upon which plaintiffs rely pursuant to the fraud-on-the-market theory. This is why Bank America is only able to find a very few district court cases that

run contrary to the wealth of case law cited by plaintiffs that hold investment banks liable for the statements of their analysts.

Contrary to the Bank America claims, the CC is actually quite specific in detailing the false and misleading statements made by Bank America. The CC details several false and misleading statements made by Bank America in 15 analysts' report it issued on Enron which helped to artificially inflate the trading prices of Enron's securities.<sup>56</sup>

In 8/99-9/99, as Enron's stock stagnated, Bank America stepped forward to push the stock higher. On 9/30/99, Bank America issued a report on Enron, rating Enron a "**Buy**" and forecasting 00 EPS of \$1.38 and a 15% secular EPS growth rate for Enron. It also stated:

- ... Enron's rapidly evolving strategy to capitalize on the exploding demand for high-bandwidth products and services.... Enron is approaching this business in a unique and innovative manner .... Enron expects this sector ... to grow 100%+ per year over the foreseeable future.
- Other important comments included management's conviction in Enron Energy Services' ability *to turn profitable in 4Q99 and increase its contribution going forward.*

¶173.

On 10/12/99, Bank America issued a report on Enron. It rated Enron a "**Buy**," forecast 00 EPS of \$1.38 and a 15% secular EPS growth rate for Enron. It also stated:

ENE reported solid 3Q99 EPS results of \$0.27 ... compares to our estimate of \$0.26. Greater year over year earnings were primarily a result of continued *strong performance from its wholesale businesses as well as better than expected results from its retail energy services operations* .... We are maintaining our **Buy** rating ....

More significantly, 3Q99 results demonstrate that ENE has positioned itself in the sweet spot of the evolving energy and communications businesses both domestically and internationally.... *The company's retail energy services segment is outperforming our expectations and holds the potential to be a major business in the next year.*

\* \* \*

Retail Energy Services produced the best quarterly results since the inception of the business .... During the quarter, Enron Energy Services entered into contracts representing \$2.5 billion of future customers expenditures for energy services, or three times the \$850 million contracted in the third quarter a year ago. In a

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<sup>56</sup> The issue is not whether or not Bank America owed some generalized duty to the market. Bank America's false and misleading statements were issued as part of its participation in a scheme to defraud, which it clearly had a duty not to participate in.

significant development during the quarter, Enron Energy Services entered into a contract with Owens Corning, representing the largest contract signed to date involving a major industrial company. The contract calls for Owens Corning to buy \$1.1 billion worth of electricity and energy-management services for 20 domestic manufacturing plants from Enron over the next ten years. With the addition of the Owens Corning contract and others expected to follow *shortly, Enron is confident that it will meet or beat its target of \$8 billion in contracts for 1999, which will be more than double the value of contracts signed during 1998....* Given this tremendous growth, we have a high degree of confidence that the Retail Energy Services business will generate positive cash flow and earnings by 4Q99.

¶182.

On 10/15/99, Bank America issued a report on Enron. It rated Enron a "**Buy**" and forecast 00 EPS of \$1.38 and a 15% secular EPS growth rate for Enron. It also stated:

ENE: EES Announces \$1.5 Billion Contract with REIT, Total Backlog in '99 Now \$7.4 B

(EES) ... announced a \$1.5 billion contract with Simon Brand Ventures to manage the energy needs of all of Simon's real estate properties over a ten year period....

The Simon contract brings EES' total announced backlog in 1999 to \$7.4 billion. EES signed \$3.8 billion of contracts in 1998 and \$1.2 billion in 1997.

\* \* \*

EES has now announced \$3 billion of long term outsourcing contracts within the last few weeks. *We believe the momentum and quality of contracts fully validate Enron's strategy and dominant presence in this field.* EES is expected to contribute at least \$50 million of ... (IBIT) in FY00 ....

¶185.

In 11/99, rumors circulated that Enron was having difficulties making its 4thQ 99 "numbers" due to problems with Enron's EES and Indian operations. As a result, Enron's stock began to weaken and fell to as low as \$34-7/8 on 11/23/99. To help support Enron's stock price, certain of Enron's bankers, including Bank America at Enron's behest, issued extremely positive – but false – reports on Enron assuring investors that Enron's business fundamentals were strong, that Enron was on track to meet or exceed forecasted levels of earnings and that any price weakness in Enron stock should be viewed as a buying opportunity. ¶189.

On 12/16/99, Bank America issued a report on Enron. It rated Enron a "**Buy**" and forecast 00 EPS of \$1.38 and a 15% secular EPS growth rate for Enron. It also stated:

- We met with Enron management yesterday .... We believe there could be significant potential upside in Enron's stock as investors have the opportunity to

understand the value of the company's communications investments and overall strategy.

\* \* \*

- We believe that Enron Communications strategy has significant potential .... We see this as an excellent time for investors to establish or increase holdings of Enron's stock, and would use any sector wide weakness as a buying opportunity. *We continue to rates shares of Enron Buy ....*

¶193.

On 1/12/00, Bank America issued a report on Enron. It **increased** the rating on Enron to a "**Strong Buy**," **increased** the stock target price to \$75 and forecast 00 and 01 EPS of \$1.35 and \$1.55 and a 15% secular EPS growth rate for Enron. It also stated:

- *We are raising our 12-month price target for Enron Corp. to \$75 from \$45 and our rating to Strong Buy from Buy.* We believe Enron Communications (ECI), represents significant unrecognized value in the stock.... *We recommend investors add aggressively to current positions or establish core positions in the stock at current levels ....*

\* \* \*

ECI has two new and related businesses. Company is the first mover and has unique technology advantage to support the following integrated services:

1. Performance-enhancing Network for Internet Content. The company has developed a software platform that can be used to enable guaranteed high performance Internet content delivery over its (or third parties') optical network backbone infrastructure....
2. Bandwidth Capacity Reselling – Unique in the marketplace; Enron already dominates in the same business in energy markets. ECI exploits fixed-cost pricing model of traditional long haul carriers, *buys unused portion of ISP backbone then redistributes at profit.*

\* \* \*

... We recommend investors add aggressively to current positions or establish core positions in the stock at current levels, ahead of the company's January 20th analyst conference. In our opinion, the company can justify a potential market value for ECI between \$25 and \$30 billion at the conference.

¶195.

On 1/18/00, Bank America issued a report on Enron. It rated Enron a "**Strong Buy**" and forecast 00 and 01 EPS of \$1.35 and \$1.55 and a 15% secular growth rate for Enron. It also stated:

- Enron Corp. reported fourth quarter EPS of \$0.31, ahead of our \$0.27 estimate and an increase of 29% year over year. For the full year 1999, ENE reported \$1.18 ... an increase of 18% versus the prior year. Fourth quarter

EPS was driven by continued growth in the Wholesale Energy Operations and Services (WEOS) business, which increased operating income by 31% .... Enron Energy Services (EES) also reported its first profitable quarter, generating \$7 million in operating income. *We continue to rate ENE Strong Buy* ....

\* \* \*

- *As expected, Enron Energy Services reported a profit in the fourth quarter.... We continue to expect EES will contribute meaningfully to EPS in 2000.*
- *We recently raised our 12-month price target for ENE to \$75 from \$45 and our rating to Strong Buy from Buy.*

¶200.

On 1/20/00, Bank America issued a report on Enron. It rated Enron a "**Strong Buy**" and forecast 00 and 01 EPS of \$1.35 and \$1.55 and a 15% secular EPS growth rate for Enron. It also stated:

- Enron Corp. announced at its analyst conference today that it has entered into a joint venture with Sun Microsystems to develop further Enron's Intelligent Network ....
- *This is a huge step forward for Enron to drive broadband high content Internet traffic onto its network, and we believe will further enhance Enron's first mover advantage to deliver unique performance-enhanced services to next generation content providers and ISPs.*

\* \* \*

- We reiterate our **Strong Buy** rating on shares of Enron ....

¶203.

The statements made in the seven analysts' reports issued by Bank America between 9/30/99-1/20/00, were false or misleading when issued. The true but concealed facts were:

(a) Enron's financial statements and results issued during this period were false and misleading as they inflated Enron's revenues, earnings, assets, and equity and concealed billions of dollars of debt that should have been shown on Enron's balance sheet, as described in ¶¶418-611.

(b) Enron's financial condition, including its liquidity and credit standing, was not nearly as strong as represented, as Enron was concealing billions of dollars of debt that should have been reported on its balance sheet – and which would have very negatively affected its credit rating,

financial condition and liquidity – by improperly transferring that debt to the balance sheets of various non-qualifying SPEs and partnerships it controlled.

(c) Enron generated hundreds of millions of dollars of profits and transferred billions of dollars of debt off its balance sheet by entering into non-arm's-length transactions with SPEs and partnerships Enron controlled.

(d) The financial performance and the value of contracts entered into by EES were grossly overstated through various techniques, including the misuse and abuse of mark-to-market accounting to create huge current-period values for Enron on what were, in fact, highly speculative and indeterminate outcomes of long-term contracts. This resulted in EES improperly and prematurely recognizing hundreds of millions of dollars of revenue that not only boosted its financial results, but allowed top EES managers and executives to collect huge bonuses based on these improperly inflated contract valuations.

(e) EES was, in fact, losing hundreds of millions of dollars on many of its retail energy contracts. To induce customers to enter into these agreements – so that Enron could claim its EES business was growing and succeeding – Enron had, in effect, "purchased" their participation by promising them unrealistic savings, charging low prices Enron knew would likely result in a loss, and spending millions of dollars in the short term to purchase purportedly more energy-efficient equipment, a significant portion of which costs Enron was likely never to recover and certainly never to make a profit on. Enron would lose money on the EES deals, but had to make them more and more attractive to generate new clients, while the Company utilized unrealistic projections and mark-to-market accounting to mislead investors into believing that the EES contracts were making money. In the 4thQ 99 EES deal with Owens Illinois, EES recognized a multi-million dollar profit when the deal closed, even though this deal would lose money for EES.

(f) The purported prospects for, and actual success of, Enron's EBS division was grossly overstated. **First**, Enron's broadband network – the so-called Enron Intelligent Network ("EIN") – was plagued by serious and persistent technical difficulties, which prevented it from providing the type of high-speed and high-quality transmission that was indispensable to any hope of commercial success. **Second**, Enron was encountering significant difficulties in completing the

build-out of its broadband network and, as a result, did not have currently, and would not have at any reasonable time in the foreseeable future, a functioning broadband network.

(g) The prospects for future revenue and profits from Enron's EBS operation *and* the purported value of that operation to Enron and to its stock price were completely false based on arbitrary and unrealistic assertions without any basis in fact because Enron knew from *current* problems in that business, as well as the current state of EBS business, that such revenue and profit forecasts and valuations were unobtainable.

(h) As a result of the foregoing, the forecasts for strong continued revenue and earnings growth for Enron's wholesale and retail energy operations were completely false, in part, because the historical financial performance and condition of those operations had been materially falsified – thus there was no real basis upon which to forecast such further growth – and because neither of those businesses had the current strengths or success to justify the forecasts and claims of future growth that were being made.

(i) As a result of the foregoing, the revenue and EPS forecasts being made by and for Enron going forward were also grossly false because historical earnings, upon which those forecasts were based, were falsified and the result of improper accounting manipulation. In truth, Enron's various business operations not only had huge concealed losses that would have to be recognized and would very adversely impact Enron's financial results, but those core business operations simply did not have the strength or success necessary for them to generate anywhere near the kind of revenue and profit growth being forecast for them. ¶214.

By 4/00, Enron stock had soared higher, in part due to Bank America's extremely positive statements about Enron over the prior months. To help support the stock – and push it even higher – Bank America continued to issue very positive – but false statements – about Enron. On 4/17/00, Bank America issued a report on Enron. It rated Enron a "**Strong Buy**" and forecast 00 and 01 EPS of \$1.35 and \$1.55 and a 15% secular EPS growth rate for Enron. It also stated:

- An impressive quarter for ENE. Driven primarily by strong growth from Wholesale Energy Operations and Retail Energy Services, ENE reported an 18% increase in earnings per share to \$0.40 in 1Q00 from \$0.34 in 1Q99.... ***The number beat our EPS estimate ....***

\* \* \*

- Retail Energy Services reported healthy EBIT of \$16 million in 1Q00 compared to a loss of \$31 million in 1Q99. Record contracting activity, including some heavyweight contracts from the likes of IBM and Chase Manhattan, is the driver behind the YOY growth in this segment. With \$3.7 billion of new energy contracts during the quarter, this was the seventh consecutive quarter of record new contracting activity....
- During the quarter, ENE Broadband achieved 85% of its year-end delivery goal.... We expect to see big things from ENE in this business ....

¶233.

On 7/24/00, Bank America issued a report on Enron. It rated Enron a "**Strong Buy**" and forecast 00 and 01 EPS of \$1.37 and \$1.55 and a 15% secular EPS growth rate for Enron. It also stated:

- ENE reported 2Q00 EPS of \$0.34, which was slightly above our estimate .... Net income increased 30% to \$289 million ....
- Results were strong across the board.

\* \* \*

- ... ENE announced that it had entered into a 20-year agreement with Blockbuster ... to provide video on demand through ENE's broadband delivery platform. ***The service is expected to roll out in several US cities by the end of this year with an expansion into other US cities and abroad by FY01.***

\* \* \*

- ENE's Retail Energy Services segment reported 2Q00 EBIT of \$24 million .... Significant scale was achieved during the quarter with the addition of contracts representing \$3.8 billion of customer's future energy expenditures.

\* \* \*

- Finally, ENE's Broadband Services segment reported total revenue of \$151 million and a net loss of \$8 million in 2Q00. ***Included in these figures was a \$50 million non-recurring gain from the sale of dark fiber assets during the quarter.***

\* \* \*

- We maintain our ... ***Strong Buy*** rating.

¶252.

By 8/00, Enron was reaching its all-time high – due in part to Bank America's repeated false statements about Enron. Bank America continued to hype the stock – to support it and try to push

it even higher. On 8/17/00, Bank America issued a report on Enron. It rated Enron a "**Strong Buy**," with a \$105 price target, and forecast 00 and 01 EPS of \$1.40 and \$1.60 and a 15% secular EPS growth rate for Enron. It also stated:

ENE: Outlook Increasingly Bullish; Raising Price Target

- ENE's outlook continues to be very promising ... ***we are raising our 12-month price objective to \$105 ....***
- ... ENE's core growth engine, wholesale energy operations, is expected to grow ... 30-40% per annum for the foreseeable future ....
- ... [E]nergy services ... also continues to provide substantial earnings growth .... ***The growth is remarkable with total contract values now at \$20 billion....***
- ... Enron Broadband Services ... ***holds potential to double the size of the company within the next few years ....*** ENE announced that it entered into a 20-year agreement to provide video on demand through ENE's broadband delivery platform.... ***This venture provides credibility to ENE's broadband technology and strategy, in our opinion....***
- ... ***We reiterate our Strong Buy opinion ....***

¶255.

On 9/19/00, Bank America issued a report on Enron. It rated Enron a "**Strong Buy**" and forecast 00 and 01 EPS of \$1.40 and \$1.60 and a 15% secular EPS growth rate for Enron. It also stated:

- Vice Chairman Lou Pai's presentation at our annual investment conference was very well attended. ***The key message in the presentation is that Enron is at the cusp of reaping rewards from businesses that they have created and built up over the past few years, namely Enron Energy Services ... and Enron Broadband Services.***

\* \* \*

- ***Enron Energy Services continues to capitalize on the energy-outsourcing trend. The growth is remarkable as Enron more than doubled its contract value to \$7.5 billion in 1H00. We believe Enron is on track to achieve its \$16 billion target and will likely hit a new plateau of growth by the end of this year.***
- ***On the Enron Intelligent Network, the fiber build out is on schedule for 14,500 miles by the end of this year.*** It currently has more than 5,000 miles complete .... Enron's foray into bandwidth intermediation. ***Enron has already transacted with 17 counter parties with 60 counter parties currently reviewing contract terms.***

- ***In terms of content, Enron Broadband Services with Blockbuster are expected to be available in two U.S. cities by the end of this year with a full roll out in 2001.***

¶258.

In early 10/00, Enron's stock declined, ***falling below the first of the equity trigger issuance prices*** contained in Enron's SPE deals which Bank America was helping to finance via LJM2. To try to support Enron's stock, on 10/17/00, Bank America issued a report on Enron. It rated Enron a "***Strong Buy***," with a \$105 price target, and forecast 00 and 01 EPS of \$1.43 and \$1.65 and a 15% secular EPS growth rate for Enron. It also stated:

- ENE reported 3Q00 EPS of \$0.34, which was above ... our estimate .... EPS grew 26% from 3Q99 EPS of \$0.27.... [N]et income for the quarter totaled \$292 million, a 31% increase over \$223 million earned in 3Q99.
- Once again, the impressive results were driven largely by extraordinary growth from the company's wholesale energy segment. EBIT from the segment grew to \$627 million during the quarter from \$378 million in 3Q99, ***a 66% increase.***

\* \* \*

- Enron Energy Services continues to capitalize on the energy-outsourcing trend. During the quarter, EBIT from the segment totaled \$30 million compared to a loss of \$18 million in 3Q99. We believe ENE is on track to achieve its \$16 billion contract value target and will likely hit a new plateau of growth by the end of this year.

\* \* \*

- ... ENE has begun to roll out its entertainment-on-demand product with Blockbuster Inc. which will provide movies .... ***The company has already implemented it in certain areas of four U.S. markets, which is expects to complete by year-end FY00. ENE expects to roll this business out in more U.S. cities and into Europe by the beginning of FY01.***

¶265.

The statements made in the five analysts' reports issued by Bank America between 4/17/00-10/17/00, were false or misleading when issued. The true but concealed facts were:

(a) Enron's financial statements and results issued during this period were false and misleading as they inflated Enron's revenues, earnings, assets, and equity and concealed billions of dollars of debt that should have been shown on Enron's balance sheet, as described in ¶¶418-611.

(b) Enron's financial condition, including its liquidity and credit standing, was not nearly as strong as represented, as Enron was concealing billions of dollars of debt that should have

been reported on its balance sheet – and which would have very negatively affected its credit rating, financial condition and liquidity – by improperly transferring that debt to the balance sheets of various non-qualifying SPEs and partnerships it controlled, as detailed herein.

(c) Enron generated hundreds of millions of dollars of profits and transferred billions of dollars of debt off its balance sheet by entering into non-arm's-length transactions with SPEs and partnerships Enron controlled.

(d) The results of Enron's WEOS business – its largest business unit – were manipulated and falsified to boost its reported profitability in various ways. *First*, by phony or illusory hedging transactions with entities that were not independent of Enron. *Second*, by the abuse of mark-to-market accounting by adopting unreasonable contract valuations and economic assumptions when contracts were initially entered into. And *third*, by arbitrarily adjusting those values upward at quarter's end to boost the wholesale operation's profits for that period – a practice known inside Enron as "moving the curve." ***Curve manipulations occurred in every quarter in all of Enron's WEOS operation.***

(e) The financial performance and the value of contracts entered into by EES were grossly overstated through various techniques, including the misuse and abuse of mark-to-market accounting to create huge current-period values for Enron on what were, in fact, highly speculative and indeterminate outcomes of long-term contracts. This resulted in EES improperly and prematurely recognizing hundreds of millions of dollars of revenue that not only boosted its financial results, but allowed top EES managers and executives to collect huge bonuses based on these improperly inflated contract valuations.

(f) EES was, in fact, losing hundreds of millions of dollars on many of its retail energy contracts. To induce customers to enter into these agreements – so that Enron could claim its EES business was growing and succeeding – Enron had, in effect, "purchased" their participation by promising them unrealistic savings, charging low prices Enron knew would likely result in a loss, and spending millions of dollars in the short term to purchase purportedly more energy-efficient equipment, a significant portion of which costs Enron was likely never to recover and certainly never to make a profit on. Enron would lose money on the EES deals, but had to make them more and

more attractive to generate new clients, while the Company utilized unrealistic projections and mark-to-market accounting to mislead investors into believing that the EES contracts were making money.

(g) EES entered into DSM contracts, which bundled energy-related products and services for its customers, including providing power and equipment as commodities to companies like J.C. Penney, Quaker Oats, IBM, Starwood Properties, Albertsons, Safeway, and others, along with long-term management and consulting services on the customers' usage of the power over the life of the contract. Enron booked 100% of the commodity portion of the contract up front, and 70% (on average) of the estimated long-term services revenue. Because the revenues from each contract were pulled into the single quarter when the contract was signed using mark-to-market accounting, EES had to close increasingly higher revenue-producing DSM transactions to show growth in EES's revenues and profits.

(h) The Enron DSM contract with J.C. Penney had losses of \$60 million, the IBM deal was a significant loss for Enron from the outset, and the CitiGroup contract was known at its inception to cost Enron millions in losses.

(i) The purported prospects for, and actual success of, Enron's EBS division was grossly overstated. *First*, Enron's broadband network – the so-called Enron Intelligent Network or EIN – was plagued by serious and persistent technical difficulties, which prevented it from providing the type of high-speed and high-quality transmission that was indispensable to any hope of commercial success. *Second*, Enron was encountering significant difficulties in completing the build-out of its broadband network and, as a result, did not have currently, and would not have at any reasonable time in the foreseeable future, a functioning broadband network. The EIN – the core of the Enron Broadband Operating System ("BOS") – was doomed to failure due to numerous intractable problems.

(j) To inflate the purported revenues of its EBS operations, Enron was engaging in transactions involving so-called dark fiber – unlit broadband-transmission capability – recognizing significant revenue on these transactions when, in fact, they were artificial contrivances known as "dark-fiber swaps," which involved no real economic substance, but were simply a swap of Enron's dark-fiber capacity with some counterparty for its dark-fiber capacity.

(k) Enron exacerbated the manipulative and deceptive financial impact of dark-fiber swaps by accounting for the revenue or payment it received from the counterparty that bought dark fiber from Enron *as current-period revenue* while, at the same time, Enron was *capitalizing* the amounts it paid to that party to buy dark fiber from it on the other side of the swap. Thus, Enron avoided recognizing the expense of that purchase in the current period and instead, amortized it over many, many years – a deliberate accounting manipulation where revenue and expense were mismatched to inflate current-period results.

(l) The prospects for future revenue and profits from Enron's EBS operation and the purported value of that operation to Enron and to its stock price was completely arbitrary and without any basis in fact because of *current* problems in that business, that such revenue and profit forecasts and valuations were arbitrary, unreasonable and unobtainable.

(m) Enron's purported growth in broadband intermediation – trading bandwidth access – was neither as successful as claimed nor was the market developing as quickly or in the manner Enron asserted. Enron grossly overstated *the number of customers or counterparties* it was doing bandwidth intermediation with by counting as ongoing customers or trading partners entities that had done only a test or an experimental trade and not engaging in any ongoing bandwidth intermediation. Even worse, the *number of trades* being conducted via Enron's broadband intermediation was grossly overstated to create the illusion of ever-increasing levels of activity, which it accomplished by splitting up what was, in fact, a single unified trade into five or 10 or even more separate trades, thus creating the false image of increasing trading activity.

(n) Enron was abusing and misusing mark-to-market accounting with respect to its broadband intermediation activity, utilizing this accounting method – together with false assumptions of ultimate value – to create much higher current-period revenue and bottom-line results than were reasonable and attainable had proper accounting techniques been used.

(o) The potential favorable impact of the Blockbuster VOD joint venture as well as its success was grossly misrepresented and overstated. *First*, Blockbuster did not have the legal right to electronically distribute movie content – the indispensable element of a successful broadband based VOD system – in cable-quality digital format. *Second*, due to technical problems with its

broadband network, Enron could not transmit movies or other content with sufficient quality or speed to permit the VOD system to ever succeed. Notwithstanding these substantial defects – plus gross abuse of mark-to-market accounting – Enron discounted and recognized a wholly unrealistic projection of revenue over the entire 20-year life of the Blockbuster VOD venture into current periods, offset it by unrealistically low expense estimates, and failed to take any proper reserve for uncertainty of outcome or collectability. Consequently, Enron secretly recognized over \$110 million of profits in the 4thQ 00 and the 1stQ 01 – *two-thirds of the earnings* claimed by EBS in those two periods – in one of the largest one-time and upward manipulations of Enron's financial statements.

(p) Enron was not successfully managing its balance sheet by effectively hedging its merchant investments and placing billions of dollars of non-recourse debt in related but independent parties. In fact, the hedges were illusory, not real, and were largely dependent on the value of Enron's own stock where Enron still was exposed to the risk of its merchant investments. In fact, that debt was *not* non-recourse because if Enron's credit rating was downgraded that debt would become recourse as to Enron. This was an extraordinarily dangerous situation for Enron because, in fact, based upon its true financial condition, which was known to its insiders, Enron did not deserve the investment-grade credit rating it was carrying and it was in constant and precarious danger of losing that rating when the true structure of its off-balance-sheet partnerships and SPEs became known and its true financial condition was revealed.

(q) In fact, Enron did not deserve an investment-grade credit rating and did not have a solid or substantial financial structure because it was inflating the value of its assets by billions of dollars while concealing billions of dollars of debt that should have been on its balance sheet. As a result, Enron's true financial structure was extremely fragile.

(r) As a result of the foregoing, the forecasts for strong continued revenue and earnings growth for Enron's wholesale and retail energy operations were completely false, in part, because the historical financial performance and condition of those operations had been materially falsified – thus there was no real basis upon which to forecast such further growth – and because neither of those businesses had the current strengths or success to justify the forecasts and claims for future growth that were being made.

(s) As a result of the foregoing, the revenue and EPS forecasts being made by and for Enron going forward were also grossly false because historical earnings, upon which those forecasts were based, were falsified and the result of improper accounting manipulation. In truth, Enron's various business operations not only had huge concealed losses, which would have to be recognized and would very adversely impact Enron's financial results, but those core business operations simply did not have the strength or success necessary for them to generate anywhere near the kind of revenue and profit growth being forecast for them. ¶300.

During 01, Enron's stock fell and pierced several of the equity issuance trigger prices in the LJM2 SPEs, thus threatening Bank America's LJM2 investment and the continuation of the Enron Ponzi scheme which Bank America was benefitting from. In mid-8/01, the Enron house of cards began to collapse with Skilling "resigning" and Enron's stock fell sharply, piercing more equity issuance trigger prices and threatening to cause the scheme to collapse. Bank America came forward to try to support Enron's stock and save its own skin. On 8/14/01, Bank America issued a report on Enron which continued to rate Enron a "**Strong Buy**" and forecast 01 and 02 EPS of \$1.85 and \$2.15. It also stated:

- ENE announced today that Jeff Skilling, President and CEO, has resigned for personal reasons.

\* \* \*

- ... We would use any weakness as a buying opportunity as the stock is trading far off its highs ....
- While we realize that this high level departure follows those of other visible members of management in the last 18 months, we are highly confident in the abilities of Ken Lay and the existing management team.

¶346.

On 8/28/01, Bank America issued a report on Enron, continuing to rate it a "**Strong Buy**" and forecasting 01 and 02 EPS of \$1.85 and \$2.15. It also stated:

- Today's Wall Street Journal featured an article on ENE, which focused largely on Ken Lay's (Chairman and CEO) efforts to help restore credibility through fuller disclosure on its complicated business.
- In light of this positive article, we believe there are several reasons to be bullish on the stock. Among them are:

- More detailed information should help alleviate a significant overhang.
- The re-emergence of Ken Lay is reassuring.
- The management team has a great deal of depth.
- We believe the stock is oversold. Given ENE's leadership role in the industry and its reputation as an innovator, we believe it deserves a premium valuation.
- Strong quarterly performance, demonstration that the growth rate is sustainable and fuller disclosure should lead to improvement.
- We reiterate our **Strong Buy** rating.

¶357.

The statements made surrounding and after Skilling's resignation by Bank America in its analysts' reports were false and misleading. First of all, Skilling did not resign for "personal reasons," but rather, because he knew that the scheme to defraud he had been actively participating in was falling apart and about to be exposed, which would result in Enron's stock price completely collapsing and Enron losing its investment-grade credit rating and likely going bankrupt. The assurances made that Enron had never been in better shape, its numbers looked good, there were no changes in Enron's earnings outlook, that the Company was very strong and the resignation did not signal any accounting problems or adverse disclosures were all lies as, in fact, Enron's business – which had been propped up through a series of manipulative or deceptive devices and contrivances for years – was now on the verge of complete collapse, due to the accumulated weight of the falsification of its financial results. ¶359.

On 10/16/01, Bank America issued a report on Enron. The report continued to rate Enron a "**Strong Buy**" and continued to forecast 01 and 02 EPS of \$1.85 and \$2.15, as well as a 17% secular EPS growth rate for Enron. It also stated:

- Enron reported ongoing operating earnings of \$0.43 per share, in line with consensus and a penny above our expectations.
- As expected, several non-recurring charges were recorded during the quarter to resolve disposition of and losses in non-core businesses totaling \$1.01 billion after-tax. Including these charges, earnings for the quarter were \$(0.84) per diluted share.

- Earnings were driven by wholesale trading and marketing, natural gas pipelines, and retail services. **Management reiterated guidance for the year of \$1.80 and for FY02 of \$2.15 per share.**

¶371.

The statements issued between 8/14/01-10/16/01 in analysts' reports were false and misleading. The true facts were that Enron's **operating earnings** for the 3rdQ 01 as reported were artificially inflated, as detailed herein, in part because of the huge dark-fiber swap transaction with Qwest; the write-offs taken by Enron on 10/16/01 did not clean up its balance sheet – in fact, there were **billions of dollars of additional overvalued assets still on Enron's balance sheet**; and Enron's shareholder equity was still overstated by \$1-\$2 billion and Enron's previously reported earnings were grotesquely false as detailed herein. The forecasts of strong 01 operating EPS of \$1.80 per share and 02 EPS of \$2.15 for Enron were also completely false as there was no basis whatsoever for these forecasts as, in fact, Enron's business internally was collapsing and was riddled with huge operating losses which were actually increasing but continuing to be concealed. In fact, Enron's liquidity was extraordinarily endangered. ¶390.

All of the Bank America research reports issued by Bank America after 6/00 were false for an additional reason. After LJM2 was formed and Bank America and/or its top executives had secretly been permitted to invest in LJM2 on or about 6/00 – ultimately to the tune of some \$45 million – Bank America continued to issue very positive analyst reports on Enron. Prior to 12/99, these reports contained a "boilerplate" disclosure:

Banc of America Securities LLC (or its affiliates), its partners and/or employees may have an interest in the securities and options on securities of the issuer described herein and may make purchases or sales, as principal or agent in securities mentioned, while this report is in circulation.... Banc of America Securities LLC may from time to time perform investment banking or other services for, or solicit investment banking or other business from, any company mentioned in this report.

After 6/00, this report contained the following boilerplate disclosures:

Banc of America Securities LLC, its affiliates, Bank of America Corporation and their respective directors, officers and associates, from time to time may maintain a long or short position in, act as a market maker for, or purchase or sell a position in, securities, loans or other financial products mentioned herein, or of the entities referred to herein, or related investment securities or products. Banc of America Securities LLC or its affiliates may have acted as manager or co-manager for a public offering of securities of companies mentioned herein.

***These boilerplate disclosures did not change in any substantive way after Bank America and/or its executives became the largest investors in LJM2*** which funded numerous non-arm's-length fraudulent deals with Enron to create phony profits and hide debt – providing lush returns to Bank America or its executives from the looting of Enron. The failure to disclose the LJM2 involvement of Bank America and/or its executives – and LJM2's involvement with Enron – made its "boilerplate" disclosure false and misleading and concealed from the market the very significant and serious conflict of interests which Enron and Bank America knew would have cast serious doubts on the objectivity and honesty of Bank America's analyst reports on Enron and disclosed that Bank America or its executives had compromising ties to and serious conflicts of interest regarding Enron.

Bank America made false and misleading statements in a Registration Statement for which it faces 1933 Act §11 liability. *See supra* 51-53. Bank America also made false and misleading statements in a 2/99 Registration Statement used by Bank America to sell 27.6 million shares of Enron stock, a 7/23/99 Registration Statement to sell 7% Exchangeable Notes and a Registration Statement used to sell 8.1375% notes in 5/00.

The 2/99 Registration Statement was false and misleading due to the incorporation Enron's 97 10-K and 98 10Qs that contained Enron's ***admittedly false financial statements for 97-98, which understated Enron's debt by billions of dollars and overstated its earnings by hundreds of millions of dollars***, as detailed in ¶¶418-611 of this CC. The other Registration Statements incorporated Enron's 99 10-K and contained Enron's 1st and 2ndQ 98 and 1stQ 99 results. The restatement of previously issued financial statements is an admission that they were materially false when issued, and Enron has restated its 97-98 results by huge amounts. While these Registration Statements included audited annual financial statements, significantly, they also incorporated or included all documents filed pursuant to §13(a) of the 1934 Act prior to the respective offerings, ***including Enron's 10-Qs which contained Enron's admittedly unaudited financial false and misleading***

*unaudited quarter financial results.* ¶¶612-613.<sup>57</sup> Of course, since the interim financial statements were unaudited they were not "expertised" and the underwriter banks are responsible for them.

**VII. BANK AMERICA ACTED WITH SCIENTER, I.E., WITH "THE REQUIRED STATE OF MIND" AND HAD MOTIVES AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFRAUD ENRON INVESTORS, AS IT MADE FALSE STATEMENTS, EMPLOYED DECEPTIVE ACTS AND MANIPULATIVE DEVICES AND CONTRIVANCES TO DECEIVE AND PARTICIPATED IN A FRAUDULENT SCHEME OR COURSE OF BUSINESS THAT OPERATED AS A FRAUD OR DECEIT ON PURCHASERS OF ENRON SECURITIES**

Bank America can claim neither ignorance nor innocence with respect to the Enron debacle.<sup>58</sup>

Bank America had an extensive and extremely close relationship with Enron, during which it gained knowledge of the fraudulent scheme and took affirmative steps to further it. Bank America did 10 securities offerings for Enron or related entities raising over \$6 billion and was participating in over \$5 billion in loans or lending commitments to Enron. Bank America's relationships with Enron were so extensive that *top officials* of the bank constantly interacted with the very top executives of Enron, *i.e.*, Lay, Skilling, Causey, McMahon or Fastow, on an almost daily basis throughout the Class Period, discussing Enron's business, financial condition, financial needs and plans, partnerships, SPEs and future prospects. Bank America not only provided *both* commercial banking and investment banking services to Enron, *Bank America helped fund Enron's key secretly controlled partnership – LJM2 and its SPEs – to facilitate illicit and contrived transactions which falsified Enron's financial statements and misrepresented its financial condition by creating hundreds of millions in phony profits and hiding billions of debt.* As a result of Bank America's participation in the fraudulent scheme, it received huge underwriting and consulting fees, interest payments, commitment fees and other payments from Enron and related entities. Bank America or its top executives were also permitted to secretly invest \$45 million in Enron's lucrative LJM2 partnership as a reward to it for its participation in this fraud, allowing it or them *to directly profit*

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<sup>57</sup> While Bank America may be able at trial to establish a defense to liability for these expertised *i.e.*, certified financial statements, in light of the CCs allegations that Bank America knew those annual certified financial statements were false they may not do so now at the 12(b)(6) stage. *Murphy*, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22207, at \*23.

<sup>58</sup> Because Bank America sold Enron securities pursuant to false and misleading Registration Statements, it faces 1933 Act §11 liability as to which no scienter is required. *See supra* §IV.

*from the looting of Enron* that took place via the repeated non-arm's-length fraudulent LJM2/SPE transactions with Enron, transactions which it knew could continue only if Enron's stock continued to trade at high prices – above the so-called equity issuance trigger prices in the LJM2/SPE deals. ¶¶31, 649, 780. At the same time, Bank America's *securities analysts were issuing extremely positive – but false and misleading – reports on Enron, extolling Enron's business success, the strength of its financial condition and its prospects for strong revenue and earnings growth, helping to push Enron's stock higher. As alleged, this is intentional participation in the falsification of Enron's financial results and thus in the fraud.*

In evaluating the adequacy of the scienter allegations against Bank America, it is important to keep in mind the different liability theories being alleged under §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 against Bank America. While the CC alleges that Bank America made false and misleading statements in registration statements and analyst reports, Bank America's liability is *not limited* to those allegedly false and misleading statements. The CC also alleges Bank America's liability for *its* conduct in participating in the scheme to defraud or course of business that operated as a fraud and deceit on purchasers of Enron publicly traded securities. This distinction is important because *if* the complaint fails to adequately allege the falsity of Bank America's own statements *or* Bank America's knowledge or reckless disregard of the falsity of those statements, the CC may still adequately allege that Bank America knowingly or recklessly employed deceptive acts or participated in the fraudulent scheme or course of business *or vice versa*. These are distinct liability theories – one based on *statements* – the other based on *conduct*, which can result in liability, either in combination or separately.

It is clear that for §10(b) or Rule 10b-5 liability to attach under either theory, *scienter must be present, i.e.*, either intentional or reckless conduct. Thus, with respect to Bank America's alleged deceptive acts and participation in the fraudulent scheme or course of business, scienter would be adequately pleaded if the facts pleaded give rise to a "strong inference" that in committing those acts, Bank America acted with the "required state of mind," *i.e.*, it acted intentionally or recklessly. This would be so even if Bank America had no knowledge that its *own statements* in analysts' reports or Registration Statements were false and misleading, for as this Court has recognized, *it is not*

*necessary that a defendant have made a false statement to be liable under §10(b) or Rule 10b-5.*  
*Landry's*, slip op. at 9 n.12.

A defendant may be held liable for participating in a scheme to defraud if it has knowledge of the scheme and commits manipulative or deceptive acts in furtherance of it.<sup>59</sup> See *BMC Software*, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 885-86, 905, 915; *Cooper*, 137 F.3d at 624 ("Central Bank does not preclude liability based on allegations that a group of defendants acted together to violate the securities laws, as long as each defendant committed a manipulative or deceptive act in furtherance of the scheme"); *First Jersey*, 101 F.3d at 1471; *Lemmer v. Nu-Kote Holding, Inc.*, No. 3:98-CV-0161-L, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13978, at \*26-\*27 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2001); *Health Mgmt.*, 970 F. Supp. at 209; *Adam*, 884 F. Supp. at 1401; *ZZZZ Best*, 864 F. Supp. at 967-72. Recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement. See *Nathenson*, 267 F.3d 400.

Whether a defendant has engaged in a scheme to defraud (or whether the complaint has sufficiently alleged so) should be determined by viewing the defendant's conduct (or the allegations of the complaint) *as a whole*. See *Blackie*, 524 F.2d at 903 n.19 (for scheme liability, complaint should not be fragmented into individual, isolated acts but should be considered as a single overall scheme to defraud); cf. *Affiliated Ute Citizens*, 406 U.S. at 151 ("Congress intended securities legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed 'not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes'") (quoting *Capital Gains Research*, 375 U.S. at 186).

It is axiomatic that with respect to scheme liability, a defendant may be liable for participating in a scheme even if it did not interact with all the other participants, was unaware of the identity of each of the other participants, did not know about the specific roles of the other participants in the scheme, did not know about or participate in all of the details of each aspect of the scheme, or joined the scheme at a different time than the other participants. See *United States*

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<sup>59</sup> We stress that the existence of the scheme and the banks' participation in it are highly factually-dependent questions that either should not be resolved on a motion to dismiss or should be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs. *Richardson*, 451 F.2d at 40 (Whether the defendant's conduct amounts to a manipulative or deceptive act "depends upon the facts and circumstances developed at trial.").

v. *Craig*, 573 F.2d 455, 483-84 (7th Cir. 1977) (scheme to defraud under mail fraud statute); *United States v. Elam*, 678 F.2d 1234, 1246 (5th Cir. 1982) (conspiracy); *United States v. Alvarez*, 625 F.2d 1196, 1198 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (conspiracy).<sup>60</sup>

Scheme to defraud and conspiracy liability theories, while they share some similarities, are separate and distinct liability theories and the elements of the two theories are not identical. See *United States v. Read*, 658 F.2d 1225, 1239 (7th Cir. 1981). Most significantly, a conspiracy requires an **agreement** and imposes liability based on the act of joining that agreement as well as on acts taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. See *id.* at 1240. A scheme to defraud, on the other hand, requires neither an agreement nor the joining of a scheme; liability is imposed based on using the mails or securities exchanges to further the fraudulent scheme. See *id.* Therefore, if knowledge of all the other details, activities, and participants in a scheme is not essential for conspiracy liability, which requires an agreement among the participants, then such knowledge certainly is not necessary for scheme liability, which does not require an agreement.

A defendant who participates in a scheme to defraud is liable for the damages caused by all of the acts taken by the participants in the scheme in furtherance of the fraud. See *In re Software Toolworks Sec. Litig.*, 50 F.3d 615, 627-29 & n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (participants in scheme to defraud can be liable for statements made by others in the scheme); *Adam*, 884 F. Supp. at 1401 (same); *ZZZZ Best*, 864 F. Supp. at 968-72 (same); *SEC v. Nat'l Bankers Life Ins. Co.*, 324 F. Supp. 189, 194-95 (N.D. Tex. 1971), *aff'd*, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971) (same).<sup>61</sup> A scheme to defraud is a

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<sup>60</sup> As the Supreme Court has stated with respect to conspiracy liability: "[T]he law rightly gives room for allowing the conviction of those discovered [to be participants in a conspiracy] upon showing sufficiently the essential nature of the plan and their connections with it, without requiring evidence of knowledge of all its details or of the participation of others. Otherwise ... conspirators would go free by their very ingenuity." *Blumenthal v. United States*, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947) (footnote omitted).

Plaintiffs cite these conspiracy cases not because they allege conspiracy liability here – they do not. However, since scheme liability is expressly provided for by the language of §10b/Rule 10b-5 and the extent of the scheme liability is **at best as broad** as a conspiracy liability would be, these conspiracy cases are useful in determining the parameters of scheme liability.

<sup>61</sup> Similarly, under the federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §1341, participants in a scheme to defraud are liable for the acts of the other participants in the scheme, even if the others committed the key acts. See, e.g., *United States v. Humphrey*, 104 F.3d 65, 70 (5th Cir. 1997); *United States v. Lothian*, 976 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1992); *United States v. Maxwell*, 920 F.2d 1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir.

unitary violation, such that the plaintiff need not prove transaction causation with respect to any particular misrepresentations or omissions or other components of the scheme. *See Shores*, 647 F.2d at 469, 472 ("The concept of [a] scheme to defraud satisfies the requirement of 'transaction causation....' It has as its core objective that the potential victim engage in the transaction for which the scheme was conceived."); *Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.*, 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1974); *ZZZZ Best*, 864 F. Supp. at 973 (to satisfy reliance requirement for scheme liability, it need only be shown that market relied on overall fraudulent scheme rather than on individual statements or omissions).

*Nat'l Bankers Life*, 324 F. Supp. 189 – a pre-*Central Bank* case – recognized that participants in a scheme to defraud under Rule 10b-5 may be held liable for all of the acts involved in the scheme. In that case, the SEC brought an action against 28 defendants for participating in a conspiracy to defraud and a scheme to defraud. *See id.* at 193-94. Since this was a pre-*Central Bank* case, the SEC did not focus on the difference between conspiracy and scheme liability, treating them essentially as synonymous, and the court did not focus on the difference between primary violators and aiders and abettors, instead assuming that the SEC intended to hold the co-schemers liable as aiders and abettors rather than as primary violators. *See id.* at 195. But although the court considered the scheme liability of the defendants under the rubric of aiding and abetting, it could just as well

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1990); *United States v. Lanier*, 838 F.2d 281, 284 (8th Cir. 1988); *United States v. Wiehoff*, 748 F.2d 1158, 1161 (7th Cir. 1984); *Craig*, 573 F.2d at 483-84.

This principle also applies to conspiracy liability. *See Read*, 658 F.2d at 1231-40 (conspirator liable for acts of co-conspirators even if statute of limitations has run on its own acts); *Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp.*, 380 F.2d 262, 267 n.2 (7th Cir. 1967) (conspirator liable even for acts of co-conspirators occurring after its own last act); *In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig.*, 430 F. Supp. 231, 233 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (conspirator liable even for acts of co-conspirators occurring prior to its joining conspiracy).

The common law also recognized this with respect to contributing tortfeasors or persons acting in concert, such as through a conspiracy or scheme. *See Restatement (Second) of Torts* §875 (1979) ("Each of two or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liability to the injured party for the entire harm."); *id.* at §876(a) ("For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him."); *id.* at §876, Comment a ("Whenever two or more persons commit tortious acts in concert, each becomes subject to liability for the acts of the others, as well as for his own acts.").

have considered it under the rubric of primary liability. Nevertheless, the important point is the court's recognition that co-schemers may be liable for all aspects of the scheme:

In the narrow sense, a defendant could have aided and abetted a particular fraudulent act under 10(b)(5)(2) or 10(b)(5)(3) or use of a particular device under 10(b)(5)(1) and thus be liable for only the results of that specific violation. In the more expansive sense, a defendant could have aided and abetted a *general scheme* under 10(b)(5)(1) and *thus be liable for the results of all aspects of the scheme* (assuming the scheme was a broad one).

*Id.*

As noted above, after *Central Bank*, a defendant may be held liable for participating in a scheme to defraud if it has knowledge and commits manipulative or deceptive acts in furtherance of it. Therefore, bringing the principle recognized in *Nat'l Bankers Life* in line with *Central Bank*, if a defendant with knowledge of a broad or general scheme to defraud commits manipulative or deceptive acts in furtherance of broad aspects of the scheme, the defendant may be held liable for all of the results of the scheme. *See generally Central Bank*, 511 U.S. at 191 ("In any complex securities fraud, moreover, there are likely to be multiple violators....").<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> In *Lemmer*, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13978, the plaintiffs alleged a scheme to defraud and sought to hold certain of the alleged participants liable for the fraudulent acts of the other participants in the scheme. *See id.* at \*25. The court held that, *on the particular facts of the case before it*, such attribution could not be made because the plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently allege either the existence of the scheme or the defendants' manipulative or deceptive acts in furtherance of it. *See id.* at \*26-\*27. For example, the sole allegations as to the existence of the scheme were "vague, general, and unsupported by specific details that might support a strong inference of such a scheme." *Id.* at \*26. In addition, the complaint made *no* allegations regarding the manipulative or deceptive acts of nearly all the defendants in furtherance of the scheme. *See id.* The scheme allegations of the *Lemmer* complaint consisted entirely of the following provision:

Each of the defendants actually knew the allegedly false statements about Nu-kote's business and future prospects were false and misleading when made. Each of the defendants is liable as a participant in a fraudulent scheme and course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit on purchasers of Nu-kote stock, including false and misleading statements and/or concealed material, adverse facts. The fraudulent scheme and course of business: (a) deceived the investing public regarding Nu-kote's products and business; (b) deceived the commercial markets regarding Nu-kote's success in integrating the Pelikan acquisition and developing new products; (c) created false financial results during the 4thQ of FY96 and the first three quarters of FY97; and (d) caused plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase Nu-kote stock at inflated prices.

*Id.* at \*26-\*27. On these facts, the *Lemmer* court concluded that "[a]llowing such general, unsupported allegations of a fraudulent scheme, without any details that support a strong inference of such a scheme such as acts of participation by each of the Defendants, would vitiate the particularity requirements of the PSLRA." *Id.* at \*27. In so finding, the court distinguished *Cooper*,

In evaluating the CC's allegations that Bank America employed acts and manipulative or deceptive devices and contrivances to deceive and participated in a fraudulent scheme and course of business, it is important to focus on the *type* of actions Bank America is alleged to have committed in furtherance of the alleged fraudulent scheme or course of business. With respect to Bank America's liability under §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for its own false and misleading *statements*, it is necessary for the complaint to plead specific facts raising a "strong inference" that Bank America knew the statements were false or acted in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. However, in this regard, Bank America's alleged conduct, as participating in the fraudulent scheme or course of business, remains highly relevant, for those *acts* themselves can show Bank America's *knowledge* of the falsity – or its reckless disregard for the truth or falsity – of the *statements* it was making.

In this regard, Bank America's participation in the funding of LJM2 – putting up \$45 million to finance repeated phony, non-arm's-length 99 deals with Enron by LJM SPEs during 00-01 is key. ***This is obviously intentional conduct – it was not and could not have been the result of negligence or inadvertence.*** Bank America's secret involvement in LJM2 – where it funded LJM2 with \$45 million – the largest single investor in LJM2 – to enable LJM2 to engage in non-arm's-length fraudulent transactions with Enron to create bogus income and hide debt, shows that Bank America ***knew (or recklessly disregarded)*** that Enron's financial statements were false, its financial condition was being misrepresented and that its purported business success was not due to strong business conditions or the skill of its managers and the success of their risk management and hedging techniques but rather to non-arm's-length fraudulent financial transactions with controlled entities. Bank America knew because it or its executives were an investor – indeed the largest investor – in LJM2 during 00-01 when LJM2 was constantly engaging in transactions with Enron where Enron

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137 F.3d 616, in which the complaint was found to contain sufficient allegations of the defendant's participation in a scheme to defraud to support liability on that basis. See 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13978, at \*26.

Unlike the complaint in *Lemmer*, and like the complaint in *Cooper*, the CC in this action includes specific, detailed, and substantial allegations concerning both the existence of a scheme to defraud and the banks' participation in it through numerous manipulative and deceptive acts, as set forth above.

insiders (Fastow, Kopper and Glisan) were on **both sides** of the transactions and that the LJM2 partnership was extraordinarily lucrative – providing huge and indeed excessive returns to LJM2's investors, *i.e.*, Bank America or its executives – returns ***Skilling now says were only possible if the transactions were non-arm's-length and fraudulent, i.e.***, due to the looting of Enron. In this regard, Skilling's recent testimony to the SEC – upon reviewing LJM2 documents that the returns the LJM2 investors got – ***it was immediately apparent to him*** – (a man who claims to lack financial sophistication) – that those returns from the deals LJM2 was getting via SPE deals with Enron were so huge – ***so lavish – that they had to be due to non-arm's-length fraudulent transactions is key.***

According to *The New York Times*:

***Enron Ex-Chief Said to Voice Suspicion of Fraud***

Jeffrey K. Skilling, the former chief executive of Enron, has told investigators that the top flight financial returns that investors made from a partnership that did business with the company could have been achieved only if the corporation was defrauded, according to documents and people involved in the case.... He indicated to the S.E.C. and to investigators for a special committee of the Enron board that such returns – which were as high as 2,500 percent in one transaction – could not have been achieved through arm's-length transactions, according to these people and investigative notes.

When shown records that laid out the details of the financial returns during his testimony several months ago before the S.E.C., Mr. Skilling was said to have grown agitated as he described his opinion of the information. Had he known the magnitude of the profits, Mr. Skilling was said to have told the regulators, he would have immediately summoned Enron executives involved in the dealings and given them 24 hours to justify such outsize results.

\* \* \*

Mr. Skilling made his statements to investigators after reviewing LJM2 records during his testimony to the S.E.C., according to documents and people involved in the case....

\* \* \*

The information that upset Mr. Skilling during his S.E.C. testimony – which has not been made public – was on the 20th page of a long report to investors in LJM2. There, LJM2 summarized its investment activity, laying out the details of its performance on a series of transactions conducted with Enron.

\* \* \*

In the LJM2 presentation, investors were told that the partnership had generated rates of return on its investments in the Raptor ranging from just more than 150 percent to 2,500 percent.

*New York Times*, "Enron Ex-Chief Said to Voice Suspicions of Fraud," 4/24/02.<sup>63</sup>

***What does this testimony say about the knowledge of a financially sophisticated bank like Bank America which was reaping the very fruits of those fraudulent non-arm's-length LJM2 transactions as they and Fastow looted Enron for their own gain!***

These favored investors in LJM2, *like Bank America* (or its top executives), actually *witnessed and benefitted from* a series of extraordinary payouts from the LJM2-controlled SPEs – securing hundreds of millions of dollars in distributions from the SPEs to LJM2 and *then huge returns/profits to themselves from LJM2 – cash generated by the illicit and contrived transactions Enron was engaging in with the LJM2 SPEs to falsify its financial results*. Thus, Bank America *was not only a knowing participant in the Enron scheme to defraud, it was a direct economic beneficiary of it and the looting of Enron*. ¶¶31, 649, 780.

Assuming these allegations are true, then how was it possible for Bank America to be making the kind of extremely positive statements about the strong economic performance of Enron's various businesses, the skill and talent of its management team, the strength of its core businesses, as well as forecasting strong continuing earnings growth over the next several years unless Bank America was deliberately lying or had simply closed its eyes in the blind pursuit of mammon.

*Livent*, 174 F. Supp. 2d 144, shows that scienter has been well alleged here. In *Livent*, purchasers of *Livent* securities sued *Livent*'s commercial and investment bank (CIBC) for violations of 1933 Act §11 and 1934 Act §10(b)/Rule 10b-5. The court also sustained the adequacy of the §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claims – finding the bank's participation in "*Livent's fraudulent scheme*" was adequately pleaded. The key allegation was that CIBC made a \$4.6 million payment to *Livent* in return for theatrical royalties, which in reality was a secret "bridge" loan to *Livent*, as CIBC had a secret side agreement from *Livent* to "repurchase" the advance in six months for \$4.6 million, plus

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<sup>63</sup> If poor Mr. Skilling, who has publicly protested his lack of financial sophistication could immediately figure out *LJM2 was a vehicle to defraud Enron, then it is a reasonable inference that sophisticated bankers, like Bank America, who were actually reaping these fantastic returns, knew it all along*.

interest – the "CIBC Wood Gundy Agreement." This was a fraudulent contrivance because Livent recorded income on the transaction, but did not record the loan. The district court held scienter was adequately alleged, stating:

*It does not require an unreasonable inferential leap to conclude, as the Noteholders suggest, that in entering into the bridge loan transaction and secret side agreements with Livent, CIBC, as Livent's investment bankers since 1993, had acquired substantial knowledge of Livent's real financial condition and was aware of Livent's reasons to account for the \$ 4.6 million "non-refundable fee" as a revenue-generating investment rather than a repayable loan....*

*Significantly, according to the complaint, the proceeds from the alleged fraudulent arrangement were reported by Livent as current revenue in its accounts and public registration statements in order [to] [sic] create a false financial basis to reinforce and ensure the success of Livent securities issues intended in part to repay Livent's substantial debt to CIBC.*

*From these allegations, it is fair to infer that in entering into the CIBC Wood Gundy Agreement, CIBC was aware not only that Livent contemplated marketing securities on the basis of public representations of its financial condition that Livent knew to be false, but that CIBC itself subsequently undertook to solicit and sell the very securities whose value incorporated and was affected by the falsehood CIBC itself had conceived with Livent. In this manner, CIBC's participation in Livent's fraudulent scheme went beyond a passive capacity as Livent's investment banker and financial adviser.*

\* \* \*

*The Noteholders have pled facts suggesting that CIBC became part and parcel of Livent's misleading statements by entering into a loan transaction whose true character and financial implications it agreed not to disclose. This financial interest and complicity not only assisted Livent in concealing critical information, it also committed CIBC to similarly withhold the truth from investors with whom it dealt in Livent securities, a commitment that effectively conflicted with any applicable duty CIBC had to disclose material facts in connection with subsequent public sales of such securities affected by the transaction.*

*Rather than generally reflecting the profit motive of any securities dealer, the concrete benefit derived by CIBC from Livent's fraud alleged here was uniquely personal to CIBC in several ways. Only CIBC, as Livent's investment bankers since 1993, is alleged to have had a longstanding, intimate relationship with Livent executives that offered it uncommon opportunity to know of, and play an active role in Livent's, financial affairs. And only CIBC is accused, in furtherance of its own motives, of assisting Livent in structuring and keeping secret the misrepresented CIBC Wood Gundy Agreement. Later, in publicly marketing Livent securities whose value partly depended on the true nature of that agreement, CIBC stood to realize gains particular to it. Beyond the standard fees and commissions associated with any investment bank's sales of securities, CIBC had a higher stake in Livent's public financings. It uniquely benefitted from the application of the proceeds of the Notes sales to Livent's considerable debt to CIBC.*

*Id.* at 151-54. The conduct of Bank America, as alleged here, far exceeds that of CIBC in *Livent*, which was sufficient for the court there to conclude that CIBC's scienter, as well as its participation in *Livent*'s "fraudulent scheme" was adequately pleaded.

In evaluating the CC's allegations of knowledge on the part of Bank America, it is important to appreciate that the banks named as defendants in this case, including Bank America, are very ***different*** financial institutions from the investment banks or commercial banks that may have been named as defendants in prior securities cases. Until recent years, investment banks were ***not*** permitted to engage in commercial bank lending and commercial banks were not permitted to engage in investment banking services. This was the essence of Glass-Steagall. However, when Glass-Steagall was repealed, most banks, including the banks named as defendants in this case quickly morphed into "financial services institutions" and began to offer both commercial and investment banking services.

This change in the nature of the operations of the banks named as defendants in this case has important implications for the CC's allegations that they knew or were reckless in not knowing that the statements they were making about Enron to investors were false and misleading. Because these banks were making huge commercial loans to Enron, ***as well as*** participating in securities offerings by Enron and related entities, they had much broader and more constant contact with Enron's top executives and access to Enron's non-public financial records, performance and plans than would have been the case had they only come periodically into contact with Enron to act as an underwriter to sell securities to the public.

During the Class Period, Bank America was a major lender to Enron, being involved in over \$5 billion in loans or lending commitments. In making large commercial loans or commitments as Bank America did to Enron, Bank America was required, not only by federal laws and regulations but by its own internal procedures, ***to engage in an extremely detailed review and analysis of the actual financial condition and creditworthiness of the borrower, not only at the outset when the loan is made, but constantly throughout the pendency of the loan or lending commitment.*** Obviously, the larger the size of the loan or loan commitment, the greater the amount of financial analysis oversight and review required. Thus, Bank America was required to perform extensive

credit analysis of Enron after obtaining detailed financial information from it. Included in this credit analysis was a detailed review of Enron's actual and contingent liabilities, its liquidity position, any equity issuance obligations it may have which could adversely affect its shareholders' equity, any debt on which Enron may have been potentially liable, even if not on Enron's books directly, the quality of Enron's profits and earnings and Enron's actual *liquidity*, including sources of funding to support repayment of any loans. In addition, after Bank America made large loans to or committed itself to credit facilities for a corporation, *it was required to closely monitor Enron by frequently reviewing its financial condition and ongoing operations for any material changes and insist that top financial officers of the borrower keep it informed of the current status of the borrower's business and financial condition.* As a result, Bank America obtained extremely detailed information concerning the actual financial condition of Enron throughout the Class Period and knew that the actual condition of Enron's business, its finances and its financial condition was far worse than was being publicly disclosed by Enron, or as described or disclosed in each of Bank America's analyst reports on Enron. Thus, Bank America knew (or was reckless in not knowing):

(a) Enron had set up LJM2 at year-end 99 so that Enron could use SPEs funded by that vehicle to engage in non-arm's-length self-dealing transactions which would enrich the investors in the LJM2 partnership – including Bank America – and, at the same time, permit Enron to generate artificial profits and conceal its true debt level by moving billions of dollars of debt off its balance sheet and onto the balance sheet of LJM2's SPEs;

(b) Enron was also engaging in similar non-arm's-length transactions with another limited partnership, JEDI, and an associated SPE known as Chewco, which was also permitting Enron to artificially inflate its reported earnings while moving large amounts of debt off its balance sheet;

(c) Enron's actual financial condition and results from operations were far worse than what was being publicly disclosed or presented: (i) because Enron was falsifying its financial results and misusing and abusing mark-to-market accounting, resulting in Enron's profitability being far less than publicly reported; (ii) because Enron was improperly moving debt off its balance sheet and onto the balance sheets of entities it secretly controlled, Enron's true debt level and leverage was

much higher than what was being publicly presented; and (iii) because of the foregoing, Enron's liquidity and creditworthiness were far worse than publicly known and its financial condition much more leveraged and precarious than was being disclosed to public investors;

(d) Enron had entered into a number of transactions with secretly controlled SPEs being funded by LJM2 which Bank America was funding – while administering its affairs – to finance these transactions, which would require Enron to issue millions of shares of Enron common stock. If Enron's common stock fell below trigger prices ranging from \$83-\$19 per share, not only would Enron be required to issue huge amounts of additional stock, also, the debt of the SPEs with which Enron was doing business would not, in fact, be non-recourse to Enron as represented but, in fact, would become and be recourse to Enron if, as and when Enron's credit rating was lowered – something Bank America knew would occur if, as and when Enron's true financial condition became public or became known to the rating agencies.

In addition to Bank America's extensive ongoing commercial banking relationship with Enron – and the knowledge it gained from that – Bank America also acted as an underwriter in 10 securities offerings, raising \$6 billion for Enron.

Thus, Bank America had ***constant access*** to Enron's top executives and Enron's financial records, finances, plans, etc. ***in connection with a series of large ongoing major commercial loans and/or lending commitments, as well as several securities offerings between 98 and 01!*** Thus, this is ***not*** a situation of alleging scienter against a bank that had only isolated contact with an issuer in the context of doing limited due diligence in connection with a single or even periodic securities offerings. Here, what is alleged, is (i) ***constant access by a sophisticated commercial lender to the innermost details of the financial structure and operations of a company that was a major borrower from the commercial operations of the bank, which;*** (ii) ***via the bank's investment banking operations was selling securities of the company to the public;*** (iii) ***was also constantly issuing analyst reports about that borrower/client to the public;*** (iv) ***while the bank or its top executives were secretly investing in a huge partnership (LJM2) which was doing non-arm's-length fraudulent transactions with Enron which were generating hundreds of millions of dollars of phony profits, while hiding billions of dollars of Enron's actual debt and generating massive***

*returns to the bank, as its secret investment in the LJM2 partnership benefitted from the looting of Enron.* With all due respect, this is a situation that has never before been presented since the passage of the federal securities laws in 1933-34 because only in recent years have banks been able to engage in the kind of joint commercial and investment banking activity present in this case and which apparently was so abused by them to the great damage of purchasers of Enron's publicly traded securities.

In interacting with Enron, Bank America functioned as an unified entity. There was no so-called "Chinese Wall" to seal off the Bank America securities analysts from the information which Bank America obtained rendering commercial and investment banking services to Enron. Alternatively, even if some restrictions on the information made available to Bank America's securities analysts existed, those unilateral and self-serving actions are insufficient to prevent imputation of all knowledge and scienter possessed by the Bank America legal entity, as its knowledge and liability in this case is determined by looking at Bank America as an overall legal entity.<sup>64</sup> ¶775.

Knowledge is imputed to a corporation through its employees and agents via *respondeat superior*. To determine the *mens rea* of a corporation, courts not only consider the actual knowledge of each individual employee, but also aggregate each employee's knowledge under a theory referred to as the "Collective Knowledge Doctrine."

The Fifth Circuit has clearly found in favor of applying traditional notions of *respondeat superior* to impute knowledge to a corporate defendant in both civil and criminal proceedings. *Standard Oil Co. v. United States*, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962). Furthermore, "[w]hether the corporate officer or agent was possessed of actual knowledge of facts is ordinarily (a question) of fact for the jury. Whether the knowledge of, or notice to, an officer of a corporation is to be imputed to the corporation is a question of law for the court." *Am. Standard Credit, Inc. v. Nat'l Cement Co.*, 643 F.2d 248, 270 (5th. Cir. 1981).

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<sup>64</sup> Any claimed "Chinese Wall" cannot provide a defense at the motion to dismiss stage. *Cooper*, 137 F.3d at 628-29.

While *Standard Oil* does not limit the imputation of knowledge to high-level employees,<sup>65</sup> subsequent Fifth Circuit cases do appear to focus much more on the employee's position in the company. See *In re Hellenic Inc.*, 252 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e have observed that the question of 'privity or knowledge must turn on the facts of the individual case,' stating that a corporation 'is charged with the privity or **knowledge of its employees when they are sufficiently high on the corporate ladder.**' We have further explained that privity or knowledge 'is imputed to the corporation when the employee is an executive officer, manager or superintendent whose scope of authority includes supervision over the phase of the business out of which the loss or injury occurred.'").

The First Circuit has detailed the Collective Knowledge Doctrine and its justifications as such:

[Defendant] Bank contends that the trial court's instructions regarding knowledge were defective because they eliminated the requirement that it be proven that the Bank violated a known legal duty. It avers that the knowledge instruction invited the jury to convict the Bank for negligently maintaining a poor communications network that prevented the consolidation of the information held by its various employees. ***The Bank argues that it is error to find that a corporation possesses a particular item of knowledge if one part of the corporation has half the information making up the item, and another part of the entity has the other half.***

***A collective knowledge instruction is entirely appropriate in the context of corporate criminal liability.*** *Riss & Company v. United States*, 262 F.2d 245, 250 (8th Cir. 1958); *Inland Freight Lines v. United States*, 191 F.2d 313, 315 (10th Cir. 1951); *Camacho v. Bowling*, 562 F. Supp. 1012, 1025 (N.D. Ill. 1983); *United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc.*, 381 F. Supp. 730, 738-39 (W.D. W.Va. 1974); *United States v. Sawyer Transport, Inc.*, 337 F. Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1971), *aff'd*, 463 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1972). The acts of a corporation are, after all, simply the acts of all of its employees operating within the scope of their employment. The law on corporate criminal liability reflects this. See, e.g., *United States v. Cincotta*, 689 F.2d 238, 241, 242 (1st Cir.), *cert. denied*, 459 U.S. 991, 103 S. Ct. 347, 74 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1982); *United States v. Richmond*, 700 F.2d 1183, 1195 n.7 (11th Cir. 1983). ***Similarly, the knowledge obtained by corporate employees acting within the scope of their employment is imputed to the corporation.*** *Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States*, 330 F.2d 719, 722 (5th Cir. 1964). Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific duties and operations into smaller components.

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<sup>65</sup> "[N]o contention is made that 'knowledge' can be acquired only through supervisory or executive personnel. On the contrary, while status of the actor in the corporate hierarchy might well have decisive significance in determining the question we later discuss concerning the intention to benefit the corporation, the corporation may be criminally bound by the acts of subordinate, even menial, employees.... ***Likewise, no contention is, or can at this late date, be made that mere violation of instructions would shield the corporation from criminal responsibility for actions which its agents have taken for it.***" *Standard Oil*, 307 F.2d at 127.

***The aggregate of those components constitutes the corporation's knowledge of a particular operation. It is irrelevant whether employees administering one component of an operation know the specific activities of employees administering another aspect of the operation:***

***"[A] corporation cannot plead innocence by asserting that the information obtained by several employees was not acquired by any one individual who then would have comprehended its full import. Rather the corporation is considered to have acquired the collective knowledge of its employees and is held responsible for their failure to act accordingly.***

*United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc.*, 381 F. Supp. at 738. Since the Bank had the compartmentalized structure common to all large corporations, ***the court's collective knowledge instruction was not only proper but necessary.***

*United States v. Bank of New England, N.A.*, 821 F.2d 844, 855-56 (1st Cir. 1987).

This district court has explicitly endorsed the Collective Knowledge Doctrine. *See Burzynski v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.*, No. H-89-3976, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21300, at \*13 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 1, 1992) ("[T]he knowledge of Aetna's agents and employees is imputed to the corporation under the doctrine of '***collective knowledge.***'") (citing *Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States*, 330 F.2d 719, 722 (5th Cir. 1963)).<sup>66</sup>

Also, knowledge held by one corporation prior to a merger with another corporation is carried over to, *i.e.*, imported to the successor succeeding entity. In *United States v. Wilshire Oil Co.*, 427 F.2d 969 (10th Cir. 1970), defendant Wilshire purchased another asphalt distributor, Riffe Petroleum Co., which then became an unincorporated division of Wilshire Oil Co. Prior to the merger, Riffe, acting through its agent, entered into a conspiracy to fix the price of asphalt sold to Kansas's highway departments. This conspiracy was alleged to have continued after Riffe was purchased by Wilshire and hence, Wilshire was indicted (and ultimately convicted) for conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act. Wilshire claimed on appeal that "the only knowledge it could have had regarding [its] participation in the conspiracy was ***knowledge acquired prior to the merger*** and [it was] thereby

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<sup>66</sup> Additionally, in *Am. Standard Credit*, 643 F.2d at 271 n.16, the Fifth Circuit stated: "The general rule is well established that a corporation is charged with constructive knowledge, regardless of its actual knowledge, of all material facts of which its officer or agent receives notice or acquires knowledge while acting in the course of his employment within the scope of his authority, even though the officer or agent does not in fact communicate his knowledge to the corporation."

liable for neither the pre-merger crime nor [its] post-merger involvement." *Id.* at 973. The court of appeals rejected Wilshire's "novel" argument, stating:

We pause to note that the argument does not deny that an agent's knowledge is imputed to the corporation if gained while acting in the scope of employment. The proposition merely suggests that Wilshire is immune from prosecution here because of a fortuitous series of events which placed them at the scene after the acquisition of the agent's information.

There is no question about the continuing nature of the plot nor is there reasonable doubt that Wilshire was a part thereof. And we believe the ticklish problem of pre-merger knowledge must be decided against Wilshire on the facts. Although appellant claims to have unwittingly bought into an on-going conspiracy and for that reason it ought to be excused, the totality of the evidence supports the conclusion that Wilshire had ample opportunity to detect and reject the illegal practices. This is not a case where a company was purchased without chance for scrutinizing observation prior to assumption of control.

*Id.* at 973-74.

Of course, motive and opportunity remain relevant considerations in determining if scienter has been adequately alleged. Bank America had very strong economic motives to employ acts and contrivances to deceive and participate in the fraudulent scheme or course of business. For instance, the proceeds of Enron's securities offerings underwritten by Bank America or other investment banks were utilized to repay Enron's existing commercial paper and bank indebtedness, including indebtedness to Bank America. And throughout the Class Period, Bank America was pocketing millions of dollars a year in interest payments, syndication fees and investment banking fees by participating in the Enron scheme **and huge returns on its secret investment in LJM2** – returns created by the looting of Enron via the very manipulative or deceptive acts and contrived transactions between Enron and LJM2 entities which Bank America was financing to defraud and stood to **continue** to collect these huge amounts going forward, so long as it helped perpetuate the Enron Ponzi scheme, ¶780.

Bank America was willing to engage and participate in the fraudulent scheme and course of business because its participation created enormous profits **for Bank America as long as the Enron scheme continued in operation** – something that Bank America was in a unique position to cause. While Bank America was lending hundreds of millions to Enron or had committed to lend hundreds of millions to Enron, it was limiting its own risk in this regard, as it knew that so long as Enron

maintained its coveted investment-grade credit rating and continued to report strong earnings and credibly forecast strong ongoing revenue and profit growth, ***Enron's access to the capital markets would continue to enable Enron to raise hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars of fresh capital from public investors which would be used to repay or reduce Enron's commercial paper debt and the loans from Bank America to Enron so that the scheme could continue.*** ¶1780.

No one had a greater motive than those who were secretly looting Enron, *i.e.*, Fastow and Enron's banks and bankers, to deceive investors as to the true state of Enron's financial condition and business prospects because that deceit was central to preserving Enron's access to public capital markets and keeping Enron's stock price inflated because that inflated stock price was the key supporting non-arm's-length fraudulent LJM transactions with SPEs that were enriching the banks and bankers. The involvement of Bank America in LJM2 was, bluntly put, a reward – a payoff – for its participation in the fraudulent scheme and one that they would continue to profit ***from as long as the Enron Ponzi scheme could be continued*** – generating huge returns for them as secret private equity investors in LJM2 ***which returns were only possible because the transactions that were being constantly entered into with Enron were non-arm's-length and fraudulent – generating bogus profits for Enron while hiding debt and at the same time generating excessive returns for LJM2 with Fastow, Enron's CFO, operating the levers on both sides of all deals.***

***Simply put, Bank America which was involved in LJM2, was engaged in looting Enron for its own personal profit.*** This gave them a tremendous motive to keep Enron afloat and its stock price inflated so that Enron could consistently go back, with their help, to the capital markets to raise capital to keep the Enron Ponzi scheme going. While the banks may now whine about the losses they claim to have suffered when the Enron Ponzi scheme collapsed, they were secretly rubbing their hands in glee during the years that the scheme succeeded and Enron was being looted while being propped up with public money which was flowing into their dirty hands and then their own deep pockets. ***And the longer Enron could be propped up and the Ponzi scheme continue, the longer Bank America could continue to pocket these huge returns*** from such transactions.

Then add to this mix the huge investment banking fees, interest charges, lending commitment fees, etc., Bank America was extracting from Enron by helping to keep the Ponzi scheme going,

either lending money to Enron to liquify Enron or by raising money from the public to liquify Enron, and then using money raised from public investors to repay itself or other banks. ***These were huge securities offerings*** – \$250 million in notes sold in 9/98; \$870 million raised from the sale of common stock in 2/99; \$370 million raised for Enron via the Azurix IPO in 6/99; \$540 million raised via the sale of Enron Oil & Gas shares in 7/99; \$222 million raised for Enron via the sale of notes in 8/99; \$500 million raised via the sale of 8.375% notes in 5/00; and \$1.9 billion raised from the sale of 0% convertible notes in 2/01. While the investment banking fees to be gained in an isolated securities offering by an investment bank which does not have an ongoing relationship with the issuer may not, in and of itself, create sufficient weight to show a motive to defraud – surely the size and the continuity of the investment banking fees here, especially when combined with the fees being obtained from the bank's commercial activities in the context of the bank's secret involvement in the LJM2 partnership must be given great weight vis-à-vis motive. After all, a complaint is to be construed in its entirety and the inferences are to be drawn in favor of the plaintiff.

Bank America claims that it lost money at the end of the day when the Ponzi scheme collapsed. But this argument actually cuts against it. Like a gambler at the craps table who has a long run of good luck, but keeps doubling-up and ends up with a huge amount of chips at work on the table when he finally rolls a seven, Bank America did very, very well for itself and its top executives as long as the run of good luck continued, *i.e.*, the Enron house of cards stood. But, they paid the price when seven came up. In fact, as the financial exposure of the banks to Enron increased as the scheme progressed – ***it only increased the motive of the banks, like Bank America, to keep Enron looking good and keep its stock price up so that its increasingly fragile financial structure would not collapse and so that Enron would continue to have access, with the help of the banks, to the capital markets to raise monies to pay back Enron's debts to the bank.***

At the end of the day, the scienter allegations against the banks in this complaint are uniquely strong in part because of the unique circumstances of this case. The banks named as defendants here chose to vastly expand types of business they did with Enron and types of commercial transactions they engaged in with Enron. In so doing, they entangled themselves in the affairs of the company that was committing the largest and worst securities fraud in the history of the United States. The

banks chose to facilitate and participate in that fraud – and to make false and misleading statements because it gave them – the banks and their top executives – the opportunity to reap huge profits. Having top bank executives and banks secretly invest millions of dollars in partnerships that engage in non-arm's-length fraudulent transactions with a public company to loot it, while creating hundreds of millions of dollars of phony profits and hiding billions of dollars of debt, while the banks were secretly engaging in other bogus transactions with the public company, further artificially boosting its reported earnings and hiding additional billions of dollars of debt and all the while issuing glowing analysts' reports praising the skill and integrity of the company's management, the tremendous successes of its core businesses, the success of its risk management and hedging techniques, and its wonderful future business and earnings prospects, is simply not banking business as usual. Or if it is, this country and our financial markets are in terrible trouble.

### VIII. CONCLUSION

In fact, as this Court knows, a key Arthur Andersen partner condemned the LJM2 partnership – in an e-mail once destroyed, but later resurrected. According to *The New York Times*, 5/10/02 "Andersen Lawyer Accuses Prosecutors of Misconduct":

[I]n one e-mail message written by Mr. Neuhausen [an Arthur Andersen partner] ... he lambasted Enron's plan to allow its chief financial officer to run a partnership that did business with the company, calling it terrible and asking, "***Why would any director sign off on such a scheme?***"

Indeed. And how could any sophisticated bank have gone in on such a "scheme"? The answer to Neuhausen's question is greed and arrogance – qualities that were present in abundance in Enron's insiders, its outside directors, its lawyers, accountants and banks.

On 2/26/02, *Dow Jones News Service* ran a story headlined: "***Next Stop On Enron Express: Wall Street.***" It noted the "***long gravy train of stock and bond offerings that Enron sent the Streets' way over the past decade.***" It also discussed:

[T]he now-infamous LJM2 partnership set up by Enron's former chief financial officer, Andrew Fastow. It's been well-documented now ... that high-powered finance firms such as CS First Boston, Merrill Lynch, JP Morgan and Bank America, were lured into the LJM2 partnership by the promise of potentially rich returns and the chance to get an inside peek into Enron's mysterious deals.

\* \* \*

*... Wall Street – which got rich touting Enron – is still acting as if it has nothing to answer for in the Enron mess.*

So far, most Wall Street institutions have said little about the Enron debacle, issuing either blanket "no comments," or denying any responsibility for the company's collapse. CS First Boston, which underwrote more than \$4.5 billion in Enron stock and bond offerings – roughly 20% of Enron's total underwriting work since 1990 ... has refused to say anything whatsoever. Merrill Lynch, which lined up investors for Fastow's LJM2 partnership and underwrote more than \$4 billion in stock and bond offerings for Enron, has been a bit more talkative – *but only to say it's utterly blameless.*

\* \* \*

Between them, Citigroup and J.P. Morgan served as lead manager on more than \$20 billion in syndicated bank loans to Enron over the past decade, with Bank America also underwriting more than \$4 billion in stock and bond offerings for the company ....

... Wall Street has plenty of explaining to do. Jonathan Kord Lagemann, a securities lawyer and former general counsel for a brokerage firm, says the Enron affair exposes the *"enormous conflict of interest" inherent in these firms' efforts to be three things at one time: underwriter, corporate analyst and stock seller.* To start, there's the obvious issue of whether pressure from their firms caused 10 of the 14 research analysts who followed Enron to keep recommending the stock to investors, even as the company was racing toward bankruptcy. A related issue is whether the analysts knew or should've known just how dire the situation was at Enron, since many of them work for firms that were invested in the partnerships that played a critical role in Enron's off-balance-sheet transactions.

¶645. The blatant self-dealing by Enron's banks has not gone unnoticed:

Many institutional investors declined to buy into LJM2 because of Fastow's conflict of interest. But some of the world's biggest institutions took a piece. Among them *were CitiGroup, Credit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, and Lehman Brothers.*

*What were they thinking? Much of the world's financial community turned out to be willing enablers of Enron. No wonder "Wall Street credibility" is fast becoming an oxymoron. Investors are angry ....*


*Business Week, 2/11/02 (¶648).*

The CC is not a blunderbuss long winded journey to nowhere. It is a thoroughly investigated detailed blueprint of Bank America's culpability which states a claim upon which relief can be granted under accepted legal theories.

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